State Neutrality Towards Religious Practice in Syria: Results, Conclusions, and Constitutional Recommendations

1

Results and Conclusions

The Syrian Authorities During the Assad Era

An examination of constitutional documents and official literature shows us that the Syrian state had a highly partisan identity during the Assad era. Arab nationalism was wedded to the core identity of the nation. While the limited presence of religious texts in the constitution might appear as a progressive secular feature, in reality it was a result of unspoken sectarian sensitivities.

The Assad regime did not rely solely on Ba’athist ideological loyalty; additionally, it distinguished between Syrians based on personal affiliation and sectarian belonging. Over time, the regime morphed from a model of totalitarian authoritarianism to a sultanistic state, in which familial and sectarian ties formed the social foundation of power. In the civil sector, government appointments and promotions were based on multiple, intertwined factors – such as personal loyalty to President Assad, membership in the Ba’ath Party, financial corruption, and networks of kinship and personal connections.

In general, government jobs in the civil sector were not subject to explicit religious or sectarian discrimination. Nominally speaking, a proportional distribution system was in place to prevent any religious or sectarian group in Syria from feeling excluded or underrepresented. In reality, the influence of an individual in a government position did not depend on their official title or competence but rather on their proximity to the presidential decision-making circle and the entity responsible for their appointment.

The Syrian army and security apparatus were shaped by sectarianism, leveraging group loyalty to President Assad as a political and social pillar. Alawite Syrians enjoyed disproportionate representation compared to other sects, and loyal Alawite officers were granted powers that far exceeded the formal limits of their positions applied to their non-Alawite counterparts. Hafez al-Assad implemented the principle of the “Leadership Triad” in the military, structured along sectarian lines to ensure absolute loyalty to his rule.

The brutally repressive policies of the Assad era contributed to an emerging narrative of Sunni victimhood among broad segments of Syrian society during his era. This, in turn, complicated the political landscape and diminished prospects for the hoped-for democratic transition. The regime sought to establish a superficially homogeneous society, where national identity was centered around the regime itself, its leader, and the Ba’athist ideology – a fundamentally Arab nationalist ideology meant to transcend religions and sects. However, following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution 2011, the regime became even more lenient toward Alawite sectarian speech and patronage, and encouraged Iranian Shiite missionary activities within Syrian communities.

The regime also worked to restrict religious gatherings in general, except for Shiite rituals and processions, which it actively supported. The Syrian authority did, however, demonstrate relative tolerance toward atheism and criticism of religious thought, especially when compared to neighbouring Arab states. This can be attributed to the Ba’athist-leftist ideology of the ruling regime, as well as the sectarian composition of the ruling elite, which was neither Sunni nor Christian. Religious practices were generally prohibited within government institutions, with a few exceptions in some civilian sectors. However, the regime strictly enforced this ban within military institutions.

Religious institutions in Syria have never truly been independent. Both the regime and Islamist opposition groups used religious institutions and places of worship for political mobilization, leading to intense political polarization between religious groups. The Syrian government directly controlled religious institutions and religious education through the Ministry of Endowments (Awqaf), which officially represented only Sunni Islam to the exclusion of other religions and sects. Religious activities were heavily monitored, especially Friday sermons and mosque-related events. As Iranian influence grew, Syria’s official religious institutions were crafted to facilitate the spread of Shiite proselytisation efforts.

From a strictly constitutional perspective, Syria does not have an official state religion. The constitutional clause stating that “Islamic jurisprudence is a principal source of legislation” clearly denotes religious influence, but a relative neutrality compared to more theocratic legal frameworks found in other Arab and Islamic states. Although the Syrian constitution affirms the principle of equality among citizens, in practice, personal status laws are tied to religious sects. This implies that legal equality applies within each religious group, rather than guaranteeing equality between individuals of different religious communities.

The Syrian regime under Assad rule never displayed the political will to adopt a unified civil personal status law that would apply equally to all Syrians. In short, this issue was not simply not a priority for the regime, which was more focused on maintaining stability and control. Moreover, the regime feared that such legal changes could provoke public protest and negative reactions among its power base, which it was unwilling to confront.

Second: The Position of the Islamic Political Spectrum During the Assad Era

The study has examined the positions of four Islamic entities; Hay‘at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian Islamic Council, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNC).

