Introduction
In the aftermath of victorious revolutions, the subject of “third sector” civil society has become more important for modern societies than ever. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) serve as fulcrums of freedom and prosperity, and as a path of opportunity for the aspirations of communities emerging from tyranny and oppression. Civil society forms an essential bridge between political transformation and democratic transition, as well as between the state and its citizens, grounding national development in principles that align with broader societal needs—an especially relevant dynamic in the evolving Syrian context.
The future of Syria after Assad’s fall presents fertile ground for examining the evolution and transformation of the third sector. Before the 1963 Baathist coup and the Assad family’s rise to power, Syria was a leader in civil and civic participation. The 2011 Syrian revolution provided a pivotal opportunity for civil actors to re-engage in public life, making it a turning point for Syrian civil society organisations to redefine their identity and role – and now particularly in a post-Assad era.
This paper explores the historical origins of Syrian civil society organisations, examining their legal and constitutional foundations. It analyses how the regimes of both Assad Sr. and Assad Jr. controlled and manipulated these organisations. Additionally, it investigates how civil society resumed its role during the Syrian revolution, highlighting key lessons learned from this period, and the transformations and challenges these organisations now face in a post-Assad era. Finally, the paper offers recommendations for civil society actors and the future Syrian government to support the development and sustainability of Syrian civil society.
- The Legal and Constitutional Framework of Syrian Organisations: A Historical Overview
Syria has experienced various phases in the development of civil associations and non-governmental organisations, driven by varying desires to regulate society through constitutional and legal frameworks. The significant activity and influence of these organisations have contributed to an organized civil society that has existed continuously for over a century.
The development of Syrian civil society began as central authority weakened during the late Ottoman era, coinciding with the rise of national associations – particularly Turkish and Arab ones. A key turning point came in 1909 with the adoption of the Second Basic Law, which formally regulated associations. During the short-lived Syrian Kingdom, Article 16 of the Syrian Constitution upheld the right to establish associations, though many Ottoman-era regulations, including the Associations Law, remained in effect to regulate their work. Under the French mandate, additional regulatory measures were introduced to tighten control over the Syrian national movement. Nevertheless, the 1930 Constitution of the Syrian Republic reaffirmed the right to form and establish associations.
After Syria gained independence, the 1950 Constitution enshrined the right of Syrians to form and join associations. The first dedicated law for Syrian associations, Law No. 47 of 1953, abolished Ottoman-era regulations and French mandate decrees. This law was notably more liberal and protective of public freedoms, aiming to regulate and support Syrian civil society. In 1958, during the Syrian-Egyptian Union, the government introduced Law No. 93, the second major law governing Syrian associations, which has remained in effect up to the present day[1].
The Ba’ath era ushered in a period of increased state control over civil society, particularly following the enactment of the 1962 Emergency Law. which significantly increased state control over civil society as a whole. Amendments to Legislative Decree No. 224 of 1969 were made as Hafez al-Assad consolidated power and imposed some of the most restrictive measures on Syrian associations and organisations. This control persisted until the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, when Bashar al-Assad formally abolished the Emergency Law and introduced new constitutional provisions, such as Articles 10 and 45, ostensibly addressing civil society demands—though these reforms remained largely cosmetic.
Figure 1: Development of the Constitutional and Legal Status of Syrian Associations
During the Syrian revolution, the opposition worked to expand civil society spaces by implementing various regulatory measures. The Interim Government, for instance, issued Decisions 10 and 11 in 2021 to regulate associations[2], while the Salvation Government also introduced general directives to oversee the operations of humanitarian organisations.
The most recent phase in regulating associations and organisations began in early 2025, when the Syrian caretaker government issued a decision to organize Syrian associations, marking a new chapter in their relationship with the government[3].
- Syria and the Experience of Organisations Under Assad Sr. & Assad Jr.
From 1970 until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria experienced three distinct stages under the Assad rule; the Hafez era, the Bashar era, and thirdly the Syrian revolution. A fourth stage, a post-Assad period, should now be considered[4].
Under Hafez al-Assad, civil society organisations faced increasing restrictions after the comparative freedom of the post-independence period. The regime used the state of emergency as a de facto replacement for the Associations Law, banning various civil organisations and halting their activities, as seen in the case of the Syrian Scouts. Strict security oversight was imposed, requiring approval for the formation of organisations, while amendments allowed associations to be dissolved by security decree.
