Harmoon Center Monitoring Report: December 8–31, 2024

This report monitors the situation in Syria from December 8 to December 31, 2024, across the following areas:

1. Administrative and governance developments
2. Security and military dynamics
3. Political and social trends
4. Service provision and living conditions

Monitoring Administrative and Governance Developments

Following the fall of the Assad regime, Syria’s new leadership undertook efforts to reshape the country’s administrative and governance structures. This initiative aimed to overcome the legacy of the former regime and establish an administration capable of managing the transitional phase. The leadership implemented a series of decisions reflecting immediate security and political priorities. However, these decisions elicited mixed reactions, as they emphasized appointing individuals with prior ties to specific entities and factions.

Local Administration:

Administrative appointments in the governorates predominantly reflected a security-oriented approach, highlighting the leadership’s emphasis on stability and control. Many appointees were drawn from military factions or the former Salvation Government. Notable appointments include:

• Governors from military factions: Amer al-Sheikh (Ahrar al-Sham) was appointed governor of Rural Damascus, and Azzam Ghareeb (al-Jabha al-Shamiyya) was named governor of Aleppo.
• Governors from the former Salvation Government: Maher Muhammad Marwan Idlibi was appointed governor of Damascus, while Anas Ayroot was assigned as governor of Tartous, then he was replaced by another one.
• Prominent security figures: Hassan Sufan (Ahrar al-Sham) was appointed governor of Latakia, underscoring the leadership’s prioritization of security concerns.

These appointments reflect the leadership’s intent to bolster security control and prevent an administrative vacuum, relying on individuals closely aligned with current decision-making circles.

1. Government Formation:

A new government was formed, featuring individuals with ties to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the former Salvation Government. The transitional leadership defended these appointments as essential, citing the alignment between these cadres and the requirements of the current phase.

Several ministries announced decisions across various areas:

• Ministry of Labor: Introduced new mechanisms for licensing civil society organizations.
• Ministry of Higher Education: Renamed universities, organized exams, and suspended the National Union of Syrian Students.
• Ministry of Health: Restructured certain health facilities and replaced their administrations.

Restructuring of Civil Entities: Transformations occurred across multiple levels, particularly within civil entities previously holding official status under the former regime. Key changes included:

• General Sports Federation: Muhammad al-Hamid was appointed president, replacing leaders associated with the former regime.
• Syrian Red Crescent: Khalid Habbubati, a figure closely connected with Assad, was dismissed, and Muhammad Hazim Baqla was appointed in his place.

Unions and Federations:

The unions were addressed in three distinct ways:

• Unions with no significant changes: Examples include the Dentists’ Union, which remained unchanged.
• Unions reactivating with existing cadres: These include the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and the Journalists’ Union, both of which resumed operations with their previous leadership.
• Unions undergoing changes: such as Lawyers’ Union and the Doctors’ Union, which are now managed by unions that were active in Idlib.

Civil Organizations and Associations

Most associations linked to the former regime, such as Qanadeel and The Syrian Trust for Development, were dissolved. However, independent associations like the Sanad Development Team continued to operate.

2. Challenges

• Leveraging Syrian Expertise: A challenge exists in attracting national technocratic cadres who are capable of working within the new governance framework, while ensuring broad representation of competencies, irrespective of political backgrounds, as loyalty still prevails over competence.
• Addressing the Legacy of the Former Regime: Efforts are focused on dismantling the remnants of the Assad regime, removing figures and entities that served as tools for internal and external regime propaganda, and subjecting them to the transitional justice process to investigate their crimes or involvement in illegal activities such as drug trafficking.
• Ensuring Union and Federation Independence: It is essential to guarantee the autonomy of unions and federations, ensuring that civil cadres are free from interference, and strengthening the role of civil society as an independent space that genuinely represents the aspirations of the people. What has happened so far is the replacement of leaders loyal to the regime with those loyal to HTS or its opposition.

The administrative and governance aspect presents a significant challenge for the new Syrian leadership. Success at this stage depends on striking a balance between strengthening security and upholding the principles of good governance. The current leadership can overcome these challenges by attracting national talent, promoting civil independence, and implementing transitional justice to close the chapter on the past and build a new state founded on transparency and justice.

Monitoring Security and Military Dynamics

After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Syria underwent significant military and security transformations. The country entered a new phase of instability and change, with the transitional government making multiple efforts to reorganize the security and military landscape.