• HTS and the Syrian Islamic Council explicitly rejected the principle of state neutrality toward Syrians’ religious beliefs, advocating for an explicit Islamic religious identity to the state.
• The Muslim Brotherhood presented a somewhat inconsistent vision, supporting an Islamic civic and cultural identity for the Syrian state. However, questions remain about the party’s ability to implement a coherent vision, given the diverse social base it seeks to appeal to.
• The National Coalition (SNC) endorsed an Islamic civilizational identity for the Syrian state but in a broad and vague manner. Their position appears hybrid, attempting to reconcile equal citizenship with traditional Islamic jurisprudential heritage.

The Position of Hay‘at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) During the Assad Era

(HTS) or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant” does not provide officially documented positions on constitutional or political matters in general, nor on the neutrality of the state toward Syrians’ religious beliefs in particular. The group tends to avoid direct statements on such topics. However, based on the final statement of the HTS-initiated “Syrian General Conference” held in Idlib in 2017, the group holds “the Islamic law as the only source of legislation and the need to preserve the identity of the Syrian Muslim people.”

Over time, HTS has gradually distanced itself from global jihadist Salafism and adopted a localized Salafi-Islamic vision. It has also promoted its own Islamic narrative of the Syrian revolution, framing it as a struggle between the Islamic popular movement and the “Nusayri regime” (a pejorative term historically used by Islamists to refer to the Alawite sect). HTS envisions an explicitly Islamic religious identity for the Syrian state, with a rigid ideological backbone that aligns with its version of Islamism.

Key Aspects of HTS’s Religious and Political Vision

• Justice over equality: HTS’s disclosure emphasizes justice rather than equality among Syrians. Concepts like coexistence and tolerance are framed not through equality but through conditional acceptance of religious minorities under an Islamic authority.

• Terminology and religious minorities: HTS avoids the term “Christians” in its religious education materials, instead using “Nasara” (a Quranic term for Christians). They reject Christian and Jewish theological doctrines and promote a critical stance toward them.

• Gradually: By 2023–2024, HTS reduced its use of the term “Nusayris” and shifted to using “Alawites,” a more widely accepted term in Syrian discourse.

• Presidency and religious leadership: the President of the Republic must be “a Sunni Muslim,” as HTS considers there to be a theological prohibition on non-Muslims ruling over Muslims.

• Sunni victimhood: HTS reinforces the narrative of “Sunni grievance” during the Assad era, attributing responsibility to the “Nusayri regime” and its foreign backers.

• Religious classification in official documents: The group appears to support identifying citizens’ religious affiliations in official documents, as it believes such classification is essential for applying Sharia-based personal status laws. However, it rejects sectarian quotas in governance.

• Religious freedom: HTS rejects freedom of belief for Muslims, criminalizing apostasy (conversion out of Islam). It also supports laws prohibiting blasphemy against Islam, but not against other religions. Criticism of core Islamic beliefs is also criminalized under its vision.

HTS’s Approach to Religious Practices and Governance:

• Mandatory religious observance: HTS advocates for compulsory religious practice for Muslims, including both within and outside government and military institutions.

• Rights of religious minorities: Similar to other Salafi movements, HTS acknowledges the right of Christians and Jews to practice their religion and manage their own personal status laws without external interference.

• Legal system and Shariah: HTS upholds Shariah as the sole source of legislation, including the implementation of Hudud (Islamic corporal punishments), such as the death penalty for apostasy from Islam, also known as ridda.

• Application of apostasy laws: While no documented executions for apostasy have been conducted by HTS courts in Idlib and rural Aleppo, the legal threat of such punishment remains a deterrent, leading individuals to self-censor and avoid religious controversy.

• Religious governance: HTS oversees religious affairs centrally through the Ministry of Endowments, Dawah, and Guidance under the Syrian Salvation Government. Additionally, it has established a “Quranic Affairs Directorate” to manage Quran memorisation programmes in mosques and religious institutes.

Conclusion:

• HTS has progressively refined its Islamist governance model, balancing strict Salafi doctrine with pragmatic political control over opposition-held areas. While it has moderated its global jihadist discourse, it continues to reject state neutrality on religious matters, advocating for a theocratic framework that enforces Islamic law as the foundation of governance.

The Position of the National Coalition(SNC), the Syrian Interim Government, and Syrian National Army Factions

• The “Syrian Revolutionary Charter on Human Rights and Public Freedoms” does not include any explicit religious or nationalist references regarding the identity of the future Syrian state. It broadly affirms principles of equality, justice, and competence without delving into the complexities of state neutrality toward Syrians’ religious beliefs. Due to a lack of response from the National Coalition, this study could not determine its precise stance on the issue at the current time.

