Introduction
The decision to disband the Eighth Brigade in Busra al-Sham in April 2025 marked a pivotal moment in the post-Assad era in Syria. This military formation had been one of the most significant outcomes of the Russian-brokered settlement in southern Syria since 2018. The brigade had played a key role in maintaining the balance of power within Daraa Governorate—first between the opposition and the regime, and later between Moscow and Damascus—culminating in the formation of the Southern Operations Room and its involvement in entering the capital following the Assad regime’s collapse. However, the decision to disband the brigade was not an isolated event; it reflected deeper structural transformations taking place in Syria during a sensitive transitional period. At this stage, the emerging state was striving to unify its military institutions, reassert sovereignty over national territory, and lay the groundwork for building a cohesive national army capable of ensuring long-term stability and preventing a relapse into chaos or the reemergence of non-state armed groups.
Organizational and Historical Background of the Eighth Brigade
The Eighth Brigade was established in July 2018 following a Russian-brokered settlement between opposition factions and the Syrian regime,[1] which came after a regime-led military campaign in Daraa Governorate supported by Russia. Composed of former fighters from the Sunni Youth Forces led by Ahmed al-Awda, the brigade became part of the Russian-controlled Fifth Corps. By 2021, the brigade had maintained a degree of autonomy despite its formal subordination. It was not directly under regime command but operated in a dual capacity: as a local armed group with strong organizational structure and as an instrument of Russian influence in southern Syria. Its presence contributed to securing large parts of eastern Daraa and played a role in combating ISIS cells. Additionally, it conducted high-level negotiations with Russian officials, granting it influence that exceeded that of most military formations established after 2018.
The hybrid nature of the Eighth Brigade—as a former opposition faction operating within the semi-official framework of the Fifth Corps—allowed it to function as an intermediary force, maintaining a degree of local security while avoiding direct confrontation with the state. At the same time, its autonomy in field decision-making within its areas of control made it a constant target of surveillance by the Assad regime’s security and military apparatus.
In late November 2024, Operation Deterrence of Aggression was launched, leading to the formation of the Southern Operations Room under the leadership of Ahmed al-Awda. On December 8, the Eighth Brigade entered Damascus, becoming the first military force to establish a presence in the capital following the regime’s collapse. This move gave the brigade symbolic importance in the power transition and allowed it to build both a media profile and popular support.
Despite its achievement, the Eighth Brigade was not immediately disbanded. Instead, it maintained control over its territory in eastern Daraa, reflecting ambiguity about its role—whether as part of the emerging state or as an independent field actor with its own vested interests. Rather than promptly ceding territory or fully integrating into the new military structure, the brigade began negotiating from a position of strength, prompting concern among key figures in the transitional government. This hesitation led to security clashes and internal accusations, including allegations of corruption within the brigade and efforts to retain influence through local loyalties.
Dismantling: The Decision and Its Immediate Implications
In April 2025, the city of Busra al-Sham in eastern Daraa witnessed a series of complex security and military events, beginning with an assassination attempt on Bilal al-Droubi, a senior official in the Ministry of Defense, on the evening of April 10. Masked gunmen opened fire, wounding him and causing his eventual death after being transported for treatment. This incident sparked rapid changes in the security landscape, immediately followed by a heavy deployment of General Security units in the area under the pretext of pursuing the attackers and restoring stability. At the same time, the General Security Directorate issued orders for members of the Fifth Corps and the Eighth Brigade to surrender their weapons, particularly in Busra al-Sham, where the local security brigade was heavily concentrated.
In the early morning hours of April 11, 2025, security convoys, backed by dozens of vehicles, made their way to the outskirts of Busra al-Sham while negotiations were ongoing with local dignitaries to hand over those responsible for the assassination. At the same time, mosques issued calls for members of the Eighth Brigade to surrender themselves and their weapons, amidst signs of the faction’s disintegration. The brigade was accused of being directly responsible for the assassination, as it was the only faction recently integrated into state institutions as a public security force.
On the same day, it was officially announced that the state was moving to disband the Eighth Brigade, led by Ahmed al-Awda, due to the collapse of previous agreements that had facilitated its integration into official institutions. Local sources confirmed the arrest of Fifth Corps members in the town of Jiza, while a siege of Busra al-Sham continued from all directions. These actions were accompanied by popular demonstrations calling for the brigade’s withdrawal from the city and demanding that those responsible for Bilal al-Droubi’s death be held accountable before his funeral could take place. This unrest was fueled by recent actions taken by the brigade that had incited local opposition.
Despite the announcement of a preliminary agreement to hand over four wanted individuals, tensions resurfaced when the full implementation of the agreement stalled, prompting the dispatch of new convoys to the neighboring town of Sura. In response, official authorities imposed a curfew in Busra al-Sham and suspended school attendance in the city as part of enhanced security measures.