1. The most significant security incidents:
2. Illegal Activities:

Following the regime’s fall, some criminal groups took advantage of the security vacuum to engage in widespread looting and sabotage. For instance, on December 12, 2024, the governorates of Tartous and Latakia saw looting operations targeting key facilities, including the Latakia pharmaceutical factory and a public transport train. These incidents heightened concerns about the security situation’s fragility. In response, security forces launched intensive campaigns to restore order and apprehend those responsible.

• Security Measures:

Security forces launched a large-scale operation north of Qirdaha, targeting militants. The campaign resulted in the deaths of three militants and the injury of ten others. Simultaneously, military reinforcements were sent to Daraa to bolster the region’s stability, and checkpoints with additional security forces were deployed in Salamiyyah and its countryside, southeast of Hama. This move was met with approval from residents, who expressed satisfaction with the enhanced security presence. On December 22, 2024, another security campaign in Homs targeted outlaws, leading to clashes between security forces and armed groups. The campaign followed a robbery incident in the Armenian neighborhood, which sparked widespread controversy. In response, the Christian Union Church issued a statement thanking the authorities for swiftly restoring security.

From December 25 to 29, large reinforcements were deployed to the provinces of Tartous, Latakia, and Homs to enforce a curfew and target remnants of the regime. During this period, violent clashes erupted in Balqassa and Talkalakh, west of Homs, as efforts were made to secure the border with Lebanon. Meanwhile, in December, widespread celebrations took place in areas west of Homs after forces gained control of the strongholds of warlord Shuja al-Ali and secured the villages along the Homs-Latakia highway.

• Confronting Remnants of the Former Regime

As part of efforts to target those involved in crimes from the regime’s remnants, the authorities conducted a series of operations, particularly after these remnants attempted to destroy critical government documents. On December 23, 2024, important documents were burned at the military court in Latakia, the Military Construction building in Jableh, and the Ministry of Transport in Damascus. On December 27, 2024, Anan Zwaikli, one of the most wanted individuals in Latakia and a key figure in militias affiliated with the former regime, was arrested. On December 29, a significant number of Air Force Intelligence personnel and high-ranking officers were arrested in Rural Damascus and Deir ez-Zor.

• Clashes with the SDF

Battles between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and opposition factions continued in northern Syria, with escalating clashes around the Tishreen Dam, the Qara Qozak Bridge, and the Deir Hafer area. The confrontations led to approximately 120 fatalities on both sides, but there were no significant changes in territorial control.

In the countryside of Hasakah, violent clashes persisted along the front lines between the Peace Spring area and the regions of Abu Rasain and Tal Tamr, with no significant changes in territorial control. Despite the intervention of the international coalition to enforce a truce, tensions remain high amid Turkish threats to launch a new military operation aimed at strengthening its control in northeastern Syria.

1. Military Appointments
2. Military appointments and restructuring included the appointment of Murhaf Abu Qasra as Minister of Defense, where he led structural reforms, such as abolishing the “four armies” system and replacing it with 12 specialized brigades. On December 29, the General Command announced a new list of promotions, that featured both local and foreign names, sparking controversy among some of the defected officers.
3. Efforts to unify the factions began with talks led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa on December 24, aimed at merging the armed factions into a single military body under the Ministry of Defense. On December 28, a strategic meeting was held between the leaders of the National Army and officials from the transitional administration to discuss strengthening military cooperation.

1. Settlements and Reconciliations

The new administration launched a settlement program aimed at restoring stability and building trust, which included the surrender of weapons and the reorganization of the legal status of individuals associated with the former regime. The initiative began on December 15 in Latakia and later expanded to Tartous and Daraa, where heavy weapons and Kornet missiles were surrendered. The process also involved the settlement of prominent figures, such as Major General Talal Makhlouf, with a focus on holding accountable those involved in crimes. For example, the commander of the Farabi checkpoint in Homs and members of the Air Force Intelligence were arrested. While the initiative has made positive initial strides, it faces challenges related to ensuring transitional justice and reintegrating former regime elements into society.

However, the implicit decision to dismiss all members of the army, security forces and even the police means that hundreds of thousands of families will be left without a source of income, which provokes great anger on the one hand, and indicates hasty in taking ill-considered decisions motivated by an exaggerated security obsession on the other.