To further suppress independent civil activity, the regime established alternative, state-aligned organisations, such as the National organisation for Syrian Childhood, affiliated with the Baath Party. These policies effectively erased the identity of civil society, replacing it with a regime-controlled structure that served as a tool to stifle opposition. The number of associations dropped to 513, down from over 596 between 1946 and 1963, reflecting the extent of political repression and the regime’s efforts to subjugate the “third sector” of civil society.
Before the 2011 revolution, Bashar al-Assad’s rule saw limited openness, in parallel with a cautious engagement with the political opposition. In late 2000, the Civil Society Revival Committees were encouraged through a statement signed by 99 intellectuals and activists. By early 2001, these efforts escalated into demands for abolishing the state of emergency, expanding freedoms, and enacting laws to regulate political parties, associations, clubs, and NGOs—though always within the framework of state control. The Ministry of Social Affairs imposed strict regulations on forming organisations, requiring prior permission at least 15 days in advance, along with a list of attendees and key figures.
Meanwhile, the regime launched a security and media crackdown, with figures such as former Minister of Information Adnan Omran dismissing Syrian civil society as “neo-colonialism.” Simultaneously, the government facilitated the creation of state-controlled organisations, often referred to as government-organized non-governmental organisations (GO-NGOs), effectively blurring the line between civil society and the regime. A prime example was the Syrian Trust for Development, founded in 2001 by Asma al-Assad, who sought to present herself as a supporter of ‘community development’ but ultimately functioned as a façade for state-controlled civil society.
During this period, the Assad regime adopted a “social market economy” policy, allowing for limited economic openness and engagement with select Syrian business networks. This included negotiations with the Aga Khan Development Network, which resumed operations in Syria in 2001, primarily to support the Ismaili community, and to partner with Syrian businessmen in Europe, such as the Said organisation[5]. As a result, the number of organisations grew to approximately 1,486—significantly higher than existed under Hafez al-Assad, which was fewer than 500.
However, this expansion did not signal a genuine shift in the culture of Syrian civil society. Most of these organisations remained confined to the service sector, operating under state oversight rather than fostering independent civic engagement. The regime’s tolerance for this limited openness ended swiftly after the Damascus Spring, culminating in a renewed crackdown that intensified following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011[6].
During the third period, Syria experienced a significant increase in the formation of civil society organisations in opposition-controlled areas. Despite challenging security conditions and the influx of international organisations—some of which entered Syria for the first time—hundreds of local organisations were established. Most of these focused on humanitarian work, while also addressing the legal aspects of the Syrian crisis. The formation of these organisations concentrated in rural areas of Aleppo and Idlib, where there was relative stability under the control of military forces[7].
During this period, the regime strived to prevent the formation of independent organisations in areas under its control, allowing only those under strict security supervision. It established associations loyal to the regime, directing them to serve its political and economic agenda centered on domination and control. Between 2011 and 2021, over 40 organisations affiliated with Assad’s networks were formed out of 83 total associations operating in Aleppo’ regime-controlled areas. One example is Hand in Hand, which supported the regime’s army. These organisations were a strategic tool for the regime to maintain complete control over civil society[8].
In contrast, opposition-controlled areas offered greater freedoms, allowing civil society to take root, though they could not yet evolve into a stable force. Despite huge challenges and instability, the organisations formed in these areas played a crucial role in reshaping the foundations of modern Syrian civil society. This shift has the potential to transform Syria’s future, working to heal the Assad regime’s successful fragmentation of the political, civil, and military spheres.
In the period after the Syrian revolution, Syrian organisations have operated under various legal frameworks, depending on their location. In formerly regime-controlled and temporary areas, they adhered to the Syrian Associations Law No. 93 of 1958. In the temporary areas, some organisations followed the Turkish Associations Law No. 5253, enacted in 2004. Others operated based on directives from the Salvation Government in Idlib. This fragmented legal landscape has made the work of Syrian organisations during the revolution highly complex.
