In late April 2025, armed groups launched sudden, violent attacks on several Syrian Druze-populated areas, including Jaramana, Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, and villages in the west of as-Sweidaa. The assaults escalated rapidly, and lacked any clear provocation. Given their timing and execution, the attacks appeared premeditated and designed to inflame sectarian tensions. The initial outbreak of unrest was notionally sparked by a fabricated recording of a Druze leader criticising the prophet Mohammed, which was swiftly exposed as fake.
Even though the Ministry of Interior issued an official statement confirming the recording’s inauthenticity, protests erupted in several cities, and the security situation quickly deteriorated. The sequence of events raises serious questions over the actors involved, and those who stood to benefit from the ensuing instability—as well as the motives behind such a calculated escalation, particularly in the absence of any plausible explanation for the outbreak of violence.
The violence resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries. Despite efforts by the General Security forces to contain the attacks, tensions persisted for several days. In response, the government in Damascus sought to negotiate an agreement to reassert state control over the Druze-populated areas of Jaramana and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya. However, the agreement has faced complex obstacles, preventing its full application on the ground. As a result, the situation remains tense and uncertain.
These events unfolded amid intense inter-communal tension, and call for a deeper analysis of their trajectory and broader implications. The recent escalation cannot be viewed in isolation from the climate of unrest that preceded—particularly the events on the Syrian coast in early March 2025, which claimed hundreds of lives and led to the collapse of the agreement between the government and the SDF. These developments have left deep psychological and societal scars on Syria’s fledgling state, further entrenching divisions among fellow citizens and creating fertile ground for future unrest. In such a febrile atmosphere, even a manufactured incident like a circulating audio recording can push on the open door of social divisions to ignite a violent outbreak—as seen in the recent events.
This paper analyses the recent events, examines the roles of the actors involved, and explores local, regional, and international responses—including the part that Israel has to play—while also anticipating possible future scenarios.
- Underlying Causes
In addition to the overall climate of tension and fear, several contributing factors helped worsen the situation and created a fertile ground for unrest. Chief among these was a lingering sense of resentment among some Syrian Druze—and shared by many Syrians—over the exclusion of key communities from political conferences organized by the transitional government, such as the Victory Conference and the National Dialogue Conference. The dismissal of thousands of employees from state institutions across Syria, including the military, security forces, police, and civil services in Druze areas, was widely perceived as an undeclared policy of sectarian exclusion.
Concerns have also risen over the security dominance of external actors—some of whose statements clashed with the values and way of life in Syrian Druze communities. As a result, the local population resisted initial calls for the state to disarm Druze factions, especially given that other factions were being integrated into the national army without facing such demands. Furthermore, the absence of a transitional justice process has led some individuals to pursue personal retribution, fueling a cycle of revenge that lies outside the rule of law. Meanwhile, sectarian hate speech has spread like wildfire on social media through anonymous or externally funded accounts, aiming to demonise particular minority groups and stoke fear and division.
- In the beginning Were Jaramana and Sahnaya
The events began at dawn on Tuesday, April 29, 2025, when an unidentified armed group attacked a General Security checkpoint at the entrance to Jaramana, approaching from the direction of al-Melaiha (al-Naseem axis), at exactly 2:00 AM. The assailants used belt-fed machine guns and mortar shells, sparking panic in the densely populated residential area at the edge of the city. The checkpoint was manned by General Security personnel, some of whom were residents of Jaramana. The fighting lasted for about an hour before reinforcements arrived from within the city. Around three hours later, the attackers launched a second assault that left eight Jaramana residents dead and approximately 30 others injured, several critically. The delayed arrival of General Security reinforcements from until after this second attack has provoked bitter criticism from local residents.
The events in Jaramana did not escalate further, thanks to the intervention of government agencies, factions from as-Sweidaa, and religious authorities who worked to resolve the dispute. However, the following day, confrontations spread to Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, an area home to Druze residents and other groups, which had already been experiencing heightened tensions in recent months. Several civilians were killed in the clashes. A large number of Sahnaya residents fled south to Druze villages in Quneitra, as did some Druze residents of Jaramana, though many returned once the situation stabilised.
The government then dispatched delegations of governors and religious authorities to the areas of conflict in an effort to contain the situation before it escalated further. Despite these attempts, unrest spread to as-Sweidaa, where an armed convoy advanced toward Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya. Clashes also erupted in the Kiswa area with armed groups unaffiliated with General Security, resulting in the deaths of several fighters from those factions. Amid the chaos, the mayor of Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya and his son were also assassinated in their home by unknown gunmen, shortly after a peace agreement was signed. He had appeared the day before in a video alongside General Security forces.