In the south, Israeli operations escalated, with over 450 airstrikes and ground operations conducted between December 8 and 25, 2024. These actions sparked protests in which four civilians were injured.

Many areas in Syria are facing remnants of war, such as landmines that have killed civilians, including 8 children, amidst removal efforts that face a lack of resources, which hinders the return of residents to their homes.

The Military Operations Department controls the governorates of Damascus and its countryside, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Idlib and the Syrian coast, while the eastern Euphrates and parts of Aleppo countryside remain under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), also, areas in Aleppo countryside and the Nabaa al-Salam area are under the control of the National Army, and Rijal al-Karama controls Sweidaá province, insisting that there is no need for members of the operations room to come, and Dara’a has a special status as it is controlled by the reconciliation factions.

Monitoring Political and Social Trends

Since the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has experienced significant political and social changes, with early signs of improvement in public administration and the enhancement of civil liberties. However, the transitional government still faces challenges in maintaining civil peace and organizing political and social life in a manner that promotes stability.

Residents began to experience a sense of relative stability, thanks to the efforts of local organizations and volunteer teams that had previously operated in opposition areas. These initiatives helped address basic needs, strengthen communication with the local community, and alleviate public anxiety.

1. Aspects of Stability and Social Participation

• Celebrating Public Occasions: A positive trend emerged within the Military Operations Department, characterized by respect for civilians and various Syrian sects. This helped foster the spread of Christmas celebrations in major cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and the countryside of Homs and Hama. In Aleppo, representatives of the Operations Department met with the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, led by Bishop Aphram Maalouli, and issued a joint statement aimed at reassuring the residents. Additionally, on December 31, Ahmad Al-Sharaa met with the heads of Christian religious sects at the People’s Palace, where they discussed various political and social issues.
• A few incidents raised concerns about the future, including the burning of the Christmas tree in Sqailbiyyah, which sparked resentment. Investigations revealed that the perpetrators came from outside the city, and security personnel were subsequently assigned to protect the celebrations.
• Public Freedoms: There were no reported cases of interference in dress or religious practices, nor were any public places, such as nightclubs, closed. This approach helped create a positive impression among the people and fostered trust in the new government. However, anxiety still persists, particularly in the coastal areas and the countryside of Homs, where concerns about the transitional phase and its potential repercussions are widespread.

2. Civil Society

Local organizations and political parties have become key players in the social and political landscape following the fall of Assad, contributing to a gradual return to civil and political activity. Syrian civil society organizations have gained relative freedom to operate in most governorates. Aleppo city, in particular, played a pioneering role in building trust between the new administration and the people. Meetings were held with the medical staff at Aleppo University Hospital to discuss ways to improve services.

In Aleppo and Hama governorates, organizations like Emergency Response and humanitarian teams from Turkey distributed essential supplies to the population and launched extensive relief campaigns. In Damascus and other major cities, new offices were opened for parties such as the New Syria Movement, while new parties like the Syrian Social Democratic Party were formed in Deir ez-Zor. Cultural forums, such as the Kawakibi Forum in Aleppo, resumed activities, marking the beginning of a cultural revival. Several organizations announced their continued operations in various governorates, coordinating with civil society and independent humanitarian groups. This collaboration helped enhance stability in regions like Latakia, where specialized civil bodies were established.

In this regard, a decision was issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, affiliated with the new administration, to organize the work of civil society organizations. The decision includes asking organizations to re-submit a license application, which has worried many organizations and their staff.

3. Foreign Political Relations

After the fall of the regime, Damascus became a hub of diplomatic activity, hosting numerous visits from international and regional delegations representing countries such as Turkey, the United States, the European Union, and Arab countries like Qatar and Kuwait.

The main topics of discussion focused on economic and development support, as well as calls to lift the sanctions imposed on Syria, given that their original target—the Assad regime—had been removed. Plans for the transitional phase, the political process, and the vision of the new government were also key points of discussion. These meetings reflect the desire to establish balanced relations with both Arab and Western countries, aiming to ensure stability and promote regional and international cooperation.