• The charter emphasizes “freedom of belief” and the state’s respect for all religions and sects. It is likely that the Coalition supports legal measures against blasphemy or religious defamation. Additionally, the National Coalition (SNC) affirms the state’s responsibility to ensure the right to practice religious rituals, without specifying whether this extends to government institutions.
• Religious institutions: The Coalition supports each religious sect’s right to manage its endowments, affairs, and institutions. However, the charter does not define the relationship between the state and religious institutions.
• Religious education: The Coalition supports promoting Islamic culture as part of the educational system, while maintaining openness to other cultural influences.

• Personal status laws: The Coalition acknowledges the existence of separate personal status laws for different religious sects. However, the charter does not explicitly address the religious identity of the state or the sources of legislation. This omission may reflect an effort to avoid ideological conflicts among the Coalition’s diverse political factions, or it may indicate a preference for deferring these matters to a future constitutional assembly or elected parliament.

• State supervision over religious education: While religious groups retain the right to teach their own doctrines, the charter affirms a supervisory role for the state in religious education.
• The Syrian Interim Government, officially affiliated with the National Coalition, and the factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA) generally adhere to a traditional Islamic framework. They operate Sharia offices and religious directorates staffed by Islamic scholars and religiously inclined legal experts.

• The armed factions under the Syrian National Army umbrella lack a defined political or ideological discourse. They tend to avoid publicly expressing their views on state neutrality in religious matter.

The Position of the Syrian Islamic Council (SIC)

• The SIC presents a comprehensive Islamist vision for the state, framing Syria as part of the larger Islamic Ummah. This perspective raises concerns about prioritizing collective religious identity over national character, potentially undermining the formation of a distinct Syrian national framework.

• The Council’s Charter emphasizes “loyalty to God, His Messenger, and the believers”. Moreover, its stance on discrimination based on religious or sectarian identity remains vague and generalized, lacking detailed answers to critical questions regarding equality among Syrians and the freedom of religious practice.
• The Council emphasizes the “freedom of the Syrian people” rather than the freedom of the individual regarding belief, opinion, and expression.

• The SIC advocates for a “unified, moderate religious reference for the Syrian people” to preserve its identity, freedom, and independence, but it does not explicitly address individual freedom of belief or the right to change one’s faith.
• The Council seeks to “apply the rulings of Islamic Sharia”, which, under most traditional applications, would require Muslims to perform religious rituals and penalize those who neglect them (e.g., fasting in Ramadan or attending Friday prayers).

• Apostasy (publicly leaving Islam) is generally criminalized in Sharia-based legal frameworks. Although the Council’s official disclosure does not explicitly mention apostasy laws, its silence on the issue suggests implicit endorsement of restrictions.
• The Council adheres to Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’) as its main reference.

• Unlike some modernist Islamist movements, which focus on broad ethical objectives (Maqasid al-Shariah), the Council emphasizes both the fundamental principles and the detailed legal rules of Shariah.

• It states that “Islam is the source of legislation” (using the definite article “the” in Arabic), but it does not clarify whether Islam is the exclusive or main source of law.
• The Council acknowledges minority rights as defined by Islamic law but simultaneously claims to guarantee full citizenship rights for all Syrians regardless of religion or ethnicity.

• This contradiction suggests a tension between traditional Islamic legal frameworks (which hierarchically define non-Muslim rights) and modern concepts of equal citizenship.

The Position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

• According to the “Covenant and Charter of the Muslim Brotherhood” (2012), the party supports the principle of citizenship, affirming that any citizen has the right to reach the highest positions of power based on elections or competence and that women enjoy full and equal rights under the law.

• However, while this stance theoretically allows for a non-Muslim president, it may not align with the views of the Brotherhood’s traditional support base, raising questions about its practical feasibility. Similarly, the presumed rejection of religious classification on ID cards and sectarian quotas seems at odds with the notion of the Brotherhood as a distinctly religious political identity, which could be seen as an attempt to project a civil image without fundamental changes in its ideological structure.
• The Brotherhood’s dual reliance on “divine laws” and “international conventions” as a reference for human rights raises questions about how contradictions between these sources would be resolved – particularly on sensitive issues like religious freedom and total equality.

• While the party cites Quranic verses such as “Let there be no compulsion in religion” to affirm freedom of belief, its position on public atheism or an individual’s right to change their religion remains unclear, especially considering Islamic legal rulings on apostasy.

