Harmoon Centre Monitoring Report, May 2025

Social, Political, Administrative and Security Monitoring Across Syria: May 2025

Contents

Administration and Governance…………………………………………………………………p. 2

Politics and Society……………………………………………………………………………….p. 3

Military and Security………………………………………………………………………………p. 5

Economics and Services……………………………………………………………..…………..p.12

Administration and Governance

1. Ministerial decisions and organisation

The reality on the ground for governance and administration has continued to improve throughout May. The Transitional Justice Council has been created, and was initially directed to prepare internal governing principles and general working policies. The body will be tasked with discovering and establishing the most serious crimes committed by the former regime. Elsewhere in government, ministerial appointments continued alongside the selection of assistant ministers at the behest of the President of the transitional government, who also appointed an official spokesperson for the Interior Ministry.

All government departments continued their administrative restructuring. The Education Ministry issued several decisions regarding universities officially recognised by the state, and outlawed the use of hate speech on campus under threat of criminal liability. The Ministry’s disregard for Syrian students in Türkiye and further afield, who make up a considerable number of the country’s student body, led to widespread outrage, especially given the lack of recognition for educational certificates awarded in Türkiye. In a significant move by the Ministry of Energy, workers from the oil sector who had been laid off during the revolution were reinstated to their posts.
Central and Departmental Appointments

3. The Role of Unions and Local Society

At the civic level, intersecting with governmental administration, union branches are working to re-establish themselves and create new chapters in different regions to improve their scope of work. In the pharmaceutical union in Hama, for example, the central union formed a new board of directors as a new branch in May.

At the level of shared civic participation between regional administrations and grassroots organisations, several provinces have undertaken programmes to repair paths, public gardens and street lights – most significantly Aleppo, Latakia and Damascus. This cooperation remains a subject of debate, as many Syrians desire this work to be undertaken solely by the state – and allow civil society to work in other directions.

Diagram of Governance Actions Throughout the Month

This graphic illustrates the high level of central governmental decision-making, without a clear impact coordinated on the ground. It is clear that decisions must be made in a broader, more focussed and better organised fashion. Appointments continue to be made according to a combination of loyalty and competence – but with the former often favoured over the latter. There is a sustained lack of transparency over the appointments process, although the level of cooperation and transparency with civil society organisations has improved. The most striking observation has been the contrast in effectiveness between different parts of government – which carries with it both positive and negative indicators.

Politics and Society

1. Political and Civic Activity in Southern Syria

The relative calm in southern Syria and the outskirts of Damascus during the month of May is a significant reflection on the work of social and political movements in the region. Organisations and foundations have returned to work, most notably in Daraa and as-Sweidaa – after being unable to work during April. The ‘Media Code of Practice for Platforms in Southern Syria’ was also signed and implemented by several media platforms in both Daraa and as-Sweidaa, aimed at forming a unified national discourse after the troubling events in Jamarana, Ashrafiya Sahnaya and as-Sweida the previous month. A forum lasting 5 days was also held in Daraa entitled “Bridging the Gap in Dara’s Health Services”, in cooperation with local parties and the health authority of the province.

At the level of public freedoms and political activity, no general adverse behaviour has been monitored – one of the key commitments from the new authorities after the fall of the Assad regime. Political and social seminars, lectures and meetings continued to take place, organised across the political and intellectual spectrum. The Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies, for example, established a seminar in Homs to improve public information verification and the use of tools to distinguish between truth and false information.

2. The Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees

During May, significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons returned to Syria when compared to the previous month. The increase may be attributed to the partial return of electricity to certain regions, alongside Syria’s improvements on the world stage – not least because of the U.S. decision to lift sanctions on Syria, a move which showed people the possibility of genuine improvements to living conditions in the near future. The rise could also be caused by the end of the educational term for schools and universities across Syria and in neighbouring countries. This may have caused an uptick in returns within Syria – as in the case of families returning from the countryside of southern Aleppo and eastern Hama, heading for Saraqib and Kafr Nabel.