- organisations in Opposition-Controlled Areas During the Syrian Revolution
The Reality and Lessons Learned
Organisations operating in opposition-controlled areas, particularly those under the Interim Government and the Salvation Government, succeeded in developing a dynamic and modern civil society model through individual and collective initiatives. These organisations received various forms of support, most notably through the creation of international funding mechanisms. During the revolution, international organisations, particularly those linked to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), saw a significant growth in their activities. OCHA expanded its programs, especially in Turkey, to include the Syrian population, following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2165 in 2014 and its subsequent extensions and amendments.
International support for organisations became more structured during the Brussels Conference, held for the first time in 2017 to mobilize international aid for groups operating in Syria. In addition, organisations also relied on personal donations from Syrian businessmen and public contributions from communities, particularly in the United States. Initially, the work of Syrian organisations was largely concentrated in Turkey, which saw two main forms of organizing Syrian associations:
1) Syrian associations treated as Turkish associations, often for bureaucratic or security reasons, which helped facilitate the operational mechanisms of Syrian organisations in Turkey.
2) International organisations already operating in Turkey expanded their programs to include Syrians or opened new branches in the country.
As of September 2024, the latest statistics show that there are 100,943 local civil society organisations in Turkey. This figure includes Syrian organisations working in humanitarian affairs, though their exact number cannot be determined, as they operate under the Turkish Associations Law. Additionally, the Turkish Ministry of Interior reports that there are 129 foreign organisations operating in Turkey, including fully licensed Syrian organisations or foreign organisations with programs serving Syrians.
These organisations have experienced varying levels of activity, influenced by international agendas and priorities related to Syria. The years 2015-2019 saw a period of growth and prosperity, while the role of the organisations began to decline with the start of the “early recovery” phase following the United Nations humanitarian assistance resolution, Resolution 2585, in 2021. Activity picked up again during the earthquake disaster, continuing through the end of 2023. However, during this period, the organisations faced their worst financial challenges due to decreased international attention on the Syrian issue, as focus shifted to other concerns, such as the Ukrainian conflict and the Palestinian crisis during the invasion of Gaza[9].
During their operations, the organisations encountered a range of responses from wider society, from acceptance to rejection. They have worked in an environment where legal frameworks were weak, making it challenging to rely on established regulations for their various activities. Despite efforts by the Interim and Salvation governments to develop legal frameworks—such as leveraging the Syrian Associations Law in the Interim-controlled areas or issuing special decisions in the Salvation model—the central authority and Syrian opposition bodies in the Interim-controlled areas remained weak. There was a lack of a clear organisational hierarchy, and mandatory controls were insufficient. Although international organisations monitored local organisations, the role of the Interim Government was limited and less able to regulate, while the Salvation Government model was more disciplined but more restrictive and less permissive.
This environment also enabled organisations to take on responsibilities typically handled by the state, such as housebuilding or development of transport infrastructure. As a result, these organisations have had to adapt to a challenging and high-pressure context, working in an environment of constant instability and tension. This phenomenon makes the transition from revolutionary activity to state-building one of the most difficult challenges, both subjectively and objectively—not just on the military front, but also within the civilian framework[10].
Figure 2: Strengths and Weaknesses of Organisations in Opposition-Controlled Areas
The work of organisations has been overly focused on the humanitarian sector, often constrained by internal challenges and political shifts. International and regional trends heavily influenced the nature of projects, whether in emergency response or early recovery efforts. The absence of a clear “programmatic identity” for the organisations’ work further hindered the development of a strong civil identity. The presence of a factional military environment also increased military interference in organisational activities, imposing security restrictions. Additionally, some organisations, in their pursuit of advantages from factions to ease their work, jeopardised their independence[11].
On the other hand, some organisations were careful not to take any political stance regarding the Assad regime during their humanitarian work, which led to limited societal acceptance. In contrast, other organisations adopted a national political identity and focused more on national work, driven by the unique nature of the Syrian context. This approach, which resonated with the predominantly national sentiment and the absence of established political and civil societies, earned them broader social acceptance – as seen most notably in the case of the Syrian Civil Defense, known as the white helmets[12].
As a result, the absence of natural state institutions or their features in opposition-held areas created a vacuum and overlap, allowing the military community to intervene in the work of organisations. Given their dominance, military factions were able to impose a form of “instrumental control” over the Syrian issue, especially amid the large number of factions and their military and political agendas.
