Abstract
examines the geopolitical consequences of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, focusing on the shifting dynamics among regional and global powers. Following Assad’s downfall in December 2024, key actors like Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are reevaluating their strategies in response to the power vacuum. The loss of Assad weakens Iran’s regional influence, while Turkey seeks to assert its presence in northern Syria and Saudi Arabia aims to counter Iranian dominance. Russia’s withdrawal from Syria presents new opportunities for American influence, while the European Union and China engage in post-Assad reconstruction efforts. The paper also highlights the complex challenges of rebuilding Syria, emphasizing the difficulty of establishing a stable, inclusive government amidst ongoing fragmentation. The analysis ultimately explores how the fall of Assad will reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics, with profound implications for both regional stability and global power dynamics.
Key words
Syria, Bashar al-Assad, geopolitics, regional powers, reconstruction.
Introduction
December 8, 2024 was a very significant date in Syrian history, and indeed for the whole of the Middle East. This date saw the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s government, after over half a century of authoritarian rule by the Assad family and the associated Ba’ath party (Shaban, 2025). Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 through a military coup which ushered in an authoritarian system under the Ba’ath Party. To maintain hegemony over the Syrian people, this regime relied on a broad security apparatus and sectarian collaborations.
Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, inheriting a system that, despite initial hopes for reform, continued to embody deep-seated corruption and human rights abuses. Bashar al-Assad inherited a state apparatus built on the Alawite minority’s dominance. While historically aligned with the Soviet Union and later Russia, and maintaining strong ties with Iran since the 1980s, external support for Assad significantly increased after 2011 with direct military and financial backing from both Iran and Russia (Phillips, 2020; Hamilton et al., 2020). The Arab Spring brought a wave of protests across the region in 2011, including in Syria, where calls for democratic reforms were met with violent repression. The Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on the protests, backed by Iran and Russia, sparked a protracted war that would devastate the country and lead to significant international involvement. However, by late 2024, Russia and Iran’s support waned. Russia, preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, reduced its military footprint in Syria, while Iran faced domestic challenges and declining regional influence amid economic sanctions.
Throughout this conflict, various non-state armed groups emerged, significantly altering the landscape of opposition forces. One of those was Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham HTS, one of the primary factions within the coalition which ultimately upended Assad. The circumstances leading to Assad’s downfall were multifaceted, involving a combination of military defeats, waning support from traditional allies, and growing discontent among the Syrian populace even in regime-controlled areas. As HTS and other factions seized key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus, they not only dismantled the regime’s control but also liberated numerous political prisoners, instilling hope for many that they might finally be able to hold the regime accountable for its atrocities.
This essay explores the changing geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East in a post-Assad context, examining the roles of regional and international powers, the reorientation of alliances, and the challenges of state-building in a fragmented Syria.
- Regional Alliances Are Getting Reconfigured
The overthrow of the Assad regime is dramatically reshaping the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East, compelling regional and global powers, including Iran, Israel, Türkiye, Arab countries, Russia, the United States of America (USA), the European Union (EU) and China, to reassess their alliances. For Iran, which has long considered Syria a critical pillar of its regional strategy, it faces a significant setback. Iran’s strategic partnership with Syria was a cornerstone of its regional influence. Its influence in the Levant is heavily contingent on its access to Syria, which served as a land bridge for arms transfers to Hezbollah and a buffer against Israeli aggression (Solomon, 2016; Risseeuw, 2018). The loss of Assad could weaken Iran’s regional position, potentially emboldening its rivals, including Saudi Arabia and Israel. In response, Tehran might seek alternative routes or allies, such as deepening its presence in Iraq, expanding cooperation with China and Russia, or even improving relations with select Gulf states. Nevertheless, losing Damascus significantly weakens its “Axis of Resistance” and shifts the regional balance against Iranian interests.
Israel has maintained a cautious line in relation to the Assad regime, considering it a predictable adversary, compared to the chaos of civil war. While Assad’s fall weakens Iran and Hezbollah, it also presents new challenges, particularly the risk of Sunni Islamist factions filling the power vacuum. . It seems that Israel has begun to sense a danger coming from Syria. This is what prompted Netanyahu to declare that the fall of the Assad regime was not in Israel’s interest. Israel is now expanding into southern Syria, occupying more land and saying it wants southern Syria to be free of any Syrian military presence. Israel’s interventions have not been confined to occupying new territory. It is attacking Syrians in the newly occupied territories. Its army killed six people in Daraa at the end of March (Reuters, 2025). Israel will probably take a wait-and-see approach, reinforcing its defences while evaluating the new Syrian terrain.