According to the Idlib technical Services Directorate, grassroots organisations have contributed meaningfully to the increase in the number of returners. As part of the “Returning in Dignity” project, launched by several organisations in Homs, approximately 60 families who had fled to the north of Syria before the fall of Assad had returned. The same can be said of southern Syria, where many have returned from Jordan to the city of Daraa. The monitoring of such returns is limited to data collected by non-governmental organisations, as no official monthly figures are currently published.

To conclude, the return to work of civil society organisations in southern Syria points to the ability to work flexibility amid changing security scenarios, whilst protecting their relative spheres of operation. The same applies to political and intellectual life – and all the while the return of Syria’s displaced people continues to increase after pausing in March and April – especially after US and European security warnings and the violent events on Syria’s coast.

This indicates the importance of Syria’s image internationally – especially the perception of her economic potential in the light of sanctions relief, and the importance of governmental service provision. At root, the imminent large-scale return of Syrians to their homelands depends on a trilogy of factors; external political developments, internal security, and governmental services.

Security and Military

1. Damascus City and Countryside

The entire Damascus province witnessed disturbances throughout May which all pointed to a lack of security stability, despite efforts by the new authorities to contain the situation.

Activities were focussed on rural Damascus, especially the towns of al-Hamah, Qudsaya and Jaramana. General Security forces undertook operations to disrupt drug-smuggling operations and arms depots in sporadic moments during the month. The operations resulted in arrests and the seizure of illicit items. In one of the most significant raids, force members were met by armed resistance including the use of RPG grenades, from a cell in Jaramana. One official was killed while several others were injured – reflecting a rise in the severity of the threats faced during such operations. In western Ghouta during the second week of May, anti-terrorism forces smashed a sleeper cell to the so-called Islamic State group and seized medium-level arms, suicide vests and missiles. Pockets of dangerous resistance clearly still exist and are able to operate close to the capital.

The area of Masaken al-Dimas also witnessed an attack on a security patrol using a hand grenade, though no injuries were recorded – again reflecting the fragility of security on the outskirts of the capital. Security forces have continued to target prominent figures from the former regime, most notably the arrest of Dr. Ghassan Yousef Ali who stands accused of murder and organ theft at Tishreen Hospital, and army officer Munzer Karam who is also linked to various violations. This marks the beginning of a symbolic transitional justice process, through the re-opening of old violations files.

Conversely, however, the areas of Sahnaya and Ashrafiya Sahnaya showed signs of relative calm after local dignitaries handed over weapons. This was followed by the release of detainees whose innocence was proven. The continuation of security raids does, however, indicate that the situation remains fragile.

In the city of Damascus itself, signs of regional tensions were monitored – as shown by the disputes in al-Bozoriya market between local authorities and stall holders, and raids in the neighbourhood of Rukneddine linked to the drugs trade. Two protests took place: the first in al-Qanoon neighbourhood against Israeli aggression, while the second took aim at the expropriation of land in Khan As’ad Pasha, reflecting the continued lack of civic participation in sovereign and economic activity.

Two significant crimes took place in Damascus and its surrounding countryside: Lawyer Khaldoun al-Mahithawi was assassinated near the Aqarba checkpoint, and a murder took place inside a nightclub in Hijaz. These two acts reflect an increased breakdown in the social fabric of Syria, and the lack of effective deterrence among certain segments of society.    

In the main, the security picture throughout Damascus province in May 2025 portrays a lack of consistent stability – despite a partial decrease in acts of open violence on the streets. While authorities seek to control the circulation of weapons in society and improve their relationship with Syrian citizens, their attempts are often thwarted by the presence of ISIS sleeper cells in possession of advanced weaponry and the growth of criminal activity due to untreated structural issues. As for the influence of the central government, any efforts lack clear implementation to progress from media statements and formal conferences discussing the issues at hand.

2. Daraa

In May, Daraa experienced a noticeable escalation in military activity caused by a multitude of threats. Security operations, assassinations, gang arrests, smuggling and score-settling all took place. The diverse nature of events taking place reflects the continued fragility of security in the province.