• The Brotherhood’s emphasis on intellectual pluralism and peaceful dialogue does not explicitly clarify whether it accepts open criticism of religious beliefs. There may be implicit restrictions that align with its Islamic orientation.

• Regarding blasphemy laws, it is likely that the Brotherhood supports legal measures against religious defamation, aiming to preserve social stability and the Islamic values central to its broader sociopolitical project.
• Religious education is a core component of the Brotherhood’s educational vision, which advocates state funding for religious schools and institutions to sustain Islamic identity through an “Islamic civilizational” approach.

• The Muslim Brotherhood likely supports community-driven funding for religious education while also calling for state involvement in managing religious institutions.

• The Brotherhood also promotes the inclusion of Islamic studies in public school curricula, emphasizing the role of Islamic institutions such as the Grand Mufti’s office and the Ministry of Religious Endowments, ensuring they align with its “Islamic renaissance vision.”
• The gap between its civil political discourse and its religious foundations raises doubts about its ability to implement secular governance while maintaining Islamic commitments.
• Its stance on religious freedom, apostasy, and blasphemy laws remains ambiguous, likely reflecting an effort to balance Islamic principles with democratic rhetoric.

Third: The Nationalist Political Spectrum

In general, Syrian-Kurdish nationalist forces – including The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNCS) – support the principle of state neutrality toward Syrians’ religious beliefs.

For these parties, the primary challenge is Kurdish nationalism, rather than religious neutrality. The main challenge they face is not the state’s neutrality toward religion, but rather its neutrality toward Syria’s different ethnic identities. This suggests that their primary concern is securing recognition and rights for Kurdish identity, rather than debating the role of religion in governance.

The Position of The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)

Based on the revised “Social Contract” document, which is influenced by the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, AANES supports affiliation with a “Democratic Syrian Republic” while emphasizing state neutrality toward religions and ethnicities, as well as equality among all Syrian components.

However, a significant segment of Syrian society may perceive this document as an attempt to impose an ideology that does not align with Syria’s diverse sociocultural fabric. The state neutrality advocated by the document may also be seen as an indirect exclusion of the Islamic identity of the Syrian majority, potentially exacerbating tensions rather than fostering coexistence.

Equality, Identity, and Sectarian Considerations:

• The document affirms equality among citizens regardless of religion and rejects sectarian and ethnic quotas.

• However, it may face popular criticism for overlooking Sunni grievances, as Sunni communities suffered marginalization under the Assad regime.

• There are inconsistencies between official principles and political practice – for instance, a key leader endorsed sectarian quotas as a temporary measure, raising questions about the administration’s true commitment to its stated principles.

• The document rejects the classification of citizens by religion in official documents and leadership appointments, reflecting a desire to strengthen national cohesion.

Religious Freedom and State Neutrality:

• The document strongly supports freedom of belief, conscience, and thought, including the right to change one’s religion and the right to atheism.

• It rejects blasphemy laws to encourage intellectual debate and constructive criticism, while ensuring government institutions remain neutral toward religious beliefs.

• Religious and cultural groups are granted the right to form independent institutions and manage their own affairs.

• The administration advocates for neutrality in education, avoiding religiously oriented curricula.

• It also calls for the financial independence of religious institutions from the state and seeks to reduce the formal role of religion in government by abolishing the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) and the position of the Grand Mufti.

Legislative and Legal Framework:

• The document proposes a neutral constitution that aligns with international human rights standards, ensuring equality among citizens without discrimination.

• It supports the adoption of a unified civil personal status law, promoting citizenship-based legal frameworks and separating religion from legislation.

Challenges and Contradictions:

While AANES’s official documents promote secularism, pluralism, and decentralization, the main challenge lies in practical implementation.

• The gap between theoretical principles and real-world application in Syria remains a significant obstacle.

• Although the document aims to promote coexistence and secure equal rights for all, inconsistencies in implementation threaten its success – especially in a complex and diverse society like Syria.

The Position of the Kurdish National Council in Syria (KNCS)

(KNCS) generally shares a similar vision with The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria regarding state neutrality on religious matters, but it exhibits greater flexibility and openness when it comes to Islamic legal references and their potential role in legislation.

State Identity and Religious Neutrality:

• The KNCS supports a neutral state identity that ensures pluralism and protects the rights of all citizens.

• It rejects the phrases “Islam is the official religion of the state” and “Islam is the religion of the majority of the Syrian people.”