Türkiye, a pivotal actor in the Syrian conflict, emerges as a potential beneficiary of Assad’s fall, as they continue to have strategic interests in northern Syria. Ankara’s involvement has been multifaceted, encompassing support for opposition factions and military operations targeting Kurdish groups in northern Syria. Türkiye’s interventions since 2016, have aimed at countering Kurdish militias like the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a key component of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), reflecting its broader goal of preventing Kurdish autonomy along its southern border. The collapse of Assad’s regime could allow Türkiye to consolidate its influence in northern Syria, but this risks clashes with other actors, including Russia and the USA, who both supported SDF. Türkiye’s ambitions extend further, as it seeks to establish new military bases in Syria, notably targeting the strategic Tiyas Air Base (T4) in central Syria. This expansion has raised alarm in Israel, which increasingly views Türkiye’s growing influence as a more immediate threat than Iran’s. The potential establishment of a Turkish airbase in Syria could disrupt the regional balance, further complicating Israel’s strategic calculations (Middle East Eye, 2025; Türkiye Today, 2025). These concerns may have led Israel to bomb the T4, sending a signal to Türkiye that it rejects the Turkish expansion in Syria.
Tensions have recently emerged between Türkiye and Iran over Syria. There was an exchange of statements between the two sides after the Turkish Foreign Minister warned Iran against supporting the SDF. This suggests a deep disagreement between the two countries over what is currently happening in Syria (Abdulrazak, 2025). Türkiye’s ambitions in Syria highlight the competing agendas that complicate the new Syrian authority’s post-Assad stabilization efforts.
The toppling of the Assad regime represents a strategic opportunity for Saudi Arabia to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its “Axis of Resistance” and promoting Sunni governance in Syria. Riyadh is poised to invest in reconstruction to shape political dynamics, yet this approach carries the risk of exacerbating sectarian tensions, particularly if HTS fails to establish an inclusive government or if rivalry with Türkiye over northern Syria intensifies. Saudi efforts to normalize relations with Syria’s new authorities and collaborate with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) aim to counterbalance Turkish and Iranian ambitions, though overextension remains a concern. Beyond geopolitical and sectarian considerations, Saudi Arabia harbours ideological apprehensions about groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other opposition factions in Syria. Riyadh has historically viewed Islamist-led governments with suspicion, considering them potential threats to regional stability and its own national security. Despite these fears, Saudi Arabia recognizes strategic advantages, notably through Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s transitional president, who was born in Saudi Arabia, fostering personal ties that may facilitate diplomatic relations. This relationship was underscored by al-Sharaa’s inaugural foreign visit to Riyadh in February 2025, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss cooperation in energy, technology, education, and health sectors, signalling Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role in Syria’s reconstruction and regional reintegration.
Qatar has cemented itself as a key player in determining Syria’s post-Assad path, making use of its past backing of various opposition factions and its proximity to Türkiye. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which prioritize countering Iran and promoting Sunni Arab governance, Qatar has focused on bolstering Islamist-leaning groups to secure influence in northwestern Syria. Doha’s financial support for reconstruction plans —paired with its diplomatic ties to Türkiye —aims to consolidate a governance model that blends pragmatic administration with political Islam, echoing its past support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya. This strategy reflects Qatar’s broader ambition to position itself as a mediator between Islamist movements in the Middle East and Western powers. This approach has long been criticized by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly since the Arab uprisings of 2011, as they view Doha’s policies as destabilizing
Egypt’s primary concern is stability, focusing on curbing jihadist threats in Sinai and managing refugee flows through international aid efforts. Egypt also seeks a mediating role in Syria’s transition in order to bolster its regional standing, while securing economic interests like Red Sea trade routes. Other Arab states like the UAE and Jordan have adopted pragmatic strategies. The UAE might seek economic dominance in Syria’s reconstruction to expand its economic influence while countering Turkish and Iranian ambitions, whereas Jordan prioritizes buffer zones to protect its borders. Collectively, Arab states want to normalize relations with Syria to integrate the post-Assad order into international structures, potentially forming a Sunni bloc to counter non-Arab rivals. However, success depends on balancing reconstruction investments with containment of sectarian and geopolitical rivalries that could reignite regional instability.