Efforts to dismantle criminal gangs emerged as a key focus during the month, with security forces thwarting armed robbery groups between Khirbet Ghazaleh and Saida, resulting in some arrests and the escape of other suspects. This was followed by a new security deployment plan, relying on forensic analysis and mobile patrols – instead of static fixed checkpoints. Forces escalated raids in areas including Maaraba, Jassem, Ibtaa, and Sheikh Miskeen, targeting individuals wanted on numerous charges from murder to arms trafficking and membership of proscribed armed groups. In Lajat, forces disrupted the operations of a gang involved in car thefts, although the area continues to be a hotspot for security chaos.

To the north of the province, assassinations against members of the former regime continued to escalate – including colonel Khalid Ghazzaleh, connected to the family of Rustam Ghazzaleh. Similar attacks took place in Ghabagheb, Jabab and Muhajjah, indicating a coordinated campaign to target specific figures for retaliatory and political reasons. A failed assassination took place against Anas al-Salkhadi, one of the leaders who opposed the 2018 settlement agreement, as well as sporadic criminal incidents including murders and bombing attacks. These widespread incidents demonstrate the absence of social deterrence and lack of preventative security.

Turning to the battle against the drugs trade, security forces disrupted two operations at the Nasib crossing and Daraa al-Balad, where a shipment of over 800,000 pills were seized. Clearly, Daraa remains a key crossing point for smuggling drugs across the border towards Jordan and the Gulf, despite some of the most strenuous efforts.

Meanwhile, Israeli forces carried out airstrikes targeting military positions of the 175th regiment in Izra’ and a missile battalion near Muthabin. Ground movements and reconnaissance flights were also observed near the Yarmouk Basin, as part of a continued Israeli policy to monitor the activities of those it considers linked to Hezbollah or Iranian-back militias.

Internally, security forces launched campaigns to collect a variety of weaponry, including arrests and raids to retrieve explosive devices and weapons, while dismantling warehouses and stores in the city of Nawa. Private universities were instructed to install surveillance systems and remove illegal stalls on the Damascus-Amman Road to control the environment around educational institutions.

As part of wider efforts to restructure the military, the Ministry of Defence took over warehouses from some Central Committee factions and began integrating their personnel into the 40th Division. The process faced obstruction after more than 5,000 volunteer applications were rejected – most of them from former opposition members of war casualties. This has raised questions over the fairness and transparency of the screening criteria and selection mechanisms.

In conclusion, Daraa seems caught between tensions and reconstruction, as attempts to impose security and rebuild institutions are met by persistent internal and external challenges – from Israeli air raids to local disputes, and the discontent of local residents at their marginalisation from the processes of governance. The future of the province remains dependent on the ability of the transitional government to strengthen the security provisions in a just way which can overcome the inherited social and sectarian divisions at play.

3. As-Sweidaa

As-Sweidaa experienced the most dramatic escalation in years during the month of May, laying bare the fragility of official control and the sheer number of armed actors in the region – and pointing to a clear failure of the institutions of state. The threats varied from armed clashes, bombardments with heavy weaponry, the use of warplanes and neighbourhood uprisings. These events led to the death and injury of many civilians and the fleeing of many families from the region.

The escalation began with a mortar attack on the village of Kanakir, followed by an airstrike on a farm to the west of as-Sweidaa which left four people dead. Israel was believed to be behind the attack. At the same time, artillery and missile attacks were launched against multiple villages, from Huran to Ara’ and al-Mujeimir. Several civilians were killed and some fled temporarily, due to a complete lack of coordinated response from the government.

In the city of as-Sweidaa itself, internal clashes took place between local factions, leading to the death of one member of the security forces, two civilians, and the burning of several buildings. Such deep fractures in the social fabric have caused a complete security breakdown, and resulted in tribal tit-for-tat killings in the neighbourhood of al-Maqoos, where three people were killed – despite the attempted intervention of the conflicts committee, guided by Sheikh al-Aql Youssef Jarbou.