• The Council opposes the requirement that the President of Syria must be Muslim and also rejects the inclusion of religious affiliation on personal identity documents.

• However, notably, the KNCS supports sectarian and ethnic quotas to ensure fair representation of all Syrian communities, setting it apart from the AANES’s anti-quota stance.

Freedom of Belief and Religious Criticism:

• The KNCS supports public atheism as part of freedom of belief.

• It affirms the right to convert between religions and the right to criticize religious beliefs, considering these fundamental aspects of freedom of thought.

• However, the KNCS favors laws that criminalize deliberate insults to religions, aiming to balance free expression with social harmony.

• The Council supports the freedom to practice religious rituals in government institutions, provided that no dedicated religious spaces are assigned within these institutions.

Religious Institutions and Education:

• The KNCS advocates for limited state oversight of religious institutions without direct government intervention.
• It aligns with the AANES’s position on removing religious education from school curricula, replacing it with courses on ethics and religious history.

• The KNCS supports partial state funding of religious schools and institutions, ensuring their independence from full state control.

• The Council favors retaining the Grand Mufti position as a symbolic historical role but without real influence.

• It also supports maintaining the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) as a “Ministry of Religious Affairs” with a limited regulatory role.

Shariah and Personal Status Laws:

• While supporting state neutrality, the KNCS acknowledges that Islamic principles (Shariah), the Quran, Sunnah, and Islamic jurisprudence could be included as one of multiple sources of legislation.

• The Council prefers separate personal status laws that reflect the religious and cultural specificities of each sect in Syria, rather than enforcing a unified civil personal status law.

Challenges and Contradictions:

• The KNCS is a broad political umbrella that includes liberal political factions, socially conservative elements, and secular-leftist groups.

• This internal ideological diversity makes it difficult to pin down a unified stance on sensitive issues like state neutrality on religious matters.

The Position of the Arab Socialist Union Party – ASU (Nasserism)

The ASU, presents a Syrian national identity with a broader Arab nationalist ambition, emphasizing equal citizenship among Syrians while also striving for supranational Arab unity projects. The party’s vision supports the establishment of an independent national state, free from sectarian, ethnic, or religious conflicts. It asserts that ethnic and sectarian groups within Syria have equal rights and responsibilities as part of the national fabric. However, the party’s political disclosures and official documents do not explicitly address the issue of state neutrality toward religious beliefs or the relationship between the state and religious institutions.

The party leadership has not expressed clear positions on key issues such as the state’s official religion, the religion of the president, sectarian grievances, religious quotas, personal status laws, or sources of legislation. Moreover, the party did not respond to inquiries regarding these topics during the study.

In conclusion, the ASU party prioritizes Arab nationalism and equal citizenship but remains ambiguous on the role of religion in governance. Its lack of a clear stance on religious neutrality suggests either a strategic avoidance of divisive issues or a focus on broader nationalist and political concerns over religious matters.

The Position of the Syrian Turkmen Renaissance Party

The Syrian Turkmen Renaissance Party supports the principle of state neutrality toward religions and considers the phrase “Islam is the religion of the majority of the Syrian people” to be detrimental to the religious neutrality of the state.

However, the Syrian Turkmen National Bloc – which represents another segment of the Turkmen political movement – rejects state religious neutrality and instead advocates for a democratic system with an Islamic reference, based on the principle of citizenship, while also demanding political, cultural, and social rights for the Turkmen community.

Religious Identity and Governance:

• The Renaissance Party rejects the requirement that the President of Syria must be Muslim and opposes listing religion on identity documents.

• The party prioritizes competence as the sole criterion for holding office and rejects sectarian or ethnic quotas in governance.

• The party has no clear position on public atheism or religious conversion, likely due to the sensitivity of these issues in Syrian society.

• It supports laws that criminalize deliberate insults to religions.

Role of the State in Religious Affairs:

• The party advocates for limited state supervision of religious institutions without direct government intervention.

• It supports a unified religious curriculum for all students, with a general, descriptive approach rather than sectarian-specific teachings.

• It endorses partial government funding for religious schools and institutes to ensure their independence from full state control.

• The party favors retaining the position of Grand Mufti as a symbolic historical role without real influence.

• It supports maintaining the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) as a “Ministry of Religious Affairs” with a limited regulatory role.

Legislative Vision and Personal Status Laws:

• The party supports a constitution with an Islamic character, stating that the Quran and Sunnah should be among the sources of legislation.