After several meetings between government delegations, including governors and the head of General Security in Rural Damascus and religious, political, and military figures from the affected areas, an agreement was finally reached to contain and de-escalate the situation. The pact called for the deployment of General Security forces in Jaramana and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya and the activation of the March agreement between the Men of Dignity Movement and the Syrian government. According to the agreement, General Security personnel in as-Sweidaa, Jaramana, and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya must select local residents with no criminal records to serve in their ranks.
Personnel should also be assigned to checkpoints in Jaramana using a rotating shift system, ensuring that duties are shared between local General Security volunteers and personnel from outside the area. The new force consists of 200 residents of Jaramana and 100 General Security personnel, who have now assumed control of local security following the withdrawal of military-strength weapons from civilians, leaving only light arms in circulation.
- As-Sweidaa at the heart of events, again
Following the unrest in Jaramana and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, the spark of the clashes lit fires in as-Sweidaa. The village of al-Sawra al-Kubra came under armed attack by rogue autonomous groups, resulting in numerous violations. These incidents exposed deep divisions among the province’s political, religious, and military actors. The schisms lie between those taking a hardline stance against the transitional government, moving from protest to direct political confrontation, and others seeking to reach an agreement. After the convoy from as-Sweidaa was attacked in Kiswa, resulting in several deaths, two main positions emerged within the region:
- The position of the newly formed Military Council in as-Sweidaa—which includes defected officers such as Tariq al-Shoufi—gave full support to demands for federal rule. The council rejected the surrender of weapons and opposed the deployment of General Security forces in the province without international guarantees. This stance was backed by the Syrian Brigade Party and the Syrian Federal Current, both of which expressed solidarity with those rejecting the truce agreements.
- The Men of Dignity and Freemen of the Mountain factions announced their support for the security agreement with Damascus, on condition that General Security personnel be selected from residents of the governorate with no criminal record.
In a striking symbolic gesture, a meeting was held on May 3, 2025, bringing together the Wise Elders (Hikmat al-Hajri, Hammoud al-Hinnawi, Yusef al-Jarbou) amongst others.[1] The gathering concluded with a statement that served as an initial, unofficial negotiating platform. The statement rejected any disarmament in the governorate without a clear and enforceable implementation plan. It emphasized that General Security personnel must be exclusively drawn from local residents and called for explicit guarantees to prevent the militarisation of the political conflict. The statement also stressed the urgent need to initiate a serious and inclusive dialogue with Damascus.
This was followed by a security deployment around as-Sweidaa, particularly in the Lajat area and at the entrance to the Damascus highway. This move suggested that the government continued to view a balance of dialogue and deterrence as the two key levers to avoid further escalation in the region.
An agreement was then reached between representatives of the Syrian transitional government and as-Sweidaa on five key points. These included the activation of Internal Security forces, made up of former Internal Security corps members, the establishment of a judicial police staffed exclusively by residents of the governorate, an immediate ceasefire, and other related measures. The agreement was implemented, and calm was restored. Under the terms of the agreement, General Security would consist solely of as-Sweidaa residents, operating under the designation of “police” and wearing a uniform distinct from that of General Security forces.
In short, during these events, as-Sweidaa became a critical testing ground for the transitional government’s ability to manage internal pluralism, political containment, and effectively control the flow of arms outside the military establishment. The events also revealed that the divisions within as-Sweidaa are no longer solely religious or political. They have evolved into a complex interplay of regional powers, with some supporting certain factions (as in the case of Israel) or shaping demands for autonomy in line with non-Syrian agendas.
- The shadow of Israel
The recent Israeli intervention marked a significant turning point in the inter-communal tensions in southern Syria. Rather than merely monitoring or exerting political pressure, Israel carried out direct airstrikes targeting the vicinity of Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya and other sites, reflecting its growing role as a self-appointed “sect protector” in the Syrian conflict. This unprecedented behaviour set a new precedent for unilateral Israeli intervention, blatant and out in the open, using the pretext of safeguarding the Druze community. It signals a clear effort to solidify Israel’s influence in the evolving landscape of southern Syria following the collapse of the former regime.
Israel officially declared that the strikes were a “warning” aimed at preventing what it described as a “potential massacre” of Druze community members, who had been attacked by what it referred to as “extremist groups.” The raids also included a missile strike near the presidential palace in Damascus, even though a ceasefire agreement had been signed between the government and community representatives less than 24 hours before.