The General Security forces themselves withdrew from the governorate in an undisclosed agreement with religious authorities and local factions. Local police units took up their positions, and instigated criminal investigations and traffic departments, as part of an attempt to impose a partial official presence without a fundamental shift in the balance of power. However, sporadic instances of chaos remained – including the storming of the governor’s office to demand the release of detainees, and an attack on a press crew covering a local agreement.

An explosive device also targeted an ambulance injuring several passengers; a dangerous development that indicated that even humanitarian services are not safe. Criminal acts in Daraa’s power supply production also resulted in a three day power outage in the city.

In other external military incidents, an airstrike was carried out on a house in the village of Al-Sha’ab – allegedly by the Jordanian airforce targeting drugs trafficking networks in the area. To further address this issue, the Ministry of Interior announced a new restructuring to allow for 100 police officers and 2,000 other security personnel in a reorganisation of local security forces.

The situation in as-Sweidaa has descended into an extremely fragile security reality, with a diversity of actors exploiting the weakness of the state and the social fabric. Despite attempts to dialogue and convene with different parties, the region could ignite into wider chaos at any moment, whether due to tribal struggles or external attacks. Despite regional efforts to reduce tension and the attempts of central government to entrench its presence, as-Sweidaa is in a dangerous position and requires more drastic action to secure its stability.

4. Hama and Homs

Homs province also experienced an increase in security operations during the month of reporting in an attempt to avoid armed chaos and weed out the remnants of the former regime. Efforts attempted to re-establish order in areas such as al-Qusayr, al-Houla and Tadmor. Events ranged from raids, anti-drugs operations, arrests of former regime officials and the seizure of arms and smuggling operations.

The most significant operations took place in Hodeida village to the west of Homs against a group of individuals that refused to negotiate, resulting in several arrests and subsequent releases of some individuals. During the raid, security forces successfully arrested individuals allegedly involved in al-Houla massacre of 2012, giving hope that the re-opening of old violations may lead to transitional justice.

In al-Wa’er neighbourhood, a drugs trader was stopped and quantities of Captagon were seized alongside cannabis and some forged currency. Security forces found an arms factory in al-Qusayr and an anti-armour missile depot, which illustrates the depth of smuggling networks interwoven with the structures of the old regime. Some of the most wanted individuals from the former regime were also arrested, including Mazen Hamoud, Mustafa Ramadhan, and Afif Idrees, as part of what appears to be a concerted effort to clear sensitive security files. Qusay al-Ali was also killed during a confrontation as part of a security patrol, along with Sheikh Nadir Khodour in Talkakh, and National Guard leader Adham Rojoub – all killed in unclear circumstances.

Kidnappings also took place during May in the region, including an incident in the neighbourhood of Abbasiya in which a kidnapped child was ultimately released. A female kidnapping gang was arrested in al-Houla, while in Palmyra, security forces seized guided missiles intended for smuggling. A stolen car was recovered in the Bayada neighbourhood as part of the anti-theft effort.

From analysis of events in Homs during the month of monitoring, there is a marked shift of security focus towards the pursuit of figures from the Assad regime, as well as dismantling arms and drugs networks. Despite tentative progress in conducting raids and attempts at justice, the balance of security continues to be thwarted by repeated incidents of infiltration, airstrikes, and explosions. Particularly in the eastern countryside of Homs, the security situation appears to be completely outside the state’s control.

As for the province of Hama, security operations also stepped up apace throughout the month of reporting, again attempting to dismantle remnants of the former regime’s networks. This coincided with an uptick in local tensions and some areas of popular civil unrest due to the activity of internal security forces to the north and west of the governorate.

The most significant operations took place in the Halfaya area, in which a number of former Shabiha members were arrested – most notably, Imad Da’boul, Talal al-Darwish, Ibrahim al-Danawar, Abdul Qaher, and Ghalab al-Jamal, in a wide ranging action to dismantle the remaining support systems for the repressive apparatus of the former regime. Saboura, in the countryside of Salamiya also saw the arrest of Rajab Fayyad al-Younes, brother of a former MP, who stands accused of running torture centres – sending a clear signal that the new authorities are seeking to root out historic injustices as they establish their control.