- Global Powers and Power Vacuum in Syria
Assad’s downfall is also reshaping the involvement of global powers’ presence in the Middle East, particularly the roles of Russia and the USA. Russia, which intervened militarily in 2015 to bolster Assad, faces a significant challenge to its regional influence. Syria has been at the centre of Russia’s strategy in the Middle East, granting access to military bases like Tartus and Hmeimim and allowing Russia to extend its power in the Mediterranean (Charap et al., 2019). Russia’s withdrawal from Syria reflects a wider adjustment in its Middle East strategy. Assad’s collapse could compel Russia to negotiate with Syria’s new authority or risk diminishing its presence in the country. However, Moscow’s ties with certain factions may help it maintain influence despite the regime’s fall. Russia has long positioned itself as a key mediator, managing relations with Iran, Türkiye, Israel, and Assad’s government. Yet, the Assad removal weakens Russia’s standing as a reliable protector of allied regimes. While it still holds strategic assets in Syria, its ability to shape events is significantly reduced, potentially creating an opportunity for the USA to regain influence in the region.
The USA, which has been slowly reducing its military presence in Syria, sees the regime change as an opportunity to further expand its regional influence without committing significant military resources to the exercise. In this context, the USA is interested in working with regional partners, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Egypt, to prevent Iran from solidifying its ties with Russia and China, thereby promoting a shift towards more favourable alignments within the region. The Syrian conflict has been a theatre of competition and occasional cooperation between the USA and Russia, particularly in coordinating air operations to prevent direct military confrontations (Ferdinando, 2015). The USA supported anti-Assad forces, aiming to curb Iranian and Russian influence, while Moscow propped up the regime to secure its strategic foothold in the Mediterranean. The fall of Assad will shift this dynamic. Russia might lose its Tartus naval base and struggle to maintain relevance in the Middle East, while the USA could gain leverage but has to deal with challenges in its role in stabilizing a post-Assad Syria. The USA remains cautious about what is happening in Syria. This was clearly demonstrated by its refusal to sign the Paris Agreement to support the transitional phase in Syria last February (France Diplomacy, 2025). This reticence stems from the HTS’s control of the government in Syria. Despite announcing its dissolution, along with all other factions, HTS appears to still be in existence. HTS is designated as a terrorist organization by the USA., which complicates interactions with Syria’s new leadership if HTS plays a significant role. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s association with HTS or other Islamist groups could influence the USA’s recognition and support. The USA and INGOs may condition engagement and aid on the inclusivity and moderation of Syria’s interim government, emphasizing the exclusion of extremist elements.
The EU, meanwhile, has a vested interest in preventing further instability in Syria, given its proximity to Europe and the ongoing refugee crisis. The EU’s approach to Syria has been guided by humanitarian concerns, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the need to stem migration flows. The fall of Assad could create new opportunities for EU engagement, particularly in supporting reconstruction efforts, but such engagement would be risky and would necessarily have to be coordinated with other actors and a clear strategy for addressing sectarian and political divisions. The EU has developed a Syria policy that aligns with certain US objectives but maintains distinct autonomy, particularly in funding, sanctions, diplomatic engagement, and migration. Following the fall of the Assad regime, the EU suspended several restrictive measures in February 2025 to facilitate Syria’s economic recovery, contrasting with the U.S.’s more conditional approach to sanctions relief. Diplomatically, the EU organized a donor conference in Brussels in March 2025, securing nearly $6.5 billion in aid for Syria’s reconstruction. Regarding migration, while some EU countries have halted Syrian asylum claims pending security assessments, there is no immediate plan for deportations, emphasizing the need for safe and dignified return conditions. This multifaceted approach underscores the EU’s commitment to addressing the Syrian crisis in alignment with its regional interests and humanitarian principles. However, the EU’s capacity to influence outcomes in Syria is constrained by its limited military leverage and internal divisions over refugee and foreign policy.