The relationship between the ruling authorities and civil society in Idlib was largely characterized by a rentier policy, in which control and possession were central, particularly with the Salvation Government holding authority over key civil decision-making. The Salvation Government allowed some limited flexibility to ensure that humanitarian organisations could provide support to the local community. In contrast, the interim government’s central authority was weak, and its role diminished due to various factors, including the nature of limited control and chaos. This created ample space for disorder and instability.
The types of civil organisations operating in the region were as follows:
– Organisations licensed in Turkey and operating in the rescue and temporary areas.
– Organisations licensed by the Salvation Government and operating locally.
– Unlicensed organisations coordinating with the Interim Government.
– International organisations operating in the areas controlled by both governments.
In light of these myriad challenges, the fall of the regime has marked a huge revival of Syrian civil society, restoring its activity and vitality, as well as national decision-making. This came after the civil society had suffered from weak financial support, politicization, and reliance on international and regional agendas. Additionally, the institutions themselves faced a decline in their ability to provide jobs, following a large-scale layoff in 2024 due to reduced international support. This posed a significant threat to the stability of Syrian civil society.
- Transformations of Civil Society After the Fall of the Assad Regime
Repositioning and Adapting to Changes
The role of third-sector organizations has evolved in two key stages. The first stage began with the onset of the military operation that ultimately led to the fall of the Assad regime, while the second stage followed its collapse. Initially, the focus was on the city of Aleppo, where the opposition’s civil experiment took root in newly governed Syrian territories. This phase was crucial in shaping the broader approach to the Syrian situation.
Several organizations operated in Aleppo, providing rapid responses to meet public needs. Notably, they also played a key role in managing public discourse and coordinating relief efforts, offering reassurance to the population. Their activities, including aid distribution and the launch of public initiatives, had a particularly strong impact across Aleppo’s diverse communities.
Most of these initiatives were emergency-driven rather than programmatic. The widespread presence of organisations became one of the tactics used by the Military Operations Administration to control the city. Aleppo saw the arrival of organisations from Idlib, many aligned with the Salvation Government, such as the Emergency Response organisation, which conducted several campaigns in areas of Aleppo focusing on religious diversity. Additionally, volunteer teams unaffiliated with any authority, like the Syrian Civil Defense, played a key role in organizing the city.
The second phase began after the fall of the regime. The expansion of areas under control of the new authorities and the lack of sufficient personnel or policies made it hugely difficult to meet the minimum standards required to address the new Syrian reality. To maintain momentum and influence organisations focused on the capital, Damascus–leading to weak activity in other Syrian governorates and a decline in the role they had once played in Aleppo. In other governorates, the civil vacuum was filled by relying on existing local communities or forming new ones. For example, in Homs, the community launched a local initiative, the Civil Peace Group, to address this absence. Similarly, in Daraa, the expatriate community contributed materially to the efforts during the years of the Syrian revolution.
The opening of Syrian provinces to one another marked the beginning of both cooperation and competition between opposition organizations and the well-established entities in Damascus and Aleppo, as well as those operating in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib. This dynamic led to a new form of polarization, as opposition organizations sought to monopolize certain sectors—often at the expense of those operating in regime-controlled areas—under the principle of “revolutionary entitlement.” This was particularly evident in the actions of opposition-affiliated student, dental, and engineering unions, which aimed to replace those previously aligned with the Assad regime.
Several organisations operating in regime-controlled areas, which were not involved in supporting the regime, managed to adapt to the current situation and revive their activities. Examples include the Sanad Development organisation and the Junior Chamber International (JCI) Syria branch[13]. These organisations hosted figures who had opposed the regime and returned to Syria, incorporating them into various dialogue or training programs. Their initiatives were widely accepted by the local community, as these organisations have a broad audience within Syria.
Meanwhile, opposition organisations sought to reposition themselves in these new areas, either by competing with existing organisations or integrating with them, as seen with Madaniya. This paved the way for new organisations within Damascus to join its efforts. Madaniya, which played a significant role during the immediate fall of the regime, launched numerous meetings, dialogues, and a landmark press conference in which it declared its commitment to “transformation and democratic principles.” The organisation’s prominent role during this period led to notable achievements, such as the appointment of Ms. Hind Qabawat as one of the seven members of the National Dialogue Committee and meetings with key figures, including Syrian Foreign Minister Mr. Asaad al-Shaibani in Paris and President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus.