In Souran, clashes broke out between residents and fugitives of the former regime who attempted to return, requiring intervention by the internal security forces to contain the situation. This event portrays the continued unwillingness of local residents to accept the return of any reminder of the former regime’s repression.

Turning to military confrontations, Israeli fighter planes deployed targeted airstrikes at training grounds near the town of Shatha in the al-Ghab plains, most likely belonging to a newly formed military division. This attack should be seen as part of a repeated policy of hitting any Syrian forces attempting to establish a presence to the west of Hama.

The city of Masiyaf and its surrounding areas were subjected to a wave of assassinations, most notably the killing of air general Abdulkarim Husun Abdo. According to local sources, over 15 assassinations took place during the month, targeting informants and members of the Assad apparatus. These events indicate that, at a grassroots level, there is a concerted effort to root out anyone linked to acts of oppression or torture.

May clearly marked a turning point in the province of Hama, with increased targeting of figures within the former regime and popular rejection of their return, flanked by security operations attempting to curb the surrounding chaos. However, the pace of assassinations reflects the dominance of actors working outside the judicial framework and threatening the possibility of a clear national path to lasting justice.

5. Idlib and Aleppo

Despite the partial stability experienced by Idlib in comparison with other provinces, May saw some concerning security events take place – exemplified by direct clashes between regional security forces and ISIS cells, which sheds light on the continued Jihadi threat despite the state of calm experienced in previous months.

On May 23, attacks were launched against a Ministry of Defence unit near the city of Khan Sheikhoun. It was established later that those involved in the action were members of a former regime cell. This was followed by a precise security operation in Ma’arra to root out the cell – which resulted in the death of one member and an injury to another. The operations point to the ability of sleeper cells to implement limited attacks, in comparison to the effectiveness of the security forces to respond at speed.

In a related context, the internal security directorate intensified deployments to the city of Jericho on May 28, coinciding with the nominal anniversary of the city’s liberation. Forces were deployed around the city’s entrances and key squares as a precautionary measure – accompanied by transparent communication with civil society, suggesting a marked improvement of relations between local residents and the security establishment.

Overall, this month has been marked by the continued security threat of jihadist cells, met by attempts to strengthen stability in Idlib’s key cities, especially through local measures and grassroots coordination.

As for Aleppo, a significant rise in security activities and qualitative operations took place, as part of the project to restructure the province and address the challenges of the previous era. Most significantly, a security operation took place in the al-Haidariya neighbourhood on May 17, targeting an ISIS cell, resulting in the deaths of three members and the arrest of a further four. More than nine million Captagon pills were also seized, reflecting sustained coordination with Turkey to combat cross-border smuggling.

Efforts continued to prosecute key figureheads of the former regime, including the director of Aleppo Central Prison, Jamal al-Bakri – who was arrested during May. Assassinations were reported against figures within the former National Defence Forces militia including; Fadi Aqili, Hamza Abdul Salam and Osama Darwish, as part of a wave of killings that appear to be acts of revenge for former violations.

In the city of Azaz, an assassination occurred on May 7, resulting in the deaths of four people. In the countryside of Jarabulus, a woman was injured by sniper fire from SDF-controlled areas on May 9, in a continuation of violations taking place along the territorial borders.

On another front, the governorate of Aleppo made appointments of new security personnel, including Hussein Salameh as head of the general intelligence services, and Mohammed Jumah Abdul Ghani as a leader of Aleppo’s internal security forces. These new officials reflect the policy of merging civilian leadership into the official security infrastructure. A delegation from the Interior Ministry visited the city of al-Bab as part of an attempt to bring security institutions closer to central government, and assess the necessary factors in doing so.

As for the northern villages, residents of Zoyan raised grievances over the victims of mines planted since the withdrawal of SDF forces from the area, amid allegations that the Hamza division was failing to sufficiently protect civilians. Engineering teams also discovered a complex network of mines near Tal Rifaat, confirming the continued danger in the liberated areas.

