Introduction
The following report provides fresh, up-to-date monitoring of the work of Syria’s new ruling from across the country during the first fortnight of 2025. From detailed security reports to accounts of workplace disputes in the public sector, this comprehensive analysis sheds light on the interim government’s priorities, policy successes and failings – and potential pitfalls – for the coming weeks and months.
Administrative and Governance Developments
During the first two weeks of the year, the caretaker government continued to resurrect the work of the state by rehabilitating and revitalizing core institutions, and focussing on key public service priorities – including the following:
- Passport renewal for Syrians abroad has resumed after the service ground to a halt following the regime’s fall on December 8, 2024. The Immigration and Passports Department announced the reinstatement of the service, including the issuance of pending passports due to be printed, with rescheduled dates. The procedures for obtaining a passport remain unchanged, and the fees for Syrians living abroad are still $300 for a non-urgent passport and $800 for a fast-track passport. However, the validity period has now been extended to up to six years.
- The Ministry of Education has continued to revise certain subjects in the school curriculum, abolishing the subject of ‘National Education’ and introducing amendments to the Islamic Education and History textbooks, following a decision issued in early January 2025.
- The new Syrian government has continued to appoint temporary university administrations, either by bringing back former figures or retaining them with minor adjustments – as seen with the Universities of Damascus and Aleppo. In some cases, it has also collaborated with academic figures associated with opposition institutions, such as Dr. Ismail Al-Khalfan, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Aleppo. Dr. Al-Khalfan previously worked with the Stabilization Support Unit and has served as a dean and lecturer at several universities in northern Syria within opposition-controlled areas. However, the Chamber of Industry in Aleppo was re-elected due to a lack of alternative personnel with sufficient qualifications.
- The administration is undertaking preliminary work to review and re-evaluate all state institutions. It is looking to manage employee numbers and dissolve some institutions, such as the Syrian Development Fund – or freeze others, such as the National Union of Syrian Students. This comprehensive process includes municipalities, local councils, and other entities. Elsewhere in the administration, a state of unrest persists in some areas due to delays in salary payments and wholesale dismissals, which have been addressed differently in each governorate depending on local factors. The recruitment process thus far has been marked by dismissals of regime appointees followed by the appointment of loyalists and former state personnel, as seen in the Department of Education in Aleppo and several other directorates. In one instance, a swathe of employees in the Department of Health in Daraa were dismissed, prompting a sit-in to protest the decision.
The new authorities justified the dismissals by citing the existence of a network of favoritism and patronage within the department itself. They stated that their action was part of institutional restructuring aligned with the requirements of a new mode of governance, in line with ‘needs and resources.’ As a result, the number of employees in the Directorate of Health in Daraa was reduced from 1,781 to just 900. However, the administration quickly reversed their decision following protests in the city; an indicator of the new government’s approach to managing public opinion and perception.
This example reflects a sense of haste in managing the workforce within state institutions, a failure to make thorough assessments, and a lack of objective criteria grounded in the public interest and balanced by the rights and welfare of workers. Arbitrary dismissals of employees in such a sweeping manner violate their rights and should not occur.
In Baniyas, the Directorate of Health (Baniyas National Hospital) terminated the employment of several health workers, following the government’s discovery of many workers without clear roles and portfolios. According to official justifications, these workers unduly increased the budget burden. However, the case of Baniyas was marked by favoritism in the selection process of workers for dismissal. Testimonies from the local community indicated that the hospital director responsible for nominating the individuals prioritized loyalty over actual needs or competencies.
In Latakia, unlike in Daraa, the contracts of 183 judiciary employees were terminated in early January 2025 without reversal. This highlights an inconsistency in the approach to public policy, as well as a sense of haste and lack of thorough study in rooting out the issue of inflated employee numbers in state institutions. The dismissals have been reportedly linked to suspicions of loyalty to the former regime or, in some cases, sectarian affiliations. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has terminated the appointment of 14 judges as senior public defenders across all Syrian governorates.