Youth organisations also sought to engage various figures in Damascus and Aleppo to address the needs of the local community, gain a better understanding of those needs, and expand their reach. The existing cadres were insufficient to achieve the necessary influence, particularly in these two cities.
The landscape of organisations operating in Syria after the regime’s fall can be categorized into five types based on the new reality:
– Organisations that operated in areas controlled by the Salvation Government and expanded, such as Emergency Response.
– Organisations that worked in the areas of the Interim Government and grew, such as the Local Councils Unit.
– Organisations affiliated with Assad, which operated in regime-controlled areas before the fall, like the Syrian Trust for Development.
– Organisations that did not support the regime but worked in its areas, later reformulating their stance on the revolution, such as the Sanad Development organisation.
– Organisations and initiatives that emerged after the regime’s fall, like We Are Back, Damascus, and Baqja.
NGOs have yet to extend their target activities to provinces and cities far from the centres of Aleppo and Damascus. However, more than a month and a half after the regime’s fall, some initiatives have begun to emerge. These include cultural events and art exhibitions, such as the Art Exhibition organized by the Khaizuran Cultural Forum and the Basmat Fan Association in Salamiyya. Additionally, the Amal Association for Juveniles in Salamiyya hosted an event honoring detainees who had been released from Assad’s prisons.
Figure 3: Democratic Environment Indicators for Organisational Work in the Future of Syria
There has been a rise in social initiatives aimed at restoring beauty to the streets of various Syrian governorates, cleaning streets and roads, painting shops with the flag of the Syrian revolution, providing relief support to local residents, and removing garbage. These efforts, which were widespread in opposition-controlled areas as part of a sense of national responsibility and belonging to Syria, have expanded and spread again after the fall of the regime. One notable example is the coordination with the Syrian government through the “We Are Back, Damascus” campaign, launched by the Syrian Civil Defence.
This campaign, involving around 37 institutions, volunteer teams, and 1,300 humanitarian workers, aimed to rehabilitate and decorate the streets of Damascus. The initiative also included youth-led campaigns to improve the appearance of cities, such as the restoration of the entrance to al-Hara in Daraa Governorate and the clean-up of Batarni Park in Latakia[14].
After the formation of the caretaker government, the Syrian Ministry of Social Affairs met with representatives from several Syrian organisations to reorganize civil society and begin establishing a cooperative and coordinated relationship. This initiative aimed to enhance transparency and build trust with organisations. The ministry informed the representatives of its intention to temporarily issue a new law for associations during this phase, and the organisations expressed their willingness to comply.
Table 1: Examples of Association Laws in Other Countries
The decision announced by the government in January 2025 introduced a set of conditions for regulating and licensing civil society organisations. This move reflects the Syrian state’s initial efforts to absorb the activities and influence of these organisations as a transitional measure, paving the way for a new phase in the relationship between the authorities and civil society—one distinct from the past. Government officials have repeatedly emphasized their commitment to broad freedoms, including the right to establish associations and the independence of the judiciary. On this particular point, lessons from other countries can inform a reassessment of Syria’s outdated Associations Law, which, despite amendments in 1969, continues to impose severe restrictions that hinder organisational work.
- The Future of Organisations After Assad’s Fall
Prospects and Strategies
Transitioning to a stable and developed Syrian civil society will require implementing key strategies that foster growth, development, and the ability to overcome current challenges. These strategies can be summarised as follows:
Reducing International Dependencies: Following the fall of the Assad regime, organisations face the challenge of trying to maintain international funding they received during the revolution while adapting to changing international policies and coordinating with the new government. These shifts could lead to a decline in the role of civil society organisations. Several international bodies have already ceased operations following US President Donald Trump’s decision to reassess international support programs such as PRM and BHA[15]. Additionally, continued reliance on Syrian national funding limits organisations’ ability to meet the growing needs, particularly as they expand into governorates with vast geographic areas requiring support and response efforts[16].
Licensing and Institutional Transformation: The transition from group-based initiatives to formalised institutions presents structural challenges, particularly in accreditation and licensing procedures. Many organisations may struggle to comply with these requirements, though some have successfully obtained licenses, such as the “Shafak organisation”.