• However, it also supports the adoption of a unified civil personal status law for all Syrians, suggesting a non-discriminatory, flexible interpretation of Islamic legal texts.

Conclusion:

The Syrian Turkmen Renaissance Party presents a hybrid vision, combining state neutrality on religious identity with Islamic legal influences in legislation.

• It advocates for an inclusive legal framework that incorporates Islamic principles without imposing religious governance.

• However, differences within the broader Turkmen political spectrum – particularly between the Renaissance Party and the National Bloc – highlight ideological inconsistencies regarding the role of Islam in governance.

• The party supports religious neutrality in governance while still acknowledging Islamic references in legislation, reflecting a pragmatic approach seeking balance between secular and religious influences.

Fourth: The Secular Political Spectrum and Religious Freedoms

The Syrian Liberal Party and the Political Committee of the Peaceful Civil Movement in as-Sweidaa both advocate for a secular vision that supports complete state neutrality toward Syrians’ religious beliefs. They perceive the state as a functional entity that ensures equal treatment of all citizens regardless of their religious affiliations. However, questions arise regarding the feasibility and challenges of implementing these secular principles within Syrian society, especially considering prevailing cultural and religious traditions.

The Position of the Political Committee of the Peaceful Civil Movement in as-Sweidaa

The Political Committee of the Peaceful Civil Movement in as-Sweidaa adopts an obviously secular stance, rejecting any Arab or Islamic civilizational identity for the state. It opposes the designation of an official state religion and rejects the notion that “Islam is the religion of the majority of the Syrian people.” The committee promotes state neutrality toward religion in supra-constitutional principles, and remains committed to separating religion from politics.

This stance is influenced by several factors, including:

• The Druze community tradition of separating religious and temporal authority.

• Concerns over the imposition of an Islamic identity (particularly Sunni Salafism) on the state if Islamist movements come to power.

Key Positions on Governance and Religious Identity:

• The committee rejects any religious requirement for the presidency.

• While acknowledging Sunni grievances under the Assad regime, it attributes responsibility solely to the ruling political system rather than broader sectarian structures.
• The committee opposes listing religious affiliation in official documents and supports a merit-based system for public office, rejecting sectarian and ethnic quotas.

Religious Freedom and Expression:

• The committee supports the right to change one’s religious beliefs but opposes public atheism.

• It rejects open criticism of religious beliefs, favoring laws against deliberate religious insults.

• It opposes religious practices within government and military institutions, advocating for a strictly secular institutional environment.

Role of the State in Religious Affairs:

• The committee rejects state involvement in religious institutions and opposes religious education in schools.

• It opposes government funding for religious schools and institutions.

• It supports the abolition of positions such as the Grand Mufti and the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) to reinforce the separation of religion and state.

Legislative Approach and Personal Status Laws:

• While advocating state neutrality in legislation, the committee acknowledges that Islamic Shariah and its objectives could be among the sources of law.

• It supports allowing individuals to choose between a civil or religious personal status law, aligning with secular models that ensure religious freedoms.

Challenges and Societal Compatibility: The committee’s liberal proposals may face resistance within the local communities it represents, particularly regarding:

• Religious conversion within the Druze sect, which remains a sensitive issue.
• Support for optional civil marriage, including interfaith unions, which could present practical challenges in implementation within the Syrian social context and pose a challenge to Druze traditional norms.

The Position of the Syrian Liberal Party “Ahrar”

The Syrian Liberal Party “Ahrar” adopts a liberal vision emphasising respect for Syria’s cultural, social, and religious diversity while maintaining that the state must remain neutral toward religion. It opposes designating an official state religion but acknowledges that recognizing Islam as the religion of the majority should be framed in a way that ensures equal citizenship for all.

Governance and Religious Identity:

• The party rejects any religious requirement for the presidency, emphasizing competence as the sole criterion for public office.

• It opposes listing religious affiliation on official documents and rejects sectarian and ethnic quotas, instead advocating for social justice without discrimination.

Freedom of Belief and Expression:

• The party supports absolute freedom of belief, including the right to atheism and religious conversion.

• It supports the right to criticize religious beliefs, provided such criticism not incite hatred.

• Ahrar opposes blasphemy laws, arguing that they conflict with commitments to freedom of expression.

• The party advocates for limiting religious practices within government and military institutions to preserve state neutrality.