In a similar area, a drug-smuggling cell was uncovered in the city of al-Safira on May 30, as part of a continuing campaign to secure the province’s eastern border against the drug trade.

Overall, these indicators reveal that Aleppo is in the advanced stages of security restructuring since liberation. However, some challenges remain – particularly with the continued threat of bombings and mines – and the dogged persistence of petty crime and smuggling in certain hotspots. This will require a more coordinated and comprehensive response to ensure stability is sustained long-term.

In the realm of military appointments, Syria has seen a wave of new personnel as part of efforts to restructure the country’s military infrastructure, in the phase after the fall of the former regime.  A series of appointments have taken place within the central command of the Defence and Interior ministries, which reflect efforts to build firm, professional foundations to the military, with more discipline and cohesion.

 Major Suhail al-Hamoud (nomme de guerre Abu al-Taw) was appointed to the training office at the Military Academy, owing to his experience with anti-tank weaponry. Brigadier General Pilot Khaled Yousef al-Hamoud was assigned to command the military base at Damascus International Airport, in a move to strengthen the armed forces’ transport and logistics capabilities. Brigadier General Hussein al-Talib (also known as Abu al-Dahdah) was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence for Administrative Affairs, while Colonel Zakaria al-Sharida (Abu Omar) was appointed as the head of appointments at the Ministry of Defence.

Mahran Hassoun (Abu Suhaib) was assigned the Fifth Brigade of the 72nd division, and the engineer Abdullah al-Sheikh was given the position of Resident Engineer at the Military Academy, to improve cohesion of technical competencies within the ministry’s institutional structure. New commanders for internal security were appointed across all Syria’s provinces, to improve the central government’s connection to local decision-making centres. They are as follows: 

Appointments were also announced for assistants within the Ministry of Interior to ensure administrative and technical integration of the Ministry’s work. They are the following:

These appointments reflect an institutional repositioning towards securing military and administrative stability by recognising the competencies of individuals with proven field and organisational track records – and emphasising the role these new leaders will play in building a new era of secure governance after years of chaos and conflict.

Economics and Services

1. New Economic Measures and Policies

Major events took place in May 2025 to impact Syria’s economy. The new transitional authorities issued a diverse range of decisions and measures, in tandem with talks over investment agreements and regional/international openness to investment in Syria. This was evident in several arenas:

1. Supporting Public Salaries

Although the announcement to raise wages took place six months ago, May was an important point on the path to implementing this policy, after Qatar pledged 29 million dollars monthly, for a period of three months on a renewable basis – specifically to support public wages. This was followed by a joint Saudi -Qatari announcement to support salaries long-term, during a visit from the Saudi Foreign Minister to Damascus.

• Raising Western Sanctions

In a landmark and pivotal shift, the US president announced the lifting of economic sanctions on Syria during a trip to Riyadh, followed by a similar move by EU member states, including sanctions on the Syrian Central Bank and other entities. The US Treasury then announced a six-month suspension of the Caesar Act, easing financial transactions with the country which facilitates remittances from abroad, and integrating Syria into the global financial system after more than a decade of isolation.

• Investment agreements

On May 1, the Syrian government signed an agreement with French company CMA CGM to expand and operate the port of Latakia for a period of 30 years, with an investment of 230 million euros.

On May 16, a memorandum of understanding was also signed with DP world to develop the port of Tartous at a cost of 800 million dollars, including a multi-purpose terminal and several industrial zones.

At the end of the month, a consortium of companies headed by the Qatari firm UCC announced an investment of 7 billion dollars to build 4 combined-cycle power plants and a solar power plant, including the repair and reconstruction of destroyed electricity infrastructure.

•   Trade Liberalisation and Stimulating Domestic Markets

The government launched a series of measures to increase free trade in Syria:

• The cancellation of over 10 different import taxes, and the reduction of customs duties reaching 60%.
• The opening of border crossings with Türkiye without imposing taxes to increase the flow of goods at competitive prices.
• Establishing a one-year grace period to clarify the status of companies that do not meet capital thresholds.
• The re-opening of the Damascus Stock Exchange after a six-month period of closure.