Service Provision and Living Conditions

The new government inherited a weakened service and economic situation, shaped by years of neglect and destruction. While there have been some minor improvements in certain areas, significant challenges remain, necessitating radical solutions and long-term planning. Below are details of the service and living conditions in Syria during this period:

1. Basic Services: Electricity and Water

In major cities like Aleppo and Damascus, electricity services have seen slight improvements, with supply hours increasing to four per day, up from just two before the regime’s fall. However, in rural areas such as Rural Damascus, the countryside of Aleppo, and the eastern neighborhoods of Homs and Aleppo, the situation has remained unchanged due to extensive infrastructure damage. Additionally, the Hasakah region experienced a complete power outage lasting four days, further exacerbating the suffering of the local population.

The situation with water was similar to that of electricity, as most areas saw no significant improvements. The exception was Aleppo, which experienced a two-week water outage due to clashes near the supply station in the Sulaiman al-Halabi neighborhood.

2. Transportation and Fuel

After the regime’s fall, most gas stations closed, but gradually reopened with significantly higher prices. The cost of one liter of diesel or gasoline reached 18,000 Syrian pounds. Cooking gas became available without smart card restrictions but at a high price, with a cylinder now costing 215,000 Syrian pounds, up from 23,000 pounds previously. These fuel price increases directly impacted transportation costs, as bus fares within cities or to nearby towns rose to 5,000 Syrian pounds, while it was less than that before,  placing a heavy burden on citizens who rely on daily transportation.

3. Public Transportation

In Aleppo, the public transportation authority resumed operations with the previous administrative staff, helping to improve internal transportation services. However, in areas like Suweida, the transportation crisis persisted due to a lack of services, which led to a strike by university students who rely on transportation between Suweida and Damascus. Overall, transportation services gradually improved in most areas, particularly as the security situation stabilized.

4. Foodstuffs and Markets

In the early days, most shops closed due to the unrest, but they gradually reopened. Markets saw a decrease in the prices of some food items, such as vegetable oil, thanks to large quantities of goods entering the country, particularly from Turkey. However, the price of bread, a staple in the Syrian diet, rose sharply, with the cost of 1.5 kg reaching 4,000 Syrian pounds, up from 800 pounds previously. This price increase led to large crowds at bakeries in many areas, further exacerbating the suffering of the people.

5. Exchange Rate

In the days following the regime’s fall, the dollar exchange rate surged to 17,000 Syrian pounds, causing a general increase in the prices of goods. However, the exchange rate later dropped to 13,500 Syrian pounds, helping to stabilize prices, with the exception of bread.

6. Government Decisions and Procedures

The government urged local administration institutions to resume their work in managing citizen services. However, the response varied by region. In Aleppo and Damascus, most institutions returned to normal operations, while in other areas, the response was slower due to a shortage of personnel or unstable security conditions.

7. Health Sector

Hospitals experienced heavy crowding in the first days due to injuries from random gunfire. However, they returned to normal operations after three days, following government directives that instructed medical staff to resume their duties.

8. Education Sector

Schools and universities resumed operations after seven days, following a series of meetings to discuss ways to reorganize the educational process. Several key decisions were made, including the cancellation of subjects associated with the former regime, such as national education, the raising of Syrian revolution flags in schools and classrooms, and the adjustment of exam schedules to align with the transitional phase.

9. Public Hygiene

Municipalities have gradually resumed operations, including the deployment of garbage trucks in major cities. Although machinery repair workshops have begun, the lack of equipment and personnel remains a significant challenge.

10. Banks and Customs

Banks and financial institutions resumed operations on December 15, 2024. The government also issued decisions to dismiss 18 customs directors at land and sea ports, replacing them with new appointees. However, these appointments sparked criticism, as they appeared to prioritize political loyalty over competence, Additionally, a decision was made to abolish customs duties.

Challenges

• Electricity and Water: Electricity and water issues remain among the top challenges due to infrastructure damage and the difficulty of repairs in certain areas.
• High Prices: Inflation in fuel and food prices is a significant burden on citizens, necessitating strict government oversight to control costs.
• Staff Shortage: Service sectors are facing a severe shortage of staff, primarily due to the dismissal of employees linked to the former regime. Attracting qualified professionals is essential to address this gap.

Despite some improvements in basic services and positive government efforts, Syria continues to face significant challenges in terms of services and living standards. Addressing these issues requires urgent investments in infrastructure, the implementation of firm economic policies to control prices, and the development of government agencies to ensure long-term stability. With strong governmental will, these challenges can be transformed into opportunities to create a better future for Syrians.

---