Participatory Development: The stance of organisations toward the Syrian revolution has played a significant role in deepening social divisions, particularly between those operating in revolutionary areas and those in regime-controlled zones before Assad’s fall. This divide weakens cooperation between civil organisations, as those that supported the revolution often claim a “revolutionary entitlement” – leading to tensions with others.
Community Acceptance: Re-evaluating the priorities of the Syrian community will be one of the biggest challenges for civil society, due to their isolation from the community in most major Syrian governorates for over 14 years. The situation in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib is vastly different from that in Damascus and Aleppo, which will require considerable time and effort to rebuild trust within the community. Organisations will need to encourage renewed engagement in civil and social issues by restoring and expanding social capital and broadening their scope of work.
Civil Peace: Promoting civil peace initiatives is one of the most important current sectors, with organisations bearing significant responsibility due to the reactionary culture left behind by the regime in Syria. This culture has reached a point where not only cities, governorates, and communities require dialogue and mediation, but even small neighborhoods. Success in building civil peace between citizens on a grass-roots level is perhaps the most crucial step toward establishing a healthy, free civil society and a strong state that aligns with the necessary freedoms. Achieving this exchange of roles and responsibilities can greatly contribute to building national integration.
Recommendations and Suggestions
- Legalize organisations and associations by simplifying establishment and registration procedures. This can be achieved by reviewing the licensing system and transitioning to a “controlled notification” system, which would improve the operational environment for organisations, enhance their freedom to work, and reduce the legal burdens they face[17].
- End the siege on organisations and eliminate the security interference that prevailed during the Assad era, including the practice of dissolving organisations by the security apparatus. Additionally, it is crucial to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and ensure that it does not interfere in the administrative affairs of organisations.
- Strengthen independence and civil liberties by ending the control over administrative and governance matters that characterized the Assad era. The role of the Ministry of Social Affairs should be limited to ensuring financial and administrative oversight, aligning with the principles of transparency and openness that underpin the concept of civil associations.
- Ensure civil rights and international alignment by creating a legal environment that allows freedom of funding, which is essential for the development of society and civil society. While oversight of funding sources is necessary, it is important that this oversight be conducted by independent judicial committees tasked with ensuring transparency, safeguarding freedoms, and ensuring accountability.
- Ensure Syria’s national sovereignty by regulating and monitoring foreign funding in a way that aligns with the country’s current circumstances, while respecting public freedoms. This approach should prevent any security or sovereignty breaches that could compromise Syria’s national interests.
- Harmonize the Associations Law with international standards, particularly Article 22 of the 1948 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which positions Syria among the countries historically committed to human rights. This alignment would provide Syria with significant opportunities to attract international organisations.
Conclusion
During the revolution, civil society organisations in Syria operated in diverse environments shaped by military and security control. In opposition-controlled areas, the state model was absent, while in Assad-controlled areas, organisations and independent civil identities were suppressed by absolute tyranny.
The significance of the post-Assad phase lies in its potential to reshape and redefine civil society. It marks a pivotal moment where the integration of the state’s role with the space for organisations, in the context of freedoms, becomes central. Implementing new legal, constitutional, and societal frameworks for Syrian civil society organisations would reinvigorate the whole of society, contributing to the rapid growth of the state.
The existence of civil groups outside the framework of the state is unacceptable, just as a state that controls civil society would undermine any possibility of building a society based on freedoms and democracy. Therefore, balancing the roles of the state and civil society in Syria’s new phase is crucial—it will shape the future of the country. This process is not the sole responsibility of the Syrian government; rather, organisations share responsibility, each playing its part in implementing the changes needed.
Defining civil institutions in response to the needs and desires of Syrian society, and ensuring they represent all citizens, will help build organisations and associations that are impactful, well-established, and widely accepted within Syrian communities. This requires adopting a “bottom-up” approach, one that is more attuned to the local community than to political structures. In other words, forming civil society should not follow the top-down model of the previous regime but should instead reflect the grassroots initiatives seen in opposition areas, which were able to lay the foundations for a modern civil society.
This transformation should not be disconnected from the structures of the new state but should work in coordination with them, ensuring that interventions are complementary and collaborative, rather than controlling or directive. Ultimately, this approach would meet the urgent needs of Syria’s new paradigm by fostering a civil culture that understands local communities and emphasizes both legitimacy and freedom.
