Administration and Governance
The new administration focussed its efforts in April on the Syrian capital, Damascus, where a significant number of impactful decisions came into effect. Aleppo followed closely behind, enacting a series of landmark policies in the province. Notably, the impact of prior decisions made across the country began to bear fruit, and visible operational improvements were seen in several provinces. Both the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Communications and Information stood out as particularly active and effective—not only due to their high levels of activity but also to the broad scope and reach of their responsibilities.
April marked the first live broadcast on Syrian satellite television from the Ministry of Information since the new authorities took power. It also featured a major public appearance by the Minister of Information, Dr. Hamza al-Mustafa—who spoke directly to events in Jaramana, highlighting his prominent role in addressing Syria’s key challenges nationwide. Meanwhile the Minister of Social Affairs, Hind Qabawat, took practical steps to address employee concerns and facilitate their return to work.
The Ministry of Education, led by Dr. Marwan al-Halabi, issued several nationwide policies, including one notable effort to preserve Syria’s fragile social fabric. The recent edict prohibits sectarian rhetoric within universities, following incidents involving students from the as-Sweidaa Governorate. Meanwhile, Abdulsalam Haykal, Minister of Communications and Information Technology, issued a statement emphasizing the need to protect the personal data of Syrians and others in similar circumstances, especially state employees. The Minister stressed that such data must not be exploited for illegal purposes, and may only be accessed through the Ministry’s officially approved electronic platforms.
The Minister of Sports and Youth, Muhammad Sameh Ahmad Al-Hamid, issued a striking decision to exclude players Sidra Suleiman and Nura Bishara, along with coach Ayman Suleiman, from the delegation of the national women’s basketball team. He also banned them from participating in any official sporting activities until further notice. This decision came after the trio posted photos on social media in which they wore the national team jersey, while obscuring the Syrian flag. Meanwhile, the Minister of Transport began his term with inspection visits to evaluate and repair key infrastructure, including maintenance work on the Rastan Bridge in Homs Governorate.
The Syrian presidency also extended the mandate of the National Fact-Finding and Investigation Committee on bloody events on Syria’s coast in March. This extension may signal either an attempt to buy political time amid increasing international engagement, or a genuine lack of sufficient time to reach concrete conclusions from their investigations thus far. In a symbolic move, all of Syria’s governorates issued a new directive to remove all symbols of the Assad regime from public spaces across Syrian cities and regions.
At the same time, governors themselves have been notably active—particularly in Aleppo, Damascus, and as-Sweidaa, where they have taken a hands-on approach to addressing both security and administrative challenges. In Daraa, Governor Anwar Taha al-Zoubi dedicated a weekly session to meet with citizens, review their concerns, and work toward practical solutions, in an effort to practice transparency and continued public engagement. Meanwhile, several ministries have finalised their internal appointments, including Nour al-Baba taking their position as official spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, tasked with addressing Syria’s security situation with the public.
Amid the ongoing restructuring of various groups and unions, Syria’s well-known Karama Sports Club terminated the assignments of all staff in administrative, service, and financial roles as part of an effort to reorganise and re-govern the club. The Artists Union, for their part, dismissed actress Sulaf Fawakherji from the union following her statements opposing the Syrian revolution. The Union’s president also managed to thwart an internal coup against him, sparked by his failure to adhere to 2019 bylaws—an issue that led to disputes which eventually became public.
The data indicate an improvement in governance decisions at the central level, with increased momentum and a more focused and organized decision-making process. However, there has been no significant shift in overarching public policies, which continue to prioritize recovery and reform within the limits of available resources. Appointments still reflect a pattern of balancing loyalty and competence—though loyalty often takes precedence. At the same time, there has been a noticeable increase in transparency and engagement with the broader public, including clearer communication about the roles and responsibilities of public sector employees. Within the unions, emerging disagreements point to tensions between the legacy of past practices and the evolving realities of union activity in the current Syrian context.
Military and Security
In April 2025, Homs Governorate experienced a series of significant security and military confrontations, highlighting the scale of the challenges facing its security services in the immediate future. These events included arrests, clashes, kidnappings, airstrikes, and the discovery of weapons depots—along with new appointments to military positions.
The month began with a security operation on April 3 leading to the arrest of Kamel Muhammad Sharif al-Abbas, one of the perpetrators of the Tadamon Massacre. Additional arrests followed on April 5, including those of an officer known as “Mario” and an armed individual, Mahmoud Shaddoud.
