Harmoon Center Monitoring Report, 15-30 January 2025

Monitoring Administrative and Governance Developments in Syria

Throughout the reporting period, the new transitional authorities in Syria continued their efforts to control, reorganize, and restore the effectiveness of state agencies.

Education:

The Ministry of Higher Education formally recognised most universities in Syria, including those established after the revolution in the liberated areas – most notably Free Aleppo University. However, it left out several key universities in northern Syria, including al -Sham and Al-Zaytouna. This decision drew the ire of faculty and students alike at the excluded institutions, leading to demonstrations and protests – as well as statements calling on the ministry to reconsider. In response, the Ministry of Higher Education publicly instructed these universities to prepare and submit their official documents for the government to review and reassess.

All universities continued to organize their internal structures, with Ali Kanaan appointed as Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Yasser Al-Huwaish as Dean of Law at Damascus University. Meanwhile, Aleppo University’s new administration has been increasingly active, both in organizing events and meetings with students on campus and in fostering dialogue between deans and student representatives, as seen in the meeting between the Dean of the Dentistry faculty with the Syrian Students Union.

The government has moved to fill vacant positions in various directorates across the country, including in Hama, where the Ministry of Education appointed Ahmad Hamad Al-Madloush to oversee the Education Directorate.

Administrative Appointments:

Notable improvements were made in the completion of most key appointments, including regional governorships. Muhammad Khalil Ayyash was assigned to lead the Daraa Council, bringing valuable experience from his work with UNDP in educational programs. Jihad Al-Qwaider took up the role of Director of Media for the Daraa and Quneitra Governorates. A prominent media figure in southern Syria, Al-Qwaider had closely covered the military battles in the region throughout the Syrian revolution.

Positive Governance Indicators

Dismissal and Termination of Contracts:

Authorities took the decision to dismiss 20 judges who had served under the former regime and terminated the contracts of temporary workers appointed to assist with administration for military veterans and the families of deceased soldiers, without renewal. Additionally, administrative orders granting them three months of paid leave were terminated. The Ministry of Finance removed Muhammad Khalid Bannoud from his position as Director General of the Syrian Tax and Fees Authority. Meanwhile, the suspension of several state institutions continued, including the Departments of Transport, Communications, and Personal Status in Aleppo.

Effectiveness of State Agencies and Institutions

The number of visits by provincial councils has increased to assess civil and political activity across the country. For example, the Directorate of Endowments and the Aleppo Provincial Council visited the Umayyad Mosque to assess the building’s rehabilitation and restoration.

Negative Governance Indicators

Signs of Improving Governance and Administration:

Consistent practical and discursive efforts to address institutional inefficiency and restore operations in public institutions.
Appointing individuals with strong reputations and broad social and political appeal, who are not aligned with military factions.
Following up on complaints, which had been neglected initially, and expanding the formation of needs-based committees based on specialisms and expertise.
The tangible impact of positive governance on social harmony, arising from improved and coherent messaging by those in the caretaker government.

Outstanding Challenges

The inability to re-staff all state agencies and institutions due to HR shortages, high public transportation fares, and delayed salaries.
The failure to complete the appointment of governors, particularly in Daraa and Suwayda governorates, due to security and military complications.
The absence of official media, which has led to the spread of unofficial news, such as in the case of Minister of Culture Diala Barakat, due to her political affiliation with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

Military and Security Developments

Damascus and Countryside

Damascus and the capital’s surrounding countryside witnessed intensive security operations and military activity. On January 15, the General Security Directorate, in collaboration with the military, launched a campaign to comb the Zabadani area of rural Damascus, targeting weapons and ammunition stockpiles allegedly belonging to factions loyal to the former regime. On January 22, an expanded security meeting was held in Damascus, attended by leaders from the Military Operations Directorate and the Ministry of Interior, to discuss the security situation outside the city. On the same day, security forces conducted a wave of arrests in Western Dummar (the Raz area), Mazzeh 86, Douma, and Ma’araba in rural Damascus, targeting former regime members carrying weapons. On January 27 and 28, the General Security Directorate carried out further security campaigns in Qatana, Jaramana, and Yarmouk Camp in rural Damascus, arresting former regime members who had evaded capture. On January 29, security forces also discovered a large drug warehouse in the Sahnaya area of rural Damascus. In a separate development, 90% of military checkpoints in Damascus and its countryside have reportedly been removed, aimed to ease restrictions on civilian movement and restore normal life in the capital and surrounding areas.