State-Religion Relations and Education:

• The party stresses state neutrality in dealing with religious institutions, advocating for financial independence of religious bodies from the state.
• It supports allowing local administrations to include religious education curricula, as long as they avoid hate speech and discrimination.

• It calls for the abolition of the Grand Mufti position and the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) in line with its commitment to state neutrality.

Legal and Personal Status Laws:

• The party advocates for a civil personal status law as the best way to guarantee individual rights, while allowing religious marriage as a voluntary option, provided that it does not contradict the constitution or international human rights conventions.

• In cases of conflict between civil and religious laws, it asserts the primacy of civil law.

Conclusion: The Syrian Liberal Party “Ahrar” strongly promotes state neutrality in religious matters, freedom of belief and expression, and a secular legal system. However, it recognizes the social realities of religious diversity by allowing religious education and marriage as optional choices, provided they comply with human rights principles.

2

Legal and Constitutional Recommendations                                                                                

Embedding Religious Neutrality into Constitutional Recommendations and Provisions

At the conclusion of this study, we have sought to move away from the format of “general recommendations,” which academic research often encourages. Instead, we aim to present a legal and constitutional vision for decision-makers in Syria and any future national conference. This vision serves as a guideline for translating the principle of religious neutrality into constitutional provisions that ensure its effective implementation within the Syrian context.

These provisions must be clearly and comprehensively drafted, addressing all legal, political, and social dimensions related to religious neutrality. They should take into account Syria’s religious and sectarian diversity and guarantee equality among all citizens, regardless of their beliefs, while establishing constitutional guarantees to prevent discrimination or the dominance of any religious doctrine over others.

Firstly: Towards Syrian State Identity

• The study supports recognising the Islamic cultural and civilizational identity of the Syrian people or state in a broadly symbolic manner that does not lead to any political or legal discrimination among Syrians. Highlighting the Islamic cultural and civilizational dimension of the people is a necessary recognition of an existing socio-cultural reality and helps fulfill the deep psychological needs of the majority of the population.

• However, the study also advocates for the removal of any reference to a state religion or an official religion for the Syrian state.

• There is no need to specify the religion of the majority of the Syrian people. While Islam is indeed the religion of most Syrians, mentioning a religious or ethnic majority and  minority in a constitutional text could violate the principle of state neutrality and make non-religious and non-Muslim Syrians feel discriminated against.

• The study supports applying theprinciple of state neutrality toward Syrians’ beliefs within the supra-constitutional principles or the core constitutional provisions that cannot be amended. This is because any violation of state neutrality regarding religious beliefs constitutes a breach of the principle of equal citizenship in rights and duties, potentially leading to discrimination or marginalization of certain groups.

The recommendation to make state neutrality a non-amendable constitutional principle is aimed at preventing its alteration due to a temporary parliamentary majority that may arise from democratic elections. Moreover, the principle of state neutrality toward religious beliefs can be reinforced and supported by various Islamic jurisprudential interpretations, religious texts, and narratives, helping clarify that this principle does not seek to undermine the religious beliefs of Sunni Muslims or any other group.

• The state should recognize and protect the cultural and religious diversity of Syrian society as an integral part of the national heritage.

• Exploiting religion for political purposes is prohibited, whether to achieve domestic political goals or to support or oppose any foreign entity or policy.

Secondly:  The State’s Power to Discriminate Based on Religion

• Syria should avoid specifying the religion of the President of the Republic. Any such indication would violate the principles of state neutrality toward Syrians’ beliefs and equal citizenship. In a country where the majority of the population is Muslim, there is no need to specify that Islam is the religion of a democratically elected president; it would be paradoxical! The presidency is a functional position within the state’s political system, a temporary role with defined and limited powers rather than absolute authority.

• All citizens are equal in holding public office. Any constitutional clause requiring a specific religious or sectarian affiliation for any position, including the presidency, should be abolished.

• The state must avoid giving space to religious, sectarian, or ethnic grievances, as they contradict the principle of individual criminal responsibility and risk fueling societal divisions, which could hinder transitional justice efforts and be misused to justify the actions of war criminals.

• Religious affiliation should not be included on personal identification documents and official government records, except for personal status matters upon individual request, rather than as a general rule.

• Sectarian or ethnic quotas in government positions should be rejected in favour of competence, while ensuring balanced political representation that reflects Syria’s religious and ethnic diversity as well as regional distribution.

• Religious coercion must be prohibited. No governmental or non-governmental entity should be allowed to pressure or coercion on individuals regarding their beliefs or religious practices.