On April 13, a person was arrested for throwing hand grenades in the Nuzha neighbourhood. On April 24, clashes broke out between the Internal Security Forces and remnants of regime forces in the village of Rayyan. On the same day, a rocket fired from Lebanese territory struck the village of al-Masryyia, injuring three civilians. On April 25, further clashes took place in the Wadi al-Dhahab neighbourhood involving a former military pilot named Shalhoub, resulting in his death and injuries to four security personnel. Earlier, on April 16, the Ministry of defence appointed Araba Idris—a native of the Baba Amr neighbourhood—as commander of the Sixth Brigade of the 52nd Division. This move was part of a broader effort to restructure key military positions within the governorate.
In April 2025, Damascus Governorate and its surrounding countryside experienced a sharp escalation in security incidents, including clashes, arrests, kidnappings, armed attacks, and popular demonstrations. These events underscored the fragility of security control in certain areas, especially on the outskirts of the capital. In response, security forces made persistent efforts to regain control through a series of raids, the establishment of checkpoints, and targeted interventions aimed at containing escalating crises.
The month began with a wave of arrests targeting former regime members. On April 22 and 23, Saleh al-Staif and Tayseer Mahfouz were detained, followed by the arrest of Mahmoud Mardini in Rural Damascus, where documents linking him to crimes committed by Air Force Intelligence were seized. Simultaneous raids in Barzeh and Masaken Barzeh led to the confiscation of weapons and ammunition. On April 29, Luay and Yahya Alloush were also arrested in Darayya.
The most intense clashes occurred in Jaramana and Sahnaya on April 29 and 30, following the circulation of a falsified audio recording deemed insulting to the Prophet Muhammad. The incident triggered widespread sectarian tension, resulting in the deaths and injuries of security personnel and members of the Druze community. In response, military forces intervened and a curfew was imposed. Additional clashes took place earlier in the month in Barzeh on April 5 and in al-Qadam on April 18.
Several large-scale attacks and disruptions were recorded throughout the month. Vital roads were affected, including the blockage of the Damascus airport road on April 25. Kidnappings occurred in Mezzeh and Rural Damascus on April 12 and 17, though the hostages were later released. Additionally, on April 2, Israel conducted an airstrike targeting the Scientific Research Center in Barzeh.
The Damascus governorate also experienced a wave of non-violent civil protests, including a student rally on April 6 opposing recent decisions in the education sector, a pro-Gaza demonstration on April 7, and another protest on April 28 demanding the release of Issam Buyadhani. Meanwhile, the release of several former regime officers, including Ali Rabi’a, sparked widespread public outrage.
Several violent incidents were also reported, including the killing of four young men in Osh al-Warwar and a shooting that left two dead on as-Sweidaa-Damascus road. In addition, devastating fires broke out in Baramkeh, Hareeqa, and Douma, while an explosion occurred on the Southern Ring Road.
Security measures were reinforced in Sahnaya and al-Qutayfah with the installation of additional checkpoints following the unrest in Jaramana. On April 17 and 18, it was announced that several former opposition leaders, including Dhirar Hishan, had joined the newly formed Syrian army. Meanwhile, on April 19, the Ministry of Interior opened recruitment for the Military Training Directorate.
Throughout April, Idlib Governorate saw heightened security activity focused on pursuing remnants of the former regime and strengthening stability in the southern villages, particularly in the Jabal al-Zawiya region. Early in the month, General Security carried out raids that led to the arrest of several pro-Assad militiamen (shabeeha), even after the remnants responded with armed resistance.
On April 3, security forces redeployed to the villages of Jabal al-Zawiya, establishing a security cordon around areas suspected of harbouring collaborators with the Assad regime. The following day, April 4, personnel launched operations targeting homes believed to shelter fugitives. From April 10, the Syrian army then strengthened its security measures by setting up new checkpoints around Idlib city to prevent the infiltration of dangerous elements, based on intelligence reports.
By mid-month, relations between the local population and security forces had improved significantly, as the new government adopted more flexible and respectful policies toward civilians. On April 25, the Ministry of Defence announced the opening of recruitment for the General Security service, targeting individuals between 20 to 40 as part of a plan to expand, refresh and modernise its personnel. The month concluded with the opening of a new police station in the village of Josef on April 29, aimed at strengthening the security presence and consolidating stability in the area.