China, an emerging player in the Middle East, might also seek to expand its influence in post-Assad Syria. Damascus and Beijing maintained close ties under al-Assad, with China vetoing 10 UN resolutions critical of him. Beijing pledged reconstruction aid, increasing support from $500,000 in 2016 to $54m in 2017, and donated 800 power generators to Latakia in 2018. It has also invested about $3 billion in Syrian oil and gas (Aljazeera, 2024). As part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested in infrastructure projects across the region. Syria’s geographical position could make it an attractive partner for reconstruction efforts. Syria officially joined the BRI in January 2022, aiming to enhance economic cooperation with China and other participating countries. However, as of now, there have been no significant infrastructure projects initiated in Syria under this framework (Food Export Trade, 2022). Unlike the other players such as Russia, Turkey and the USA, China has not had direct military involvement in Syria. Therefore, China’s role is most likely motivated by its economic agenda rather than its interest in mediating political disputes, which inhibits it from playing a role in shaping Syria’s future political structure.
- A New Order in the Middle East: Geopolitical Prospects Post-Assad
The fall of al-Assad’s regime marks a major turning point for Syria and a significant shift in Middle East geopolitics. It disrupts long-established rivalries, such as the USA-Russia dynamic, while exposing the limits of external influence and placing Syrian actors at the heart of shaping the country’s future. As regional powers recalibrate their strategies, the post-Assad landscape will demand pragmatic approaches to coexistence. For Syria’s leadership, the key challenge will be fostering inclusive governance that accommodates its diverse population, mitigating the risks of prolonged instability and humanitarian crises. A well-executed strategy could pave the way for a more resilient geopolitical framework, where cooperation takes precedence over conflict.
However, the withdrawal of Iranian forces and their proxies, the breaking up of Assad’s security apparatus and the diminution of Russia’s role could create a power vacuum that results in competing interventions. Türkiye and the Gulf Arab states could join the Western Powers in an alliance to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria and prevent a resurgence of extremism. However, such efforts may exacerbate existing tensions. For instance, Türkiye’s aspirations in northern Syria, which include efforts to restrain Kurdish autonomy, might work at cross-purposes with the Gulf Arab states’ emphasis on isolating Iran, the United States’ intention to empower the SDF in its fight against ISIS and Russia’s interest in preserving its military presence in the region. Meanwhile, the humanitarian disaster risks destabilizing neighbouring states, making reconstruction aid a crucial geopolitical lever. Some regional players like Qatar and the UAE may deploy their financial means to engineer governance in post-conflict Syria but competing visions for Syria’s political future (centralized or decentralized models, for example) are likely to intensify existing frictions. The right balance between stability and sovereignty must be struck — not least because external actors run the risk of reproducing historical errors, placing short-term commitment to security and fighting extremism over long-term engagement to support institutional reconstruction and development.
The hallmark of this new order will be the primacy of regional issues in the foreign policy calculus; counterterrorism, border security and reconstruction will become the lifeblood of foreign policy for all relevant actors. The cost of rebuilding Syria, which is estimated between $400 billion and $1 trillion (Asseburg, 2020, p.17), provides the Gulf states with an opportunity to exert influence through investment, which could overshadow Egypt’s role due to its more limited resources. But the quick shifting of alliances — recent Gulf normalization with Assad and the increasingly warmth ties between Türkiye and Russia, for example — reveals a fragile, miscalculation-prone balance. Thus, the post-Assad Middle East could swing between a cooperative framework, where powers ally to stabilize Syria and combat extremism, and a competitive struggle, where rivalries deepen sectarian and regional divisions. Whether regional actors will opt for acting in favour of collective stability or individual gain in the new order remains to be seen, and it may even take some time before a working equilibrium is reached, as the region’s players come to terms with the magnitude of the change.
Türkiye is playing a primary role in this new order, using its military presence in northwestern Syria and its support for opposition factions to exert influence over the fragmentary post-Assad state. Ankara’s concentration on diminishing Kurdish autonomy is in its national security interests, but it may come into conflict with Arab states like Saudi Arabia that prioritize eliminating residual Iranian influence. Iran, while weakened by Assad’s departure, is unlikely to give up its foothold entirely, and may instead double down on militia networks to maintain its influence in Syria and Lebanon. This has formed a triangular tension between Türkiye and Iran as mentioned earlier. It might also form tension with the Gulf, as Saudi Arabia is eager to reframe Syria, through economic support and political backing for Sunni groups. At the same time, Russia’s reduced posturing — limited by its focus on Ukraine — could lead it to pull back from its base in Tartus, which would clear the path for Western powers, especially the USA, to re-engage, maybe by reinforcing Kurdish troops in the northeast.