In the following days, the Public Security Directorate continued its raids and arrests, targeting leaders and members of the Eighth Brigade. This coincided with the reopening of former detention facilities operated by the faction, and the transfer of detainees to the city of Daraa for review of their files. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense assumed control of all the brigade’s military headquarters and assets, including heavy weapons. Captain Muhammad al-Qadri was appointed to oversee the handover process.[2]
With the conclusion of this phase, authorities announced the opening of an official security center (district and police station) in the city, with officials from the governorate present. This move signified an effort to consolidate institutional presence and solidify the transfer of security authority from local factions to the state. It was confirmed that the leaders of the Eighth Brigade, including Ahmed al-Awda, remained in the city, despite rumors of their departure from the country. Meanwhile, residents began filing lawsuits against several of these leaders.
On April 20, an official military meeting was held in Busra al-Sham, bringing together officers from the Ministry of Defense, including Colonel Binayyan al-Hariri, commander of the 40th Division. The meeting concluded with plans to regulate the military situation in the city and register new recruits with the ministry in preparation for a training course specifically for local recruits. This meeting marked the end of the Eighth Brigade’s phase and the beginning of an official security restructuring led directly by the state, signaling a new approach to restoring security in the eastern Daraa countryside.
Challenges to Ending Factionalism and Building a Unified National Army
The announcement of the disbandment of the Eighth Brigade was more than a security measure aimed at stabilizing the situation in Daraa; it was a symbolic move signaling the beginning of a project to build a unified national army. According to official discourse, the new Syrian leadership rejects the existence of any armed faction operating outside the state’s institutional framework, regardless of its history, size, or affiliation.
This approach aligns with other agreements, most notably the one signed in March 2025 by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi. That agreement called for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from several neighborhoods in Aleppo and the integration of the autonomous administration’s institutions into those of the state. Similar negotiations are also ongoing with armed groups in Suweida to regularize their status.
The disbandment of the Eighth Brigade is thus part of a broader security strategy to restructure the military sector by integrating de facto forces into the national army. This effort involves redefining Syrian military doctrine to establish a non-ideological, inclusive national institution that is independent of any factional or external influence.
The integration of the Eighth Brigade into the state’s military institutions serves as a critical test of the new Syrian state’s ability to navigate the transition from armed chaos to institutional order. This challenge goes beyond simply incorporating fighters into official structures; it is a complex process shaped by overlapping security, economic, social, and political factors. Complicating matters further is the rise of alternative forms of local control, many of which are rooted in regional or factional loyalties.
This process requires a clear strategic vision operating on three levels:
- Military and Psychological Rehabilitation: Although the brigade’s fighters possess combat experience, they come from diverse backgrounds in terms of discipline, doctrine, and affiliation. Effective integration requires advanced professional training that includes both administrative and security components. Equally important is the reinforcement of military discipline and national loyalty, with the ultimate goal of transforming these individuals from irregular fighters into regular soldiers.
- Fair and Effective Job Classification: Not all fighters are suited for integration into the army; some may be more appropriate for roles in the police force or civilian sectors. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense, in coordination with other relevant ministries, must implement a detailed allocation plan based on clear standards of professionalism and competence. This plan should also consider the psychological and economic needs of the fighters, including opportunities for temporary or civilian employment and the provision of appropriate incentives to encourage their positive engagement in public life.
- Establishing a Unified National Doctrine: One of the most pressing challenges facing the new state is the development of a military doctrine rooted in loyalty to the nation rather than to any party, sect, or group. Past experience has shown that armies founded on sectarian or ideological bases often become instruments of oppression or division. To prevent this, the integration of armed factions must be accompanied by the creation of a “national military charter,” adopted by all army personnel, that affirms commitment to the constitution, pluralism, and human rights.
It is important to note that these challenges extend beyond organizational matters to include the broader political and societal context. Some segments of the local population may view the return of state control with suspicion, particularly if it is accompanied by repressive security practices or a disregard for residents’ concerns. The success of this phase, therefore, hinges on the strength of political will to manage the process transparently and a genuine openness to local initiatives for reconciliation and rebuilding trust.
The decision to disband the Eighth Brigade cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader geopolitical shifts in southern Syria and the country as a whole. From 2018 to 2025, the brigade functioned as a tool of Russian influence in the south, leveraging its control over the border, its ability to neutralize Iranian infiltration, and its role in negotiating with tribes and local actors. However, Moscow became increasingly withdrawn after the fall of the Assad regime and the subsequent shift in the balance of power, compounded by its focus on other geopolitical developments and the rise of new local forces.
On the other hand, the disbandment of the brigade marked a victory for the new leadership, which aimed to unify the security structures under a single authority. This decision can be seen as a move to limit external influences—whether from Iran or Russia—on the domestic scene, while also restoring the prestige of the central state in a region that had long been viewed as a “model of armed decentralization.”
Regionally, the decision sends reassuring signals to Arab capitals, signaling that the new Damascus is taking decisive steps toward disarming factions and building a national army. This opens the door to Arab political and economic support, which had previously been contingent on ending security chaos.
In this context, Daraa’s strategic importance as a sensitive geopolitical hotspot becomes clear. Overlooking the border with Jordan, it has long served as a corridor for smuggling and cross-border operations. By disbanding the brigade, the Syrian Interim Government has sent a clear message to Amman that southern Syria will no longer be an uncontested sphere of influence, paving the way for new security partnerships with its Arab neighbors.