All these measures are aimed at breaking monopolies, and creating a fertile atmosphere for business, with encouragement for manufacturing and trade through the reduction of costs and the simplification of bureaucratic processes. Some manufacturers who produce goods in Syria at an elevated cost have found themselves uncompetitive after the drop in prices. At the same time, farmers have feared that their crops may fail if borders continue to open uncontrolled. This must compel the government to take policy steps to protect local producers so they can adapt to the changing market economy.

2. Living Standards

Despite the launch of such broad economic measures in May 2025, the impact on living standards across Syria is yet to be directly felt. Trade liberalisation and the reduction of customs duties have contributed to improved flow of goods, particularly in northern Syria – but this has not translated into tangible improvements in living standards, owing to the persistent gap between household income and necessary expenditure.

In the currency markets the US dollar has dropped to 9,500 Lira, owing to the first arrivals of financial support from the Gulf and the increased demand for Lira from Syrians returning to their homes. This improvement remains fragile and could easily be reversed, as it relies heavily on external support rather than internal economic stability.

Public services have not seen a noticeable improvement; electricity provision remains weak across most provinces, receiving between 4-7 hours of electricity per day due to crumbling infrastructure and consistent theft. Despite Qatari funding for new electricity projects, Syrians will not see the results for at least two years.

In the fields of health, education and water supply a slight improvement was recorded in some governorates thanks to external support, but without reaching levels which could be felt in daily life.

This month can be seen as the overture to economic stability, but not an actual recovery. The market has seen the return of confidence among some economic actors, but as salaries remain low and services mostly absent, any improvement of living standards will be contingent on converting this period of stability into sustainable growth supported by effective government action to intervene when necessary.

Efforts to Stabilise the Syrian Economy

May 2025

2. Winners and Losers in Syria’s New Political Economy

1. The Winners

The economic measures effected in May 2025 brought about a noticeable redistribution of profits and losses across the Syrian economy, reflecting a change in economic interests at play after the political transition. The parties benefitting from the measure can be sorted according to four main categories:

• Those on limited income: this group benefited somewhat from a 50-80% drop in the price of some basic commodities compared to the start of the year, resulting from increased cross-border trade. Promises to raise salaries by 400% offered a ray of economic hope which has yet to cast light on Syrians’ daily lives, due to a lack of implementation.
• The local private sector: small local companies benefited greatly from the drop in customs duties, the re-opening of the stock market and the lifting of sanctions on the Central Bank. These actions have provided companies with previously unimaginable opportunities for expansion and imports.
• The transitional authorities and their allies: the government has succeeded in strengthening its position through partnerships in the Gulf – particularly with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This has allowed for increased linkage between Syrian and Turkish markets, and strengthened the standing of these external parties in the reconstruction process.
• Foreign companies and international institutions: these groups returned to the Syrian economic landscape en masse, with strategic partnerships to run ports and energy infrastructure. Institutional partnerships such as the World Bank also resumed their investment in development projects.

2. The Losers

On the other hand, several groups lost out from the changes implemented in May:

• Elites allied with the former regime: these groups lost their privileged access to certain parts of the economy and were isolated from the new Syrian landscape.
• Iran and Russia: both parties saw a regression in their economic involvement in Syria, making way for actors from Europe and the Gulf.
• Warlords and armed groups: these factions lost their unofficial sources of funding due to increased border security and clearer central authority.
• Local farmers and producers: many small-scale agricultural outfits lost out in competition with cheaper imported goods, which points to the need for interim protective measures for Syrian producers.

In summary, these changes reflect a deeper transition in the landscape of economic interests in Syria, and a move from the old, closed rentier systems of patronage to an economy that is more open and diverse. This change must still face the challenges of ensuring balance between openness and protection for the most vulnerable parties. Economic justice for Syria depends on the new government’s ability to manage this transition effectively.