Throughout April, rural Aleppo experienced a range of security and military incidents, including raids and arrests, assassinations, armed clashes, and criminal cases, alongside notable changes in military leadership. The month began with a General Security campaign in the village of Firziyya in the Azaz countryside targeting National Army members accused of past crimes. On April 2, a landmine detonated by the SDF near Manbij resulted in a massacre of members of the Bu Banna tribe, and was followed by further shelling and kidnappings.
On April 3, Internal Security Forces redeployed to the Nayrab Camp following a clash with a criminal gang, leading to the arrest of individuals responsible for unrest in the area. The next day, April 4, 97 SDF prisoners were handed over to Internal Security as part of a prisoner exchange. Security operations targeting drug trafficking in Tal Aran and Sfeera resulted in the seizure of tens of thousands of captagon pills. Meanwhile, the Midan police in Aleppo recovered $45,000 stolen from a currency exchange company.
In the city of al-Bab, authorities managed to dismantle a criminal gang responsible for the murder of Ali Qaddour following his kidnapping. Concrete barriers were removed from in front of the Political Security branch in the Sulaymaniyya neighbourhood, and a motorcycle theft gang was arrested in Jarablus. Meanwhile, a violent clash broke out in the Sheikh Saeed neighbourhood involving the Mido family, resulting in the deaths of six family members. On April 22, a massive fire at a gas station in al-Bab caused extensive damage, prompting decisions to relocate gas stations away from residential areas. On April 23, over 6,000 captagon pills were seized, and three members of the Mu’tasim Brigade were killed in Afrin, during an incident which was later determined to have been motivated by personal reasons.
Several new appointees were confirmed in the Aleppo governorate during April; most notably within the 80th Division on April 18, where al-Mu’tasim Abbas, Salim al-Tamer, and Muhammad Nasser Tafash were appointed to leadership roles. On April 24, Hashem Abu Azzam was named deputy head of military security in Aleppo, with expanded authority over the northern and eastern countryside. Additionally, journalist Ismail al-Raj was assigned public relations duties within the General Security service on April 10.
In April 2025, Aleppo itself experienced an intense uptick in security activity, including prisoner exchanges, increased coordination between local forces, pursuits of regime remnants, and a rise in crime and assassinations. On April 3 and 4, a group of SDF members left the city as part of a prisoner exchange with the Syrian government. Weapons were also seized in the Nayrab Camp following riots. On April 13, General Security and Asayish forces collaborated in the Ashrafiyya and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods, removing earth mounds and installing joint checkpoints.
Assassinations have surged sharply, including the killing of the mukhtar of the Salah al-Din neighbourhood on April 11, Dr. Hussam al-Dhareer on April 22, Sheikh Muhammad al-Hajj Barakat in Sfeera, and Wael Shamma in the Zibdiyya neighbourhood on April 29. Violent clashes erupted in the Sheikh Saeed neighbourhood on April 23, resulting in six deaths. Additionally, two soldiers were killed in Afrin on April 28 in a personal dispute.
On the criminal front, multiple robberies were thwarted by the successful arrest of gangs in Sfeera on April 7 and 8, as well as in Kallaseh and Midan. Large sums of money and stolen property were recovered. The group responsible for robbing and killing Ali Qaddour and Bilal al-Raslan was apprehended, and Saleh al-Staif—accused of five murders—was arrested on April 22.
The universities experienced an escalation in sectarian tensions on April 28, marked by hostile chants that led Druze students to leave, followed by a stabbing incident the next day. Regarding landmine incidents, five civilians—including two children—were injured in Tal Hudayya and Umm al-Joloud. Additionally, a gas station fire in al-Bab on April 23 caused dozens of injuries.
General Security conducted significant operations, arresting a drug dealer in Tal Aran on April 5 and apprehending children who had stolen a large sum of money. It also held training courses to enhance personnel capabilities on April 20. On April 30, Abdul Aziz al-Ali and his brothers were arrested in Khanaser during efforts to track down remnants of the former regime.
In April 2025, Daraa Governorate saw a significant escalation in security and military operations. The most notable event was the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade faction following the killing of its leader, Bilal al-Masatfa al-Duroubi, during a raid on April 3. This was followed by the deployment of security convoys in Busra al-Hareer and the imposition of a curfew. On April 5, an agreement was reached to surrender headquarters, heavy weapons, and those involved. Subsequently, on April 6, a widespread arrest campaign took place in Msayfrah, Jiza, and Saida, accompanied by the confiscation of weapons and vehicles, which was met with popular approval.