Most significantly, key military and revolutionary factions held a meeting at the People’s Palace in Damascus, chaired by Ahmad al-Sharaa, dubbed the “Victory Conference.” The conference focused on the country’s security and military developments and discussed strategies to address the current challenges. During the meeting, it was agreed to appoint Ahmad al-Sharaa as President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Aleppo

On January 18, the General Security Forces set up a checkpoint on the road between al-Bab and Aleppo, replacing the military police crossing previously controlled by the National Army. On January 23, the Governor of Aleppo met with the leadership of the civil and military police in al-Bab at the governorate building in Aleppo. The two parties agreed to maintain the current structure of the civil and military police in the region for at least six months, with instructions to reduce the number of personnel in both institutions given the area’s actual needs.

On the same day, a car bomb exploded near the National Hospital in the city of Manbij, resulting in civilian injuries. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but initial reports suggested possible SDF involvement. The blast targeted members of the Dawn of Freedom operations room, which is affiliated with the central armed forces.

A delegation from the Ministry of Interior, led by Brigadier General Ahmad Lattouf, visited the Security and Police Directorate in al-Bab. During the visit, they discussed cooperation on maintaining security, amid the ongoing Turkish role in overseeing security and service institutions, particularly at commercial crossings.

Military escalations occurred on January 24 in the eastern countryside of Aleppo when SDF forces launched drone attacks on Army positions, killing 9 members and wounding 11 others. On January 25, security forces of the new Interior Ministry were deployed across the city of Manbij, which had been in a state of chaos since its liberation from the SDF. On the same day, the same forces entered al-Bab and established a military headquarters on the city’s outskirts. However, they have not yet intervened in security operations within the city, nor have they taken control of the civil or military police from prior power brokers. On the same day, violent clashes occurred in the Kara Kozak Bridge area in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, resulting in 20 fighters killed and wounded in confrontations with the SDF. Meanwhile, the SDF forces continue to target civilians in the region, particularly in the Deir Hafer area, where many civilians have been killed by deliberate shelling of civilian targets or by the explosion of mines planted by the SDF.

In general, security in Aleppo’s countryside remains under the auspices of Turkish control, with Turkish advisors maintaining a direct presence within the bodies . The region has not seen significant changes in administrative positions so far, and most of the current adjustments are focused on the economic sector, particularly changes in the management of commercial crossings and the movement of freight and goods.

Latakia:

Rapid escalations in security and military activity have stoked tensions that were already running high in Latakia due to protracted operations. On January 19, the General Security Directorate conducted one of the largest raids in the port of Latakia, seizing two warehouses filled with large shipments of Captagon pills. Initial investigations revealed that the shipments were linked to Maher al-Assad, with an estimated 100 million pills prepared for smuggling. The day before, on January 18, the families of military detainees staged a sit-in at the Agriculture Roundabout, demanding the release of their detained sons. The protest ended without further escalation.

On January 18, the Ministry of Interior issued new decisions allowing Major Adel Shaddoud, Major Khider Ismail, and Captain Suhail Muhammad to return to their posts. Additionally, Brigadier General Haitham al-Hamid was appointed head of the Criminal Security Branch in Latakia. The day before, on January 17, the ministry opened recruitment for the General Directorate of Border Security, with official applications to be submitted through designated centres to be announced in the coming weeks.

On January 22, gunmen attacked a checkpoint of the Military Operations Department in the industrial zone at the entrance to the city of Jableh, in Latakia’s countryside. The attack resulted in two casualties of Military Operations Department members and left two others wounded. In response, the authorities imposed a curfew in Jableh to track down the attackers and maintain security.

Tartous:

Tartous has remained relatively stable, due to comprehensive search campaigns and security efforts to control smuggling operations, while gradually releasing military detainees. On January 18, the General Security Directorate in Tartous intercepted an arms smuggling operation heading to Lebanon, seizing a shipment of weapons and missiles. On January 26, the Military Operations Department released 160 military personnel as part of efforts to stabilize relations and ease restrictions on former military members. Security services launched extensive search operations across the governorate to maintain order and pursue suspects. Temporary permits continued to be issued to individuals undergoing investigation, helping to regularise their status. Applications to join the General Security Directorate are being reviewed as part of efforts to strengthen the local security forces. Unlike in some other governorates, no military trials or field executions were reported. Arrests of former military personnel were temporary, with most being released after interrogation.