Cited Works
Arabic Sources:
Farzat, Muhammad Harb. Party Life in Syria: A Historical Study of the Emergence and Development of Political Parties, 1908-1955 (1955), pp. 246-280.
“Rebuilding Syrian Civil Society after Change,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, July 5, 2021. https://cutt.ly/hrq2aIAy.
Zabad, Yaman. “Civil Sector Response to the Earthquake in Regime Areas,” 21 March 2023, Omran Center for Studies. https://cutt.ly/vrq2gmcX.
English Sources:
Awad, Ziad. “Non-Governmental organisations in Aleppo: Under Regime Control and at its Service,” Middle East Directions, 14 June 2022. https://cutt.ly/Orq0HSLI.
Elvira, L. Ruiz de, & Zintl, T. (2023). The End of the Ba’athist Social Contract in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria: Reading Sociopolitical Transformations through Charities and Broader Benevolent Activism. HAL Archives. https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03963418v1.
Halimeh, Housam. “Civil Society organisations’ Role in Early Recovery in Northwest Syria,” DergiPark Akademik, 22 October 2022: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/irmrs/issue/73124/1130383.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. State and Civil Society in Syria, The Middle East Institute (MEI). https://cutt.ly/lrq0GfAE.
“How the Syrian Regime Uses the Humanitarian organisations SARC and STD to Steal Humanitarian Aid.” Syrian Network for Human Rights, 28-Dec-2023. https://cutt.ly/Hrq0HdK0.
Khalaf, Rana. “Governance Without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State Building During Conflict,” Syria Studies, 21 September 2015: https://cutt.ly/hrq0Jnur.
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[1] Muhammad Harb Farzat, Party Life in Syria: A Historical Study of the Emergence and Development of Political Parties, 1908-1955 (1955), pp. 246-280.
[2] Resolution No. 10, issued on August 4, 2020, consists of eight articles outlining the mechanisms and conditions for registering organisations and associations, the required official documents, and internal regulations.
[3] The decision outlined general procedures, including the submission of credentials, internal regulations, and the establishment of a clear headquarters.
[4] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, State and Civil Society in Syria, The Middle East Institute (MEI): https://cutt.ly/lrq0GfAE
[5] A charity founded by Syrian businessman Wafiq Saïd in Britain.
[6] L. Ruiz de Elvira & T. Zintl (2023), The End of the Ba’athist Social Contract in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria: Reading Sociopolitical Transformations through Charities and Broader Benevolent Activism. HAL Archives. https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03963418v1
[7] Syrian Network for Human Rights, How The Syrian Regime Uses the Humanitarian organisations SARC and STD to Steal Humanitarian Aid, 28-Dec-2023: https://cutt.ly/Hrq0HdK0
[8] Ziad Awad, Non-Governmental organisations in Aleppo: Under Regime Control and at its Service, 14 June 2022, https://cutt.ly/Orq0HSLI
[9] Yaman Zabad, Civil Sector Response to the Earthquake in Regime Areas, 21 March 2023, Omran Center for Studies: https://cutt.ly/vrq2gmcX
[10] Housam Halimeh, Civil Society organisations’ role in Early recovery in Northwest Syria, 22 October 2022: https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/irmrs/issue/73124/1130383
[11] Rebuilding Syrian Civil Society after Change, Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, 5 July 2021, https://cutt.ly/hrq2aIAy
[12] Rana Khalaf, Governance without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State-Building during Conflict, 21 September 2015: https://cutt.ly/hrq0Jnur
[13] Both organisations are prominent youth organisations in Syria. The Sanad Development organisation, formed in 2012, is a local entity, while the Junior Chamber International (JCI) is an American organisation focused on supporting youth, with branches worldwide. Its most notable founder was U.S. President John F. Kennedy.
[14] Alessandra Bajec, The vital role of civil society in building a post-Assad Syria, The New Arab, 5 February 2025: https://cutt.ly/srq0JZZV
[15] U.S. Department of State, Strengthening Support for Syria: Factsheet, 2 February 2024: https://shorturl.at/iYivy
[16] Marina Dunbar, Nearly $500m of food aid at risk of spoilage after Trump USAID cuts, The Guardian, 10 February 2025: https://cutt.ly/Arq0CEPv
[17] State Repression of Human Rights Activism in Syria, Human Rights Watch, 2007: https://cutt.ly/8rq0J5TM