On April 1, Sanamayn came under a coordinated armed attack involving mortars and machine guns, injuring a member of the General Security. Clashes also broke out in Qarfa during an attempt to arrest a former member of the Popular Committees. The very next day, Israel launched airstrikes on Tal al-Jumu’ and Harsh Tseel, causing casualties, and dropped warning leaflets over the town of Koya. Meanwhile, security forces intervened to quell an armed clash in Jassem.
On April 4, former regime officer Muhammad al-Ghazali was arrested while attempting to flee to Lebanon, along with several former Air Force Intelligence officers. On April 6, Muhammad al-Rifai’i died in custody of a heart attack, prompting an investigation. Then April 7, counterfeit currency was seized in Dael, and the following day, stolen goods belonging to the Transport Directorate were recovered.
On April 10, a campaign was launched to prevent scrap metal trafficking in Sanamayn, and a missile depot was seized between Daraa and Atman. A tribal reconciliation was also reached in Jaleen, and a fact-finding committee was established. On April 11, security forces conducted another raid on a missile depot. On April 14, Muhammad al-Sukhni survived an assassination attempt on the road to Khirbat Ghazaleh, and the Masmiyya District Headquarters was opened in the northern part of the governorate.
Mid-month saw several service-related developments, including the return of a medical department to the Ministry of Health and the opening of the Busra al-Sham district on April 15. On April 16, an armed clash in Sheikh Maskeen left one militant dead, while a UN convoy was observed near Ma’arba. The following day, a disarmament campaign was launched in al-Faqee’ and al-Dalli, accompanied by a voluntary weapons surrender initiative in Ma’arba.
On April 20, a large quantity of hashish and captagon was confiscated following a clash in Saida, and Muhammad Bajbouj was arrested on charges of murder and thuggery. The next day, security forces conducted raids in Dael and Ibta’a, seizing weapons and redeploying troops to al-Faqee’. On April 22, a booby-trapped house was detonated in Sheikh Maskeen, and an ammunition depot was uncovered in Busra al-Sham.
Assassinations persisted throughout the month, culminating on April 25 with the killing of Omar al-Jahmani, a suspected drug trafficker. This brought the total number of cases to nine, including six former Free Syrian Army members. On April 27, explosive devices were seized in Sanamayn, and two of the most wanted suspects were arrested.
The month concluded on April 28 with a large-scale security campaign in the Lajat area and the deployment of a UN patrol to the village of Ain Dhikr. Residents of Downtown Daraa issued a statement demanding accountability for those who insulted the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Meanwhile, the Security Directorate recovered significant quantities of stolen medicine in Sanamayn.
In April 2025, as-Sweidaa Governorate saw limited security developments that nonetheless highlighted rising tensions between the local population and security forces, with sensitive sectarian and social issues emerging. On April 5, two young men, Adham Abboud and Uday Abu Zeidan, were arrested after ammunition was found forgotten in their car while they were returning from Damascus; they were later released. On April 24, Qaisar al-Bad’eesh and Raed Jammoul were detained following a sectarian altercation with security personnel, a case which was later resolved through the intervention of the Men of Dignity. On April 27, 21 as-Sweidaa residents were arrested in the Homs countryside while traveling to a civil event in Raqqa; they were subsequently released on bail.
Tensions peaked on April 26 when brothers Muhammad and Abdul Rahman al-Fawwal were attacked on the Damascus-Sweidaa road near al-Matla, part of a series of indiscriminate assaults targeting as-Sweidaa residents in the southern countryside of Damascus. In kidnapping incidents, Hatem Abu Sa’ad was abducted on April 24 while traveling to Lebanon and later found dead; checkpoint guards were accused of involvement in the murder. Transportation director Faisal Shehayyeb was also kidnapped but was released following negotiations in exchange for the freedom of one of the kidnappers.
On April 7, a committee from the Ministry of Interior interviewed several former officers from as-Sweidaa Police Command. The goal was to reinstate them as part of efforts to stabilise security and restore local confidence after they had been placed on leave following the fall of the regime.
Overall, the security situation in as-Sweidaa remains fragile, marked by sporadic escalations and clashes with security forces. The lack of a genuine consensus on the role of the new security services keeps the ceasefire fragile and potentially volatile.