  Table of food prices across Syria’s provinces (USD)

When comparing April and May 2025, we find that food prices fluctuated by differing amounts across various provinces. For example, tomatoes increased by 122% in Damascus but dropped by 41.7% in Hama, and by 44% in as-Sweidaa. The price of onions also rose by 66.7% in the capital, unlike the sharp declines witnessed in Idlib and as-Sweidaa (61.4% and 66.2% respectively. The same can be said for the price of potatoes, which rose by 27.5% in Damascus, but dropped by 40.5% in as-Sweidaa. Eggs rose by 24.4% in Damascus, 35.6% in Hama and 87.5% in Daraa – but dropped by 10% in Idlib. Bread remained relatively stable, rising by 46.7% and 10% in Damascus and Daraa respectively, but fell by 16.7% in Aleppo.

These figures reveal that some regions are undergoing significant inflation – as in Damascus – while others benefited from the decline in Idlib and as-Sweidaa. This reflects the varied impact of economic policies and trade liberalisation, and shows that the government continues to face discrepancies of supply and demand, despite efforts at reform.

Table of Fuel and Building Material Prices (USD)

When compared to April, May’s fuel prices showed a significant increase across much of Syria. In the fuel sector, gasoline rose by 20.5 % in Damascus and 14.5% in Aleppo, while Idlib and Hama recorded increases of 14.1% and 15.7%, respectively. Diesel prices rose by 13.4% in Damascus and 10.4% in Aleppo, while the increase was limited in Idlib (3.8%) and decreased slightly in as-Sweidaa (2.4%). Domestic gas prices increased by 13.4% in Damascus and 10.3% in Aleppo, while they remained relatively stable in Idlib and Daraa, and slightly decreased in as-Sweidaa. These changes indicate supply disruptions or increased transportation costs and taxes imposed on petroleum products, especially in major cities.

As for building materials, the market remained relatively stable. Cement prices rose by 9.1% in Damascus and 6.7% in Aleppo, with smaller increases in Idlib (2.6%) and as-Sweidaa (4.2%). The price of iron, a building material, rose by 5% in Damascus, 5.1% in Aleppo, and only 1.9% in Idlib and Daraa.

Table of Gold and Foreign Currency Prices

May saw a relative improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian Lira against foreign currencies, with the dollar falling from approximately 11,000 Lira in April to 9,500 in May – a net decline of around 13.6%. This improvement may be linked to the influx of financial aid from the Gulf and the increased demand for local currency from returnees, also boosting the supply of foreign currency. Although the decline in dollar price is a positive indicator, it remains unstable given its reliance on external funding rather than long-term domestic improvements in production or export.

Conclusions

• Despite positive indications of real administrative reform and transparency in appointments, implementation remains partial and selective, and reveals significant disparities across government departments when it comes to effectiveness. Loyalty continues to trump competence in some areas, and transparency is still forthcoming.

• The Syrian economic outlook is beginning to witness tangible openings with the lifting of sanctions and influxes of investment to pave the way for reconstruction. However, this rapid transformation has the potential to create disparities between social classes and threatens local producers who face unfair competition on the open market, requiring corrective interventions from central government to protect the most vulnerable.

• Although some food prices have declined, this has yet to trickle through into Syrians’ standard of living. Basic services from electricity to water and health services continue to flounder, and the income gap remains far too wide.

• Many of Syria’s provinces continue to suffer from security disturbances from organised crime outfits to jihadist sleeper cells, along with tribal tensions and score-settling revenge attacks. Although there have been some successes in restructuring the nation’s security apparatus, stability remains weak and under threat in the long term.

• Civil society and political organisations have resumed activity in certain areas, amid a gradual openness to public freedoms. However, this positive progress remains fragile and relies on the stability of the security environment and transitional justice mechanisms.

• Syrians have continued to return home in noticeable numbers, led by an improvement in general conditions and political openness – though the sustainability of returns depends on clarity around the future of sanctions on the economy, improvements in Syria’s infrastructure and calm on the streets.

• Some of the first steps have been taken to hold the Assad regime formerly accountable for their crimes, but these steps remain limited in scope and require a lawful, transparent and institutional path forwards, to avoid being transformed into tools for political revenge and the extra-judicial settling of scores.
•  

---