Participation and Transparency
The caretaker government has attempted to introduce various initiatives aimed at reassuring the public and encouraging participation at grassroots level. For example, it has published a dedicated link for complaints and objections regarding members of educational staff, and launched a private Telegram channel. However, no-one responded to the complaints submitted, making the initiative appear more formalistic than practical. In another example, the Damascus Governorate published Decision No. 28/1 on January 8, 2025, which established a committee to review grievances and complaints related to service providers and their municipalities. The decision excludes complaints currently under judicial review or those resolved by a judicial ruling.
New Governors:
In the first month after the fall of the regime, most of the figures appointed as governors of Syrian provinces by the new Syrian government were closely affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or loyalist factions. However, as the second month began, the caretaker government began reviewing the files of all governors. This led to the appointment of Muhammad Othman as governor of Latakia in replacement of Hassan Soufan, the appointment of former Minister of Interior Muhammad Abdulrahman as governor of Idlib, replacing Ahmad al-Sheikh and, the appointment of Ali Kada as Minister of Interior, replacing Abdulrahman.
Ali Kada had previously served as assistant interior minister for administrative affairs and public relations in the Salvation Government (SG). These changes reflect an ongoing evaluation process, and indicate that dismissals may continue. The government appears intent on maintaining appointments based on loyalty and ties to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with some factional appeasement evident—for instance, the appointment of Azzam Gharib (commander of al-Jabha al-Shamiyah, ‘The Levant Front’) as governor of Aleppo. Meanwhile, some governorates remain in a state of administrative vacuum. No governor has yet been appointed to Daraa, and in Sweida, the proposal submitted by the Sweida delegates to the Damascus government for the governorship has not been adopted.
The approach to dealing with the Syrian Red Crescent has been relatively different, with no freezing of its work or dismissal of its employees. However, the administration appointed a new president and canceled the contracts of some limited advisors, while maintaining its employees – unlike the dealings with other institutions, where engagements with the employees of state institutions were divided into three types:
- Employees were dismissed from their jobs, such as those at the Adliya (the Palace of Justice) in Latakia and the Directorate of Health in Daraa and, in response, organized sit-ins to protest their arbitrary dismissal.
- Employees were fully retained, with administrative adjustments made to the organizations they work for, such as the Syrian Red Crescent.
- Employees who became part-time employees, such as some employees of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, in order to hand over files they worked on during the Assad regime, with their long-term status to be decided later.
The overall approach to redundancies in civil government institutions was implemented as part of the administrative restructuring prompted – in part – by the presence of ghost employees on their payrolls.
In conclusion, it is evident that public administration and governance policies are marked by urgency and instability, and driven by a preference for internal loyalty. This is reflected in the ongoing policy of frequent appointments and replacements, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the dismissal or retention of employees. Such practices contribute to the continued absence of even the most basic governance practices. There is no doubt that transitioning toward state-building requires efforts to foster national participation for all, based on merit and experience.
Security and Military Monitoring
Idlib governorate experienced relative stability during the first and second weeks of January 2025, with no significant security or military incidents reported. There were also no reports of arrests or the emergence of new factions. However, on January 15, 2025, in Sarmada, two Syrians, including a boy, were killed in a drone strike believed to be affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) on the outskirts of the city of Sarmada in northern Idlib countryside. According to local reports, the drone shot four missiles at two individuals riding a motorcycle, one of whom was an amputee, on an agricultural road west of the city of Sarmada. The target was identified as Muhammad Fayyad Al-Dhiban, originally from the village of Sheikh Idris in the eastern countryside of Saraqib, north of Idlib. He had previously been active within the ranks of IS and lost one of his legs due to Global Coalition bombardment on IS positions in the eastern countryside of Hama, before relocating to northern Syria.
In Aleppo governorate, incidents escalated at the beginning of the year. On January 10, security forces arrested armed members of the former regime in the Al-Salehin police section. In the Tishreen Dam area, the Syrian National Army took control of the village of al-Qishla after clashes with the SDF. Additional clashes occurred on January 11, resulting in the death of one soldier and injuries to three others. Several cases of kidnapping were also reported in the areas of Al-Safirah and Al-Hamdaniyah. However, the intervention of Public Security led to the release of the kidnappers, most of whom were acting out of personal disputes. No cases of ransom demands or politically motivated kidnappings were announced.