In April 2025, many Syrian governorates experienced a marked escalation in security and military challenges, with tensions most stark in Damascus, Daraa, and Aleppo, followed by Homs and Idlib. Meanwhile, as-Sweidaa saw low-intensity but highly sensitive tensions. Key developments included mass arrest campaigns, violent clashes, kidnappings, and assassinations, alongside an increase in explosions, fires, and sectarian attacks. The most significant incidents were concentrated in:
- Daraa: Nine assassinations were recorded, the most notable occurring after the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade. Security raids covered six towns and villages, and two missile warehouses were uncovered.
- Aleppo and its countryside: Over six assassinations, including prominent local figures, and four family or factional clashes were reported. Authorities seized more than 10,000 captagon pills, and several major explosions and fires occurred.
- Homs: Although limited in number, clashes were high-risk, including direct targeting of regime remnants, cross-border shelling from Lebanon that injured civilians, and decisions to restructure military forces.
- Idlib: A gradual improvement in security was observed, marked by preemptive raids—particularly in Jabal al-Zawiya—and the initiation of new recruitment efforts for the General Security.
- as-Sweidaa: Although tensions remained low in intensity, they carried sensitive sectarian overtones. The month saw the arrest of more than 25 individuals, as well as regionally driven kidnappings and killings. Efforts to contain the situation included reinstating previously dismissed police officers.
- The number of documented security incidents—including arrests, clashes, assassinations, kidnappings, fires, and explosions—reached approximately 120 across all governorates. These included 18 assassinations and nearly 30 raids. Meanwhile, military reassignments increased, with at least six new appointments to sensitive security positions, reflecting efforts to contain unrest and reestablish the local balance of power in different regions.
Indicators suggest that the greatest challenge facing the transitional authorities is not merely dismantling remnants of the former regime, but managing the deep-rooted security chaos fueled by local power centres and the lingering effects of sectarian and regional conflict. As a result, the security situation remains one of the most complex and intractable issues at this early stage of Syria’s reconstruction.
Politics and Society
Security developments in April dominated southern Syria and the outskirts of Damascus in April, leading to a noticeable decline in civil society activity—particularly in as-Sweidaa. However, the region saw increased political and religious engagement, marked by the publication of statements both in support of and opposition to the government’s actions. Some statements, such as those issued by the Men of Dignity Movement, endorsed the government’s presence under existing agreements. Others, like that of the Syrian Brigade Party, rejected the government’s broader conduct, including its constitutional declaration, military restructuring, and the presence of General Security personnel in the governorate. As a result, political activity in as-Sweidaa surged in April—not as a product of sustained momentum or engagement, but rather in reaction to unfolding events. Elsewhere, political engagement remained consistent, with ongoing initiatives such as the Syrian Women’s Dialogue Conference held in Aleppo.
On the political front, the most significant international development was the speech delivered by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Sheibani at the United Nations and the Security Council, signaling the Syrian Foreign Ministry’s efforts to open new diplomatic channels aimed at lifting international sanctions.
The second key event was the United Kingdom’s decision to lift sanctions on 13 Syrian entities, including the cessation of a ban on oil imports from Syria. However, the lifted sanctions notably included the now-defunct Air Force Intelligence Directorate of the Assad regime and Sana TV—both of which no longer exist within the current security or media apparatus. This raises questions about whether the move was limited to obsolete entities or if it signals a broader British position suggesting that Syria’s core security structure will remain intact, with reforms limited to surface-level changes.
Regarding personal freedoms, no general violations were officially recorded in April. However, two nightclubs in Damascus were reportedly raided, without an official statement on the matter from the Ministry of Interior. Eyewitnesses claimed that these establishments were not merely entertainment venues but also sites of illicit activity, including the employment of minors in exploitative professions and drug trafficking. Meanwhile, residents of Ma’araba staged demonstrations demanding the closure of nightclubs located in residential areas, citing excessive noise and its negative impact on children.
As a result, the focus of Syrian political activity shifted from hosting diplomatic visits in the months following the fall of the Assad regime to engaging in external diplomacy aimed at breaking the isolation imposed during Assad’s rule. These efforts seek to open new economic channels and promote Syria’s emerging presence on the international stage. This diplomatic outreach has coincided with a cautiously favourable political climate at home, marked by the continuation of political freedoms and a general absence of interference in civil liberties across the country.