Homs:

Significant confrontations occurred in Homs on January 20 and 21, when security forces launched a large-scale operation in the western countryside. The campaign resulted in at least six deaths during violent clashes in the village of al-Ghor al-Gharbiyya, located near the Lebanese border. The operations targeted weapons depots, smuggling networks, and armed groups affiliated with the former regime that had refused to surrender their weapons.

Hama:

Hama experienced a wide range of security and military challenges – including arrests, confrontations by armed gangs and attacks on civilians, as security authorities worked to improve stability in the region. On January 25, the General Security Department in Salamiyya conducted an operation targeting a gang specializing in looting and robbery. The gang, which wore uniforms similar to those of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, had been robbing shops in local markets. This operation followed public protests in the city’s square, where residents demanded action against the group and an end to the chaos it had caused. On January 27, unknown assailants targeted the village of al-Anz, east of Salamyya, who targeted several residents. The attack left five people dead, including a child, and is believed to have been motivated by tribal disputes. Throughout this period, the governorate saw no significant changes in its security or military structure. There were no new appointments, promotions, or dismissals in military institutions, and no new decisions regarding recruitment or enlistment, suggesting relative stability in military resources despite the increasing security challenges.

Daraa

Security forces in Daraa faced fresh challenges on many fronts, amid ongoing security operations and efforts by local factions to regularise their forces. Notably, there were increased Israeli movements in the western countryside of the governorate. Israeli forces continued to bolster their presence at the al-Jazeera barracks on the outskirts of Ma’ariyah in the Yarmouk Basin. They installed electricity poles along the road connecting the border strip to the al-Jazeera barracks, and a military convoy of six vehicles entered the village of Abdeen before proceeding to the village of Jamla.

On January 22, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qosra appointed Colonel Binyan Ahmad al-Hariri as the military commander of the Hauran border control region. Al-Hariri, originally from the town of Alma, east of Daraa, previously held a leadership role in the Ahrar al-Sham movement in northern Syria.

Idlib:

The new administration launched a large-scale security campaign—the first of its kind since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—targeting former security figures implicated in past crimes. The campaign led to the arrest of several wanted individuals. In the last week of the month, the al-Qaeda-linked organisation ‘Guardians of the Faith’ announced its own official dissolution after months of intense security pressure and the arrests of several leaders. Though the group was not subjected to direct military attack, shifting security dynamics in Idlib very much forced its hand. On January 30, international coalition jets carried out an airstrike in Sarmada, in the northern Idlib countryside, targeting a car carrying one of the organization’s leaders and killing him instantly.

Deir Ezzor, Hasakah, and Raqqa:

Security in the Deir Ezzor and Hasakah governorates came under extensive strain. On January 17, ISIS attacked a local military position in the village of al-Zirr, in Deir Ezzor’s eastern countryside, causing several casualties. That same day, an Iraqi military unit advanced 150 meters into Syrian territory in the al-Ya’rubiyah area of Hasakah’s countryside, seizing a military position in the village of al-Mashhaniya and further heightening border tensions. On January 20, several explosions were heard in Qamishli following a drone airstrike, which caused material damage but no reported casualties. On January 22, Turkish aircraft bombed military sites west of Hasakah in the Jabal Abdul Aziz area after foreign forces had withdrawn. This was followed by artillery shelling of positions in the village of al-Hishah, near the town of Ain Issa.

On January 26, the SDF-affiliated “Autonomous Administration” announced that Syrian families residing in al-Hol detention camp would be allowed to return to their homes across Syria voluntarily. Meanwhile, local forces conducted raids and arrests in the towns of al-Hissan, Shaqra, and al-Ji’a in Deir ez-Zor’s western countryside. On January 30, Turkish artillery shelled the outskirts of Abu Rasain in Hasakah’s countryside as part of the ongoing escalation on the border of SDF-controlled territory. That same day, local forces arrested media activist Thamer al-Shahadah during a dawn raid in the town of al-Sha’fah in Deir ez-Zor’s eastern countryside.