The Kurdish question is a major one, as efforts to achieve autonomy in northeastern Syria risk igniting tensions between Turks and Kurds across the region. As such, the fall of the Assad regime could also be a further blow to authoritarianism, potentially empowering popular movements across the region that challenge the status quo and refashion the Arab state and society. Though regional powers have made territorial integrity a declared priority, competing interventions could in practice carve Syria into spheres of influence, compounding instability across the Levant. The new order, therefore, will reflect a fragile balance: stopgap coalitions address short-term emergencies but cannot tackle the structural drivers of war. In this environment, the geopolitical future of the Middle East will hinge on whether states can rise to meet the unpredictable demands of collective security — or follow a new era of shattered alliances. The agreement, signed in Damascus between the Syrian president and the SDF commander on March 10, does not appear to be sustainable in the long run. So far, there have been no concrete steps toward implementing its provisions. SDF continues to target areas under government control, particularly near the front lines, without showing any serious indications of its commitment to implementing the agreement. It seems that this agreement was not based on deep strategic understandings, but rather came as an agreement of necessity, as both sides needed a temporary de-escalation to buy more time. The SDF is seeking to reorganize its positions and adapt to the new US administration headed by Trump, while the Syrian government is trying to absorb the repercussions of the recent events on the Syrian coast and reassert its political and security control. Given the fragility of the agreement’s foundation and the ongoing tensions and clashes, its chances of survival appear slim unless there are fundamental shifts in positions or external pressures that push both sides to truly commit to implementing the agreement.
The USA’s role toward a post-Assad Middle East is not likely to involve deep engagement but rather strategic recalibration, seeking to balance traditional priorities—countering Iranian influence, stabilizing allies and defeating extremism—against a diminished willingness to conduct direct military operations. In a great-power contest with Russia and China, Washington will use alliances (eg, the Gulf states and Israel), sanctions and multilateral structures to determine what Syria’s reconstruction and governance look like, while tolerating Syria’s limited Kurdish autonomy to prevent an ISIS flashback, regardless of Turkish objections. However, its capacity to impose power will be contingent on pragmatic alliance building, conditional aid and diplomatic engagement, negotiating contradictions like Türkiye’s independent Syria policy and Gulf states’ ties to Moscow. U.S. imposed sanctions remain a powerful tool in shaping post-Assad Syria. Designed to punish the Assad regime and its backers, these sanctions could persist to pressure new Syrian authorities, particularly if HTS dominates. The U.S. might adjust sanctions to incentivize inclusive governance, offering relief as a bargaining chip, though this depends on the new regime’s willingness to align with Western interests. The potential for sanctions to either stabilize or destabilize Syria hinges on their calibration and the broader geopolitical context. The USA will still serve as a major indirect player in the new geopolitics of the region, depending on soft power, economic governance, and adroit formation of coalitions to protect their interests in a fragmented, multipolar context.
The collapse of al-Assad’s regime is a crucial moment that forces us to rethink the geopolitics of the Middle East. It upends long-held alliances, opens doors for new power alignments and highlights the frailty of states in the region. It may also risk unleashing new conflicts and worsening instability, even as Assad’s removal will weaken Iran and Russia. The engagement of external actors, whether through military intervention, economic assistance, or diplomatic engagement, will determine the course of post-Assad Syria and consequently the wider region.
In conclusion, the post-regime era provides a unique opportunity to reconfigure the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East but will require a fine-tuning of interests. The creation of a stable and inclusive Syrian government is essential not only to the country’s healing, but also to regional order. Handled properly, this transition could create a much more cooperative setting, one where pragmatism displaces sectarianism and great-power rivalry. Missteps could deepen existing divisions, prolong instability and impede efforts to respond to the humanitarian and security challenges that have long afflicted the region. The interplay of these factors will determine whether the Middle East comes out with a more resilient system, or whether it reverts to new kinds of fragmentation. Any post-Assad transition will involve complex humanitarian considerations. The possibility of refugees returning will depend on the emergence of security and stable governance. The demands for reconstruction will be immense, potentially leading outside powers to be inclined to extend financial assistance. The post-Assad Middle East is likely to experience a long period of instability before a new equilibrium emerges, with implications that extend far beyond Syria’s borders and will shape regional politics for decades to come.
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