Economics and Services
April 2025 saw a series of regional and international economic and trade developments concerning Syria, amid growing discussions about the country entering a new phase of economic openness. These developments suggest a shift in perception among some states, recognizing that Syria’s next phase will be focused more on economy and reconstruction than security or military concerns. On April 2, the US administration imposed high customs duties on imports from several countries, including a 41% tariff on Syrian exports—the highest rate among the Arab countries affected. However, this move is best understood within the broader context of US economic policy, rather than as a reflection of its political stance toward Syria.
As part of efforts to revive economic ties with Syria, the Turkish Minister of Trade made an official visit to Damascus on April 16. During the visit, he discussed with Syrian officials ways to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries. The talks covered proposals to establish free zones, activate customs exchanges, and develop partnerships in transportation, industry, and industrial cities. Both sides also expressed their intention to negotiate a comprehensive economic agreement. The Turkish Minister announced plans to organize future reciprocal visits to further strengthen the bilateral partnership.
On the other hand, the Iraqi government resumed delivering a previously pledged wheat grant to Syria, with the first shipment arriving on April 25. Additionally, Russia sent an exceptional shipment of 6,600 tons of wheat to Syria through the port of Latakia, outside the scope of the existing supply agreement between the two countries. These actions indicate a willingness by parties allied with the former regime to re-engage with the new government in Damascus.
Turning to the circulation of currency, the Real Estate Bank of Syria announced on April 8 that it had raised the weekly ATM withdrawal limit to 1.8 million Syrian pounds. It also set branch withdrawal limits at 5 million Syrian pounds for individuals and 10 million for businesses, subject to liquidity availability. The Commercial Bank of Syria also issued a circular on April 23 allowing loans to be repaid or closed in Syrian pounds after exchanging the equivalent amount in US dollars—either in cash or through bank accounts. Bank branches were granted exceptional authority to handle amounts up to $1,000. Despite these measures, the banking network faced a severe liquidity crisis, delaying salary disbursements for some government employees by up to four months. This was driven by increased demand for local currency, coinciding with the return of large numbers of Syrians to the country. The new cash requirement was estimated at around 180 billion Syrian pounds, compared to only 100 billion before the return. These measures reflect the intentions of the new government to adapt to the demands of the transitional phase, especially amid rising monetary pressures from the return of formerly displaced persons. However, the worsening liquidity crisis reveals that the banking structure remains fragile and calls for a radical restructuring or reform of the public financing system.
In a move to support productive sectors, the General Establishment for Electricity Transmission and Distribution issued a decision on April 7 reducing electricity tariffs for industrial zones that are partially or fully exempt from rationing by 21%, lowering the rate to 1,500 Syrian pounds per kilowatt-hour. On April 24, the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports announced the opening of investment opportunities in Syrian free zones, designating several key areas for development, including Damascus, Damascus Airport, Adra, Hassia, Aleppo, Latakia, and Tartous. Registration was set to begin on April 27. These steps reflect the new government’s efforts to position itself as a nuanced provider of targeted economic support and to rebuild confidence in the investment climate. The emerging economic policy appears to seek a balance between promoting economic openness and maintaining centralised control over production factors.
In the agricultural sector, farmers in Daraa Governorate faced a severe crisis due to poor rainfall, which resulted in a decline in the quality of wheat, barley, and legume crops such as peas and beans. Many were forced to use diesel-powered pumps to irrigate their fields from wells, while others resorted to selling their crops as livestock feed. These conditions signal a sharp and concerning drop in agricultural production for the current season.
At the international level, the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Administrator of the UN Development Programme for Arab States announced on April 18 that talks were underway to resume financial support for Syria from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He highlighted a Saudi initiative to repay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank, describing it as an initial step toward securing new financial grants to support reconstruction. The UN statement reflects a cautious international openness toward the new Syrian government and signals a shift from viewing Syria as a failed state to one entering a reconstruction phase—offering the new government an opportunity to engage in development-focused negotiations rather than solely political ones.
For his part, the Syrian Finance Minister confirmed that the country is not currently seeking financial loans from international institutions. Instead, it is focussing on technical support and capacity-building initiatives as part of its broader economic reform plans. This reflects the new government’s intention to avoid the pitfalls of financial dependency and prioritize the development of national capacities and modern institutions. This approach appears to be a strategic effort to build trust both domestically and internationally through a gradual, reform-oriented trajectory.