Key for security operations map – see overleaf:

On January 14, 2025, Turkish warplanes conducted four airstrikes on sites near Ayn al-Arab and the town of Sirreen.
On January 16, 2025, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced that its units had destroyed a Syrian National Army weapons and ammunition depot in the village of al-Sakwiyya, in the Abu Qalqal district, south of Manbij.
On January 19, 2025, a car bomb exploded near the village of Kabarja, east of Manbij in Aleppo’s eastern countryside, causing no casualties. This incident follows a series of explosions in Manbij in recent weeks. On January 17, a car bomb detonated on al-Rabita Street in the city center, injuring four people to varying degrees. Earlier, on December 24, 2024, an explosion on al-Tajneed Street killed two people and wounded eight others. Another blast occurred on December 27, when a car bomb exploded near the Grand Mosque on al-Saray Street.
On January 19, 2025, the Syrian National Army’s ‘Dawn of Freedom’ operations room launched a military operation to seize the villages surrounding the hills near Tishreen Dam and those adjacent to Syriatel Hill, both previously under SDF control.
On January 21, 2025, SDF forces launched a raid in the city of Tabqa, west of Raqqa, to track down members who had previously fled.
On January 22, 2025, the SDF shells hit civilian homes in the Abu Qalqal district, south of Manbij, causing material damage. In a separate incident, SDF artillery fire on the village of Tal Arsh, north of Tishreen Dam, killed two sisters, Hayat (9) and Haneen (10), from the Farouq al-Issa family.
On January 23, 2025, the Syrian administration’s Military Operations Department seized control of the villages of Abu al-Tabat, al-Maksar, al-Rashid, al-Hulul, al-Suwaydiyya, and Terwaziyya in southwestern Raqqa.
On January 23, 2025, the SDF shelled the city of Jarabulus, east of Aleppo, with rocket launchers, targeting residential neighborhoods, the Tanak camp for displaced persons, and the Jarablus municipal stadium. The attack injured seven civilians, including two children, with varying degrees of severity.
On January 27, 2025, a Turkish F-16 warplane carried out multiple airstrikes on SDF positions in the hills near Tishreen Dam, in the countryside of Manbij. In response, SDF forces shelled the town of Rasm al-Harmal (Imam) with artillery, killing three civilians.
On January 28, 2025, Turkish warplanes carried out multiple airstrikes on SDF positions around the town of Ain Issa, north of Raqqa. Simultaneously, the Syrian National Army shelled SDF positions in the area. The attacks led to the destruction of an SDF ammunition and heavy weapons depot near Ain Issa.

Monitoring Political and Social Developments

Social Developments

Interaction between local civil society organizations and international groups increased in the second half of January, marking a resumption of international activity in Syria since the disruptions of December. This included a visit by a German delegation to the city of Daraa, the provision of medical aid by Doctors Without Borders in the same city, and a meeting between the director of the Syrian Red Crescent in Aleppo and the Secretary-General of the Turkish Red Crescent. Additionally, sub-presidential Syrian government officials began engaging with diplomatic missions. The governor of Aleppo met a delegation from the Italian embassy in Damascus, while Turkish Justice and Development Party MP Zafer Sirakaya held separate meetings with the governors of Aleppo and Hama, and the University of Damascus hosted the Chargé d’Affaires of the Turkish Embassy in Damascus.

At the civil society level, work expanded across Syria, initially concentrated in Damascus and later Aleppo, in the weeks following the fall of the Assad regime. Civil activity began to grow significantly in several cities, including cultural events and art exhibitions. Notable examples include a plastic arts exhibition hosted by the Khaizuran Cultural Forum and the Basmat Art Association in Salamyya, as well as an event organized by the Amal Association for Juveniles to honor detainees released from Assad’s prisons. Youth-led campaigns aimed at improving the appearance of cities also emerged, such as efforts to restore the entrance to the city of al-Hara in Daraa Governorate, rehabilitate the Batarni Park in Latakia, and launch a clean-up initiative at the Latakia National Hospital by medical students. This momentum extended to larger civil organizations, such as the Syrian Red Crescent, which resumed its activities in Daraa by launching a campaign to support small projects and providing grants for fertilizer to local farmers.