This shift carries significant implications. Israel has openly adopted a policy of “protecting minorities” in Syria, framing its airstrikes in sectarian terms. Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, the Druze spiritual leader in Israel, openly thanked the Israeli Prime Minister for “intervening to save Syria’s Druze.” This rhetoric of sectarian protection emerges against the backdrop of a tense domestic Israeli climate due to the Gaza war, as Netanyahu seeks to rally Druze support at home and demonstrate a commitment to defending their kin abroad. At the same time, the intervention sends a political message to the Syrian transitional government. The strike near the presidential palace was not merely a military warning—it was a symbolic gesture signaling that Israel does not recognise or respect the transitional government’s legitimacy. It also underscored that any future settlement that ignores Israeli interests or border security concerns will remain susceptible to disruption. This posture reflects Israel’s ongoing strategy of “managing chaos” in southern Syria since 2018, albeit with new variations in its current application.
The danger of this model lies in its violation of Syrian sovereignty and its potential to be replicated among other communities. This risks further unraveling the fragile remnants of any Syrian social contract and paves the way for renewed foreign interventions under conditional “humanitarian” pretexts, thereby perpetuating new forms of damaging division in Syria’s social fabric.
Despite Israel’s efforts to position itself as a protector of the Druze community, most Druze in as-Sweidaa and other areas reject this claim, reaffirming their loyalty to the Syrian state and firmly opposing any foreign intervention. Protest demonstrations broke out in several regions, condemning statements made by Israeli officials and stressing that the protection of the Druze is the sole responsibility of the Syrian state.
- The Transitional Government’s response
The events in Jaramana, Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, and as-Sweidaa served as a critical test for the transitional authorities in Damascus in the months following the fall of the Assad regime. Far from being a limited security crisis, they raised broader questions about the government’s ability to establish security, the capacity of its institutions to accommodate a diverse society, and its potential to present a viable alternative to the deeply troubled state it inherited.
The Syrian Ministry of Interior issued a statement denying the authenticity of an audio recording attributed to a member of the Druze community, calling it “fake and baseless.” However, the wording of the statement caused confusion—particularly the part that welcomed what it described as “the Muslims’ rush to defend their Prophet.” This led some to interpret the statement as implicitly justifying the reaction, despite the official denial that any insult had occurred. The contradiction fueled local concerns about the mixed messages in the government’s discourse and raised doubts about its alignment with the later calls for calm.
The government responded to the situation with a two-pronged approach, blending political strategies with security deployments, while avoiding unilateral military solutions. This approach was reflected in immediate de-escalation efforts and the establishment of communication channels. Official delegations, accompanied by General Security officials, were sent to the affected areas to meet with religious leaders and local dignitaries. These meetings led to truce agreements and the deployment of General Security forces in certain regions.
The government proposed to integrate those willing to join the General Security forces as a means of restoring grass-roots legitimacy to state institutions. This initiative opened the door to recruitment and included a mechanism for arms control, excluding anyone with a criminal record or involved in drug trafficking from joining the official security forces. The transitional government’s official discourse avoided labelling the events as “sectarian,” instead framing the issue as a security problem caused by “rogue groups.” This was a clear attempt to downplay the sectarian nature of the events and prevent them from spreading to other regions. Despite these positive steps, the events highlighted the limitations of security control in rural Damascus and the absence of a unified legal framework capable of addressing the demands of local movements in an institutional manner.
These events offered the new central authorities an opportunity to strengthen their security and administrative presence in areas inhabited by Syrian Druze. Agreements were made to deploy General Security forces in regions like Jaramana and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, with the majority of personnel being drawn from these areas. This approach enabled the government to re-establish some of its official presence without directly confronting local factions.
Despite the severity of the events and the resulting deaths and injuries among both civilians and military personnel, the Syrian transitional government has not announced the formation of an official investigation committee to clarify what transpired in Jaramana and Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, or to identify those responsible for the attacks on General Security forces and civilians. This has raised concerns among many local actors. The lack of such action is a clear missed opportunity to build trust between the state and the affected communities, and to establish a clear, institutional narrative of the events, free from local partisan influence.
Some indicators suggest that the recent escalation was not solely the result of local tensions or security missteps, but may also have a personal political dimension. Some have interpreted the incident as an attempt to undermine the new leadership in Damascus, led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who has pursued a flexible approach toward Syrian communities since assuming power and signalled openness to the international community. This approach may face resistance from more hardline elements within the state apparatus or from factions that perceive any settlement as a threat to their interests. In this context, certain events have weakened his moderate stance, forcing him to either retreat or engage in confrontation. This presents the transitional government with a dual challenge, on both security and political fronts.