Signalling a step toward international financial reintegration, an official Syrian delegation participated—for the first time in over two decades—in the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, held in Washington from April 21 to 26. The delegation’s aim was to explore avenues for support and reestablish Syria’s presence on global financial platforms.
Despite progress on economic fronts, the humanitarian crisis in Syria remains severe and acute. On April 21, the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis confirmed that over 16 million Syrians—most of them women and children—still require humanitarian assistance, underscoring the scale of the challenges facing the recovery process. The humanitarian dimension continues to be the greatest test for the new government, as the international community assesses its ability to support vulnerable populations. Delivering effective relief and equitable public services is essential to building both local and international legitimacy.
On the urban front, Damascus Governor Maher Marwan conducted an inspection visit to the Decree 66 Directorate to review progress on the Marota City and Basilia City projects. He affirmed the government’s commitment to addressing obstacles facing investors and contractors, while also striving to meet the needs of the local community as part of the broader urban reconstruction effort. Although the Marota and Basilia projects were initiated under the former regime, their completion under the new government requires a revised approach—one that prioritizes social considerations, fair compensation, and the restoration of rights previously violated in these developments.
Food Prices Across Syria (USD)
Prices of several basic food items in April 2025 saw significant fluctuations compared to March across the governorates of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib. Egg prices dropped by 16% in Damascus and 15% in Aleppo, while onion prices fell by 23% in Aleppo and 14% in Damascus. Potato prices declined by around 10% in Damascus and 3.5% in Aleppo. Tomato prices surged by 50% in Hama but dropped by 36% in Damascus. Meanwhile, bread prices rose by approximately 15% in all governorates, largely due to the increase in the dollar exchange rate rather than changes in its price against the Syrian pound. Prices in Idlib remained relatively stable, suggesting a local balance of supply and demand. These nationwide shifts highlight the volatility of the Syrian market during the transitional phase and underscore regional disparities in the new administration’s capacity to regulate market conditions.
Fuel and Building Material Prices (USD)
Iron prices saw a notable drop in April compared to March, falling by approximately 22.4% in Idlib and 15.7% in Damascus, likely due to reduced demand or new import restrictions. Cement prices declined by about 8.3% in Damascus, remained stable in Idlib, and rose slightly in Aleppo and Hama. In the energy sector, diesel prices increased by 6.4% in Damascus but declined in Aleppo and Hama. Gasoline prices rose modestly in Damascus by 4.6%, while dropping in Hama. Domestic gas prices fell sharply—by 17.9% in Hama and 11% in Damascus—while staying stable in Idlib. These fluctuations reflect ongoing efforts to regulate markets and highlight the varying capacities of governorates to secure essential supplies.
Gold prices rose sharply in April compared to March, increasing by 16% in Damascus, 16.3% in Aleppo, and 15.4% in Idlib. This surge reflects heightened demand for safe-haven assets amid market volatility, as well as global price increases. The dollar exchange rate also climbed—by 13.6% in Hama and 12.3% in Aleppo—while the rise in Idlib was more modest (+1.9%), due to limited demand for the Syrian pound there. The euro followed a similar trend, increasing by 18% in Aleppo and 16.3% in Damascus. The Turkish lira rose by 13.6% in both Damascus and Aleppo. These sharp increases signal a general depreciation of the Syrian pound and point to continued monetary instability.
In conclusion, several economic indicators suggest that Syria is entering a new phase of economic restructuring. Regional developments—such as the Turkish Minister of Trade’s visit to Damascus, the UN Assistant Secretary-General’s announcement of ongoing talks with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the Saudi-Qatari initiative to repay Syria’s debt—demonstrate a clear willingness to rebuild economic partnerships with the new government.
Domestically, monetary measures have been implemented to address the liquidity crisis caused by increased demand for the Syrian pound, although the banking system remains fragile and vulnerable to destablisation. Efforts to reduce industrial electricity prices and expand investment opportunities represent a cautious attempt to restore investor confidence. In the goods markets, prices of iron and gas have significantly declined, while gold and foreign currency prices have risen by over 15%, reflecting weak monetary stability and a continued decline in the Syrian pound. Food prices have also been affected by local fluctuations and uneven market control across governorates. Despite these recovery efforts, the persistent humanitarian crisis continues to challenge the new administration’s ability to revive the economy.