In Latakia governorate, there was significant security activity. On January 9, police forces arrested a group of thieves involved in the theft of public property. On January 11, the public security command successfully freed a kidnapped citizen and arrested the perpetrators. Militarily, clashes escalated in the Ain al-Sharqiyah area. On January 13 a faction loyal to the former regime, led by Bassam Hussam al-Din, attacked a military barracks. The attack resulted in the killing of two security personnel and the kidnapping of seven others. Hussam al-Din appeared in a video threatening to execute the abductees if his demands for a complete withdrawal of security forces from Latakia’s mountainous region were not met. However, within a few hours, the security forces carried out a successful operation to free the abductees. The operation concluded when Bassam Hussam al-Din was killed while trying to detonate explosives to kill his hostages during the clash. It is noteworthy that Bassam Hussam al-Din was previously one of the most prominent commanders of the so-called ‘Mountain Lions’ battalion, which had received support from Air Force Intelligence.
In Tartous governorate, security efforts focused on arresting individuals involved in theft and looting. On January 6, the Ministry of Defense announced the merger of various military factions to enhance operations in the region. Clashes were reported in Khirbet al-Mu’azzah between the Military Operations Department and remnants of the former regime.
In Homs governorate, on January 7, 2025, Syrian security authorities announced the conclusion of a security campaign to sweep through several neighborhoods in the city of Homs, including Al-Zahra and Al-Abbasiyah. The campaign reportedly achieved its stated objectives and resulted in the arrest of several wanted individuals. In a statement, the director of public security in Homs confirmed the success of the campaign, which began earlier this month. Its focus was on searching for weapons depots used in illegal activities and arresting individuals who refused to hand over their weapons to settlement centers. The operation led to the arrest of numerous suspects; those found guilty were referred to the judiciary, while those proven innocent were released. Investigations are ongoing for others still under scrutiny. On January 8, the Military Operations Command (MOC) forces withdrew from the areas covered by the campaign, while Public Security Command checkpoints were maintained to ensure security and stability.
In Daraa governorate, intensive security operations continued against formations loyal to the former regime, mostly remnants of military or security groups affiliated with the Assad regime. No clashes with captagon traders were reported, as their activity has significantly decreased since the fall of the regime.
Since January 8, the MOC has arrested individuals involved in war crimes and drug trafficking in the areas of Al-Sanamayn and Ghabaghib, as well as northern Daraa. The Command also thwarted an attempt to form new armed groups in the northern countryside by recovering stolen weapons and arresting those responsible. On January 13, the town of Ghabaghib witnessed a security sweep aimed at disarming civilians in cooperation with local residents. The operation resulted in the seizure of significant quantities of cannabis.
In Quneitra governorate, Israeli ground forces advanced into the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) disengagement zone within Syrian territory, seizing key positions, including Quneitra and the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israeli forces would remain in the buffer zone for the foreseeable future to ensure national security. On January 9, Israel withdrew from the Yarmouk Basin area, but expanded its presence along the northern axes. By this time, the total area penetrated by Israeli forces increased from 303 square kilometers to 346 square kilometers.
In Damascus, on January 3, security authorities announced the discovery of a large warehouse containing narcotic substances inside the former regime’s security premises in the Kafr Sousse area. Large quantities of captagon pills, cannabis and alcohol were immediately destroyed. On January 5, security forces conducted a sweep of the Qudsaya area in the countryside of Damascus, targeting factions loyal to the former regime. The operation resulted in clashes with some militants. Security forces seized large quantities of ammunition and weapons and arrested several wanted individuals based on lists issued by the security administration, citing activities and violations they had committed prior to the fall of the regime.