Possible Scenarios
Scenario 1: Successful Integration and the Development of a Comprehensive National Model
The successful disbandment of the Eighth Brigade, along with the state’s careful handling of the process, could serve as a starting point for replicating this approach to other factions, ultimately leading to the creation of a unified national army that transcends regional and factional divisions. This scenario is achievable, provided there is a supportive political environment that embraces the idea of a comprehensive national army, free from narrow loyalties. Achieving this requires, first and foremost, strong political support to ensure the government’s full commitment to the vision, along with sufficient financial and technical resources to rehabilitate former fighters and facilitate their integration into state institutions.
Additionally, it will be essential to establish channels of cooperation with international experts specializing in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as well as security sector reform (SSR) programs. These experts can provide the scientific and practical foundations necessary for integrating fighters into a modern military institution. In this model, former fighters could form the core of a multi-sectarian army, united by a national doctrine. This army would be capable of maintaining security in the south, along the borders, and in major cities, ultimately ending the longstanding security chaos.[3]
However, this process faces significant challenges, notably the resistance of some local leaders to losing their autonomy and the lack of institutional expertise required to manage such a complex and comprehensive integration. Additionally, regional powers affected by the centralization of Syrian decision-making may attempt to hinder the process by supporting rebel movements or instigating internal crises. To overcome these obstacles, an independent national body must be established to oversee the integration process with full transparency. This body should be supported by a legal framework that guarantees equality and opportunities for all new recruits, while strengthening popular oversight to ensure the process remains credible and successful.
Scenario 2: Local Resistance and the Reconfiguration of Insurgent Networks
If the state fails to manage this delicate transition and disband the Eighth Brigade as a model, a negative scenario could unfold, marked by the resurgence of local resistance pockets and insurgent networks. This becomes more likely if the authorities treat former fighters solely as security threats rather than as partners in building the next phase. The lack of political, economic, and social guarantees for fighters could drive them to reestablish organized smuggling cells or local resistance networks, especially in the face of a security vacuum or poor management following the disbandment.
Feelings of exclusion and a loss of trust in the new authority will be exacerbated by a fragile economic environment, where high unemployment and a lack of meaningful opportunities push young people toward extremism or violence. Additionally, some regional powers seeking to disrupt Syria’s unification will find fertile ground to reassert their influence by arming or supporting these networks politically and through media channels.
To address these challenges before they escalate, the state must adopt a dual approach that combines security measures with social initiatives. This includes launching genuine community reconciliation programs alongside immediate development projects in affected areas, such as job creation, infrastructure improvements, and the careful integration of fighters into both civilian and military life. Additionally, soft intelligence tools must be developed to detect threats early, avoiding mass repression policies that could worsen the crisis rather than contain it.
Conclusion
If the disbandment of the brigade succeeds, it could serve as a model for resolving the status of other armed factions. This model would involve replicating the negotiation-dissolution-integration process, tailored to the specific needs of each region, ensuring the expansion of state control without triggering widespread conflict. However, this scenario requires the state to be politically and financially prepared to offer genuine incentives, realistic plans, and legal and security guarantees that prevent discrimination while involving local communities in the restructuring process.
The disbandment of the Eighth Brigade is not merely the dismantling of an armed faction; it is a political and security milestone that marks the beginning of shaping post-Assad Syria. This decision demonstrated the transitional leadership’s ability to impose the state’s authority despite the challenges on the ground and the complex web of loyalties. However, the greater challenge lies not just in dismantling the factions, but in building genuine institutions that can unify all Syrians within a single army, one that reflects the aspirations of the revolution and protects the state from the historical risks of coups and fragmentation. Without a comprehensive national integration project based on transparent dialogue, fair participation, and an independent national doctrine, the chaos of post-conflict states will remain a vivid reminder to Syrians of what could unfold if dismantling does not lead to true reconstruction.
[1] The Eighth Brigade’s strength ranged between 1,700 and 2,500 fighters, according to multiple field sources. When it was formed in July 2018 as part of the Russian-brokered settlement, the brigade consisted of approximately 1,800 fighters, most of whom were drawn from the former Sunni Youth Forces faction. As its security and operational activities expanded in eastern Daraa between 2020 and 2022, its numbers gradually grew, reaching an estimated peak of 2,200 to 2,500 fighters.
[2] As part of the disbandment of the Eighth Brigade and the transfer of its military and human resources to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, Captain Muhammad al-Qadri was tasked with coordinating directly with the relevant authorities to ensure a smooth transition. According to local sources, his appointment was aimed at overseeing the handover process in an orderly and coordinated manner, positioning him as a liaison between the Ministry of Defense and the parties involved in the transfer.
[3] Samir Abdullah and Nawwar Shaaban, “Rebuilding Security in Syria: Challenges and Strategies for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, April 11, 2025, accessed April 22, 2025:
https://www.harmoon.org/researches/الأمن-في-سورية/