In terms of political and individual freedoms, the space for political activity remains open, with no interference reported. Several organizations that had previously operated outside Syria, such as the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Saydnaya Prison, have announced their official licensing in Syria, stating that the process was “carried out smoothly.” Political movements, groups, and parties continue to hold activities and meetings, including one by the Democratic Civil Action Authority in Salamyya and the Kawakibi Forum, which announced its founding document in a meeting held in Aleppo. Similarly, no laws restricting freedoms have been issued, either on an individual level or in terms of media freedom, with no reports of media outlets being prevented from operating. In terms of protest sit-ins, two types have emerged:

Protests against decisions affecting state employees, such as the demonstration in front of the governorate building in Aleppo following the decision to lay off several workers, and the protest in front of the Education Directorate in Aleppo over the decision to end the determination of work centers for employees.
Protests demanding transitional justice, such as the one in Marjeh Square in Damascus, where the families of detainees called for the accountability of war criminals and for accelerating the implementation of transitional justice.

The government maintained that the dismissal decisions were not personal but part of a broader effort to restructure institutions and review employee records. It justified the move by citing the prevalence of fraudulent employees on the payroll of civil government institutions during the Assad regime.

Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees:

Displaced people returned to their cities, towns and villages across Syria, though the government did not release official figures on returnees, whether from abroad or within the country. Estimates from local sources indicate that around 1,000 people returned to the Hama countryside, including Muhardeh, Tal Malah, and Kafr Huda.

Monitoring Political Developments:

In the domestic political arena, al-Sharaa’s speech at the “Victory Conference” and his address to the Syrian people were among the most significant political events. His speech at the conference operated on two levels: first, framing the events in Syria within the broader context of regime collapse or transition, and second, outlining the leadership’s priorities for the next stage, structured around several key themes:

Governance: Addressing the power vacuum and rebuilding state institutions.
Security: Ensuring stability and preventing chaos.
International Relations: Reinforcing Syria’s global integration and diplomatic ties.
Domestic Affairs: Facilitating refugee returns, implementing transitional justice, and promoting national reconciliation.
Economy: Advancing reconstruction efforts.

The spokesman for the Military Operations Department, Hassan Abdul Ghani, outlined the path ahead in his speech announcing the conference’s decisions, which can be broadly defined as the following:

Appointing Ahmad al-Sharaa as Transitional President of the Syrian Arab Republic: This decision elevated al-Sharaa from a rebel leader to an official political figure, enabling him to engage with counterparts internationally—a crucial aspect of diplomatic protocol. The timing was significant, as it came just a day before the Emir of Qatar’s visit to Damascus, the highest-ranking political figure to visit the capital since Assad’s escape.
1. Abolishing the 2012 Constitution and Dissolution of the People’s Assembly: The dissolution of the People’s Assembly was expected, given its ties to the previous regime and its composition of businessmen close to Assad and militia leaders affiliated with his army. Additionally, the Syrian leadership suspended the last constitution issued under Bashar al-Assad, necessitating a constitutional declaration to outline the framework for the next phase in detail.
1. Abolitshing Political Parties Linked to the Former Regime: The decision included dissolving the Baath Party and the National Progressive Front, banning their reformation under any name, and reclaiming all their assets for the state. However, some ambiguity remains, particularly regarding whether ideological elements of the Baath Party or similar movements—such as nationalism or communism—might resurface in future licensed parties. Reclaiming party assets for the state is seen as a positive step, especially since many were not solely political entities but included educational and service institutions. For instance, Sham University in Damascus, owned by the Baath Party, was not shut down entirely. Instead, a decision was made to allocate the majority of its revenues to the state and to replace its president, Dr. Sharif al-Ashqar, rather than closing the institution outright.
1. Dismantling Former Military and Security Institutions and Dissolving Revolutionary Factions: This decision operated on two levels. The first involved dissolving existing factions, including the Military Operations Administration, the National Army factions, and the Southern Operations Room factions in Daraa. Notably, local factions in Suwayda were absent from the conference, and there was no mention of the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in any speeches or decisions. The second level focused on dismantling the Assad-era military structure and security branches, with an emphasis on rebuilding both institutions from the ground up.

In his address to the people, al-Sharaa outlined the Syrian leadership’s key priorities: law and order, transitional justice, the prosecution of criminals inside and outside Syria, the unity of Syrian territory, the establishment of strong and efficient institutions, economic foundations, and the restoration of essential services. He also emphasized several points shaping the next stage, particularly the commitment to Syria’s territorial unity. This stance signals that he will not make concessions to the SDF and that the new leadership is determined to reclaim areas under SDF control while focusing on rebuilding Syrian institutions and the economy.