• The state is committed to combating all forms of religious, sectarian, or cultural discrimination in both the public and private sectors and shall establish an independent body responsible for monitoring and ensuring the implementation of equality principles.

Thirdly: Freedom of Belief and Religious Expression

● The state must affirm the principle of freedom of belief and the right to express opinions and beliefs without conditions or restrictions, in accordance with the principle of “No compulsion in religion.”

● Any specific indication to atheism should be avoided due to the sensitivities within Syrian society regarding this issue.

● Government employees must be prohibited from asking Syrian citizens about their religious beliefs or sect.

● The state must recognise that religious conversion is included under the right to freedom of belief and does not require legal acknowledgment or official documentation from judicial or executive state authorities, as it is a personal matter that does not necessitate public declaration.

● Racism must be outlawed in all its forms, including incitement to violence and hatred based on religious belief, with emphasis that racism is a crime against individuals rather than a general offence against a religion or belief.

● Distinction must be made between academic research and critical viewpoints, and incitement to religious hatred and discrimination.

● We must reject the existence of a “blasphemy law,” as laws themselves criminalizing racism and incitement to violence and hatred would sufficiently address concerns while preventing the misuse of such a law to suppress freedom of expression.

● Ensuring individuals’ freedom to practice religious rituals within government and military institutions, provided that regulatory guidelines are in place to prevent disruption of work operations and to ensure no discrimination between employees based on religious belief or their rituals.

Fourthly: The Relationship Between the State, Religious Institutions, and Religious Education

● The study supports a supervisory role for the state concerning religious institutions.

● The study advocates for a common national curriculum for all students, either as a general descriptive syllabus, a history of religions course, or an ethics and behavior course in public schools. Regardless of the chosen approach, Islamic values such as justice, tolerance, and a strong work ethic should be highlighted in a way that aligns with Syrian cultural identity.

● Religious education should be offered separately in private religious schools.

● The state should provide partial and conditional funding to religious schools and institutes to ensure their proper functioning and positive role in society.

● The position of Grand Mufti of the Republic is unnecessary, but a consultative council composed of diverse Syrian religious figures may exist without legislative or executive authority.

● The Ministry of Endowments & Religious Affairs (Awqaf) is also unnecessary, but multiple religious bodies should manage religious institutions and places of worship under government oversight and legal regulations.

● The state is committed to providing public services, including education and healthcare, on a basis of full equality among citizens, without religious or sectarian discrimination.

● Religious institutions of different sects shall maintain their independence, with state intervention limited to legal and public order requirements.

● The state must monitor the sources of funding for religious institutions to ensure transparency and prevent their use in promoting extremism or supporting illegal activities.

● The educational curriculum should include programs that promote citizenship, tolerance, human rights, and the encouragement of intercultural dialogue.

● The state must guarantee a neutral, civil educational system that respects cultural and religious pluralism. Educational curricula must not promote any specific religion, denigrate any belief, or propagate anti-religious ideologies.

● Referring to Islamic law through its essential objectives, or Maqasid, helps avoid rigid interpretations of texts and instead emphasizes key life priorities – such as preserving life, human dignity, property, and freedom of religious belief.

● References to Islamic cultural heritage in constitutional texts can be made, as they reflect Syria’s historical and civilizational legacy while addressing the psychological and identity-related needs of a broad segment of Syrians.

Fifthly-Constitution and Personality Law

• The Supreme Constitutional Court should be responsible for reviewing laws and legislation and their compatibility with neutrality for constitutional equality.

• Islamic jurisprudence is a diverse human resource matured over 14 centuries, and is an integral part of the human cultural and legislative experience in general.

• The presence of references to the Islamic cultural heritage in constitutional texts is an expression of the Syrian historical cultural heritage itself, and it also meets certain psychological-affiliation basics for a wide segment of Syrians.

Accordingly, the study suggests selecting one or more of the following formulations:

• The newly rebuilt Syrian state maintains neutrality regarding the beliefs of its citizens.

• Islamic jurisprudence is one of the sources of future legislation.

• The objectives of Islamic law, along with its tolerant and diverseinterpretations, are among the sources of legislation.

Regarding the Personal Status Law, the study recommends:

• Granting Syrian citizens the freedom to choose between a sectarian religious personal status law or a general civil personal status law for all Syrians. This recommendation is meant to uphold the value of individual freedom for all people in general and enshrine the rights of Syrians in particular.

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