- Regional and International Reactions
Regional and international reactions to these events and the Israeli escalation varied, and emphasised the need for self-restraint and avoiding actions that could fuel sectarian divisions. Turkey condemned the Israeli airstrikes as an opportunistic exploitation of Syria’s internal tensions and accused Tel Aviv of attempting to export its Gaza crisis to the Syrian arena. France described the violence as having the potential to exacerbate societal schisms within Syria, urging all parties to de-escalate and stressing the Syrian government’s responsibility to maintain public order and prevent such incidents from recurring.
Jordan highlighted the importance of maintaining societal balance in mixed areas and promoting coexistence among diverse communities, in order to prevent localised tensions from escalating into open conflicts. Most regional and Arab countries also condemned the Israeli intervention and bombing. This issue was raised during President al-Sharaa’s visit to France, where he met with President Macron, underscoring its significance to Western countries.
In the same vein, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt travelled in haste to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. He expressed his support for the Syrian state and firmly rejected any notion of “international protection” for the Druze community—a clear response to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri’s proposal.
The United Nations also voiced concern over the escalating sectarian violence, highlighting the gravity of attacks on civilians and security forces. It called for urgent measures to protect the population and restore stability in affected areas. Additionally, the UN stressed the importance of respecting Syria’s sovereignty and warned against foreign intervention under the guise of humanitarian aid.
Overall, international and regional reactions reflected concerns about the fragility of Syria’s transitional phase, viewing the incident as a test of the new government’s ability to avoid being drawn into a vicious circle of internal conflicts and prevent the crisis from being exploited for external agendas that could obstruct the political settlement process.
These developments have cast a shadow over the Syrian transitional government’s image in international circles. The rise in sectarian violence has raised doubts about its ability to maintain security and protect all segments of society—an essential criterion in the international community’s evaluation of any emerging post-conflict authority. While geographically limited, some European capitals view these events as revealing weaknesses in the new administrative and security structures. This perception could delay or complicate future efforts to ease sanctions or provide direct development support, unless the political and social roots of the tensions are addressed clearly and through institutional means.
- Future Scenarios
The developments in Jaramana, Ashrafiyyat Sahnaya, and as-Sweidaa reveal a complex crisis and highlight the challenges of redefining the relationship between the government and various social groups during a transitional phase in which governance rules and mechanisms for managing local diversity remain unsettled. Given the intricate interplay between domestic dynamics and regional influences, three potential scenarios emerge, each varying in terms of escalation and the degree of local and international involvement.
- Scenario One: Gradual Containment and Local Consensus-Building
This scenario is the most realistic and aligns closely with the requirements for local stability. According to this hypothesis, the transitional government pursues a gradual de-escalation strategy, based on flexible understandings with moderate religious and community leaders. The required approach involves the orderly dismantling of armed groups through local agreements on the surrender of weapons, guided by a clear timetable. At the same time, it calls for restructuring the General Security forces to allow the integration of residents from areas experiencing inter-communal tensions. Achieving this scenario depends on establishing permanent channels of dialogue with religious leaders and local factions to build mutual trust and lay the foundation for long-term stability—all without resorting to violence or exclusion.
The success of this scenario depends on several key factors: the credibility and effectiveness of government guarantees, the availability of regional political support—particularly from Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries active in Syrian affairs—and the containment of sectarian incitement spread through externally funded social media networks. Equally important is the new authorities’ ability to bring factions and rogue elements under control, dismantle them, and integrate their members into the new national army.
- Scenario Two: Gradual Escalation Toward a Comprehensive Internal Confrontation
This scenario represents the most dangerous outcome for Syria. It is likely to unfold if the de-escalation process between the transitional government and local factions in as-Sweidaa breaks down. Such a failure of dialogue efforts may be caused by the government reneging on its commitments to integrate residents of the governorate into the security framework, a lack of transparency in restructuring local institutions, or the transitional authorities’ inability to control rogue factions and elements.
A prolonged political and security deadlock could lead to a gradual slide into open internal conflict, beginning with localised clashes between opposing groups—such as the Military Council, which rejects any settlement, and factions like the Men of Dignity and the Sheikhs of Dignity. Hardline elements may escalate tensions through rhetorical or direct actions, including inciting unrest, or targeting culturally and morally significant figures. Such developments would pose a serious threat to social stability and severely damage the transitional government’s credibility as a guarantor of civil peace.
In this scenario, as-Sweidaa becomes a complex battleground, exploited by arms and drug smuggling networks that flourish in the absence of state control. These networks create a parallel armed economy that would be challenging to dismantle in the future.