On the other hand, some criticisms of the speech’s content emerged, particularly regarding the omission of key details. Notably, there was no specific timetable for the steps outlined for the transitional phase. Additionally, al-Sharaa, who is responsible for forming the preparatory committee for the conference—now referred to as the “National Dialogue Conference”—presented it primarily as a forum for exchanging opinions and consultations. Critics argued that the constitutional declaration should precede all other steps, as it would establish the foundational guidelines for the transitional phase. Moreover, the speech did not address the issue of public freedoms, and al-Sharaa notably avoided using the term “democracy,” instead opting for expressions like “free elections” and “Shura.”

On the foreign policy front, the visit of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, stood out as the highest-level diplomatic visit to Damascus since Assad’s fall. Ahmad al-Sharaa also met with a Palestinian government delegation, held discussions with international organizations and communities, and opened up new possibilities for diplomatic activity in Damascus. Additionally, President al-Sharaa welcomed the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court, Karim Ahmed Khan, as well as a Syrian women’s delegation from the U.S. and a delegation from the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Monitoring the Service, Living, and Economic Conditions

Trade and Customs:

Reports circulated about a ban on Iranian, Russian, or Israeli goods entering Syria. However, the Land and Sea Ports Authority denied these claims, stating that a prohibitive list would be published later, after specialized committees conduct their studies on the matter. Meanwhile, truck drivers at the Nassib border crossing with Jordan have expressed dissatisfaction, demanding that Jordan treat Syrian trucks the same as foreign vehicles not subject to customs duties. At present, Syrian trucks face excessive fees reaching up to $1,300 to make the crossing.

Turkish exports to Syria rose by 35% last month after the Syrian government reduced customs duties on about 269 goods imported from Turkey. These goods include agricultural and industrial products, as well as items related to transit, bilateral transport, and contracting – all part of a free trade agreement with Turkey. In another development, the Syrian government announced the dissolution of the General Corporation for Foreign Trade. Going forward, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade will handle all decisions and procedures related to imports and exports. It will also prepare a list of employees required to continue operations, while the remaining employees will be reassigned at the discretion of the Minister. Following a decision by the Minister of Transport allowing the import of cars no older than 15 years, a new batch of vehicles has arrived at the port of Latakia.

Industry:

The Land and Sea Ports Authority announced the exemption of industrialists from paying customs duties on the import of production lines or machinery to support the growth of industry. While this decision may result in a loss of tax revenue for the state, it aims to boost the sector, foster economic growth, and stimulate the economy at a crucial time when Syrian society is grappling with high unemployment and poverty rates. In Idlib, the Ministry of Industry announced the dissolution of the Idlib Chamber of Commerce and Industry, based in Hama. The ministry justified the move with the existence of a chamber in the city of Idlib that already oversees the work of traders and industrialists. As a result, the chamber in Hama’s functions will now be transferred to Idlib.

Living Conditions and Salaries:

The country continues to face economic stagnation. The lack of rainfall this year has weakened the agricultural and livestock sectors. To make matters worse, the instability of the dollar exchange rate—despite some improvement in the Syrian pound since the fall of the regime—has caused people to delay small projects that could stimulate local markets. The economy is stagnating, particularly in the private sector, with the exception of the food and grocery sectors. This stagnation is also reflected in the prices of certain goods. For example, olive oil prices in Daraa have deflated due to difficulties in selling the product, low purchasing power, and an oversupply among farmers. The Syrian government has imposed customs duties on oil, vegetables, and fruits – further impacting these trades. Regarding salaries, the government approved a 400% increase for state and public sector employees, though this increase did not apply to retirees. The Minister of Finance indicated that an increase for retirees will be approved at a later date. In the private sector, salaries remained unchanged, coinciding with a decline in the dollar exchange rate and a strengthening of the Syrian pound, which reached about 10,000 pounds per dollar in Damascus. It was also noted that some factories reduced wages due to stagnation in the local market, which is severely limited to food and groceries.

Communications:

Communications continue to suffer from weak network coverage, especially in rural areas, where the service can sometimes be completely interrupted. This issue also affects urban areas, as seen in Aleppo, where internet lines were cut off in many neighborhoods after cables were stolen. The Communications Directorate’s failure to connect new lines exacerbated the situation, prompting some workers in the field to turn to satellite internet services and offer these services to residents. A similar situation is unfolding in some areas of rural Damascus.

Foodstuffs Price List in US Dollars by Governorate