On January 6, the Public Security Command announced foiling a plot by IS to blow up the shrine of Sayyida Zainab in the suburbs of Damascus. Security services successfully arrested the members of the cell involved and reaffirmed their commitment to protecting all components of the Syrian people and their sacred sites. Efforts to enhance security responses have continued across the board. The capital, Damascus, witnessed the graduation of a fresh assignment of Public Security Command forces on January 14, reflecting the ongoing focus on rehabilitating security personnel. Rapid response security units are being deployed ad hoc during the current period to address security vacuums in different areas across the governorate.
In Hama governorate, Syrian security services continued their campaigns in the western countryside, focusing on dismantling networks associated with the former regime. During combing operations in the western countryside of Hama, security forces seized large quantities of weapons and ammunition, which helped reduce the risk of reorganized armed activities. Efforts were particularly concentrated in areas such as Masyaf and Al-Suqaylabiyah.
In Deir ez-Zor governorate, there was an escalation in security incidents. On January 2, Public Security in the city of Deir ez-Zor arrested four people who were masquerading as fighters of the Military Operations Department and attacked civilians near the Al-Tamween roundabout. In Al-Bukamal on January 3, the Military Operations Command arrested more than a dozen people accused of killing two members of its forces. On January 5, the city witnessed a security campaign targeting a number of members of the National Defense Militia known for drug trafficking.
On January 5, the Sabikhan sub-district witnessed clashes between the Military Operations Command and the SDF, resulting in the injury of a civilian by SDF gunfire. On January 6, IS cells attacked an SDF post in the town of Jazrat al-Buhumaid, killing four SDF members. Additionally, clashes erupted in the town of al-Zaghir between the SDF and local residents.
In terms of ordinance left over from the war, mines have caused numerous explosions in various areas of the governorate. On January 1, a child was seriously injured in the town of As Salhiyah. On January 2, Muhammad al-Rajab, the leader of the Lions of the East faction, was killed in the Sabikhan desert due to a mine explosion. Injuries and explosions continued in the following days across several towns, including Khasham, Mazloum, and Mayadin.
The military situation remained complex, marked by ongoing clashes between Dawn of Freedom brigades and the SDF across various fronts, including along the Tishreen Dam. Meanwhile, the SDF intensified security measures against civilians in its areas of control within Raqqa and Al-Hasakah governorates. These events underscore the persistent security and military challenges on Syria’s northeastern fronts, stemming from the number and power of conflicting parties and the increased dangers posed by mines and armed organization cells.
Political and Social Monitoring:
- Political Monitoring
Syrian cities have seen several meetings of different political forces and parties. The current authority has not imposed any restrictions on political gatherings, the activities of political parties, or the opening of headquarters for them in the cities.
In terms of foreign policy, there has been significant diplomatic activity involving Damascus. The current government placed greater emphasis on external relations and international discourse – often at the expense of internal dialogue with the population. Meetings by the commander of military operations were limited to interviews with Al-Arabiya, CNN, and YouTuber Joe Hattab, while no official statements were made by Ahmed Al-Sharaa. The government’s external discourse, conveyed through diplomatic delegations and during visits, focused on three main objectives: lifting sanctions, advancing reconstruction efforts, and restoring relations with other countries to ensure they pose no threat to Syria. The international message also stressed the unity of Syrian territory and a firm rejection of any secessionist projects within the country. As for the internal political movement, no details regarding the national conference have been officially announced, despite persistent rumors about it. Little is yet known in terms of the objectives, invitation process and time of convening the conference, after a media blackout by the administration on this matter.
On January 6, 2025, the US Treasury announced exemptions to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria and temporarily ease sanctions for six months. This move may offer modest support to the new government in securing energy and food supplies for the country as a whole.
- Social Monitoring:
Community initiatives have blossomed, both from volunteer teams and local residents. Projects include cleaning streets, repainting shop fronts that had previously been painted with the red flag, and replacing them with the green flag. One of the most significant ongoing civil initiatives is the removal of garbage accumulated in neighborhoods, a result of municipal failures and poor regulation of waste collection. This phenomenon has been widely observed in cities across the country. Meanwhile, the authority has issued a decision requiring all civil society