Another, though currently unlikely, scenario is the gradual internationalisation of the Druze issue. This scenario poses a significant risk if Israeli intervention escalates or if international calls for special protection of the Syrian Druze community gain traction. Such efforts could fuel a narrative of religious persecution, potentially justifying foreign intervention. This path would undermine the legitimacy of the transitional government, threaten its control over security and political decision-making, and pave the way for international intervention and the imposition of non-Syrian federal arrangements under the pretext of protecting minorities.
- Recommendations
In light of recent events and the Israeli escalation, the likelihood of regional states exploiting internal challenges in Syria has markedly increased. This calls for a balanced approach that combines maintaining security with strengthening community partnerships, based on the following principles:
- Security and Institutional Reform
- Opening membership to all eligible Syrians without exception, integrating disciplined elements from regional areas into the General Security forces, while excluding individuals involved in crimes or drug trafficking.
- Gradually disarming factions and restricting weapons to the state, ensuring strict security vetting without discrimination between groups.
- Enhancing security coordination with neighbouring countries and other states actively involved in Syrian affairs.
- Developing a clear strategy for DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) programmes, starting with the establishment of a well-defined structure for the new army and a time-bound roadmap.
- Enhancing Dialogue and Building Trust
- Initiating a participatory local dialogue with religious, political, and societal leaders to solidify the ceasefire, prioritising political and social authorities.
- Establishing local committees to oversee the implementation of agreements and monitor issues related to recruitment and conflict resolution.
- Providing legal guarantees to protect individuals who have not committed violations from prosecution.
- Ensuring genuine and inclusive participation in power-sharing.
- Strengthening National and Media Discourse
- Countering sectarian incitement campaigns by issuing statements and declarations that clarify the nature of current events and the government’s response.
- Reaffirming respect for pluralism within the framework of the state, without resorting to quotas or sectarian exclusion.
- Linking Security and Development
- Launching small development projects in areas emerging from tension as an incentive for stability.
- Supporting community reintegration programs and establishing a transitional justice body composed of political and legal figures, with clear bylaws, working mechanisms, and binding rules.
Conclusion
Recent events have tested the transitional Syrian government’s ability to maintain security and manage social diversity, amid the lack of political consensus and the influence of regional and international interventions. These events have also exposed deep divisions within as-Sweidaa’s social fabric, once solely solely religious, now grown into political and military disputes. At the time of writing, there is now a competition for representation and leadership of the local community, with one faction advocating for involvement in the new state project and another pushing for greater independence. Despite the agreements that have been made, their foundations remain fragile and prone to collapse.
Recent events underscore the profound challenges facing Syria during its transitional phase. These challenges extend beyond localised security disturbances, revealing the delicacy of societal balances and the competing local and regional agendas. They also raise a crucial question about the new transitional government’s ability to manage societal diversity and control violence on the streets of Syria without succumbing to sectarianism or reinforcing the logic of quotas, which undermines the concept of a modern state.
In contrast, the Israeli intervention has set a dangerous precedent—not only due to its military threat but also because of its explicit adoption of a sectarian protectionist discourse. This threatens to turn issues for minorities in Syria into a tool of long-term political manipulation at the international level. The danger of this intervention lies in the potential for it to serve as a model for other groups within Syrian society, such as Christians, Kurds, or Alawites. This directly undermines the principle of national sovereignty and jeopardises the unity of the state’s military and security decision-making.
Further complicating the situation, some of the sectarian escalation in tense regions was fueled by media campaigns led by anonymous, fake accounts that spread division and hatred. This can be seen as part of a “directed information war” aimed at undermining the political transition and destabilising society from within.
Ultimately, the fundamental challenge lies not only in containing potentially explosive crises, but also in transforming temporary settlements into sustainable solutions rooted in genuine local partnership, institutional justice, and the sovereignty of a unified state. Achieving this requires avoiding the pitfalls of sectarian quotas and veiled forms of patronage which obstruct the creation of an inclusive national contract.
Despite the success of immediate efforts to contain the current crisis, the risk of renewed sectarian violence remains alarmingly high, primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive strategy for addressing the root causes of tension. The fragility of the situation is further compounded by the transitional authorities’ failure to develop effective early warning systems for sectarian threats. They also lack the rapid response mechanisms necessary to prevent escalation and protect civilians from its devastating consequences.
These events highlight the fragility of the current situation and the challenge of building a political system that can accommodate and manage diversity without slipping into sectarianism or chaos. Successfully containing tensions requires more than short-term security agreements—it demands a state project grounded in genuine partnership, justice, and institutional clarity, free from the logic of quotas or sect-based exclusion.
[1] “The Suweida Agreement: A Step Towards Stability or a Fragile Security Arrangement?” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, May 4, 2025, accessed May 5, 2025: https://bit.ly/44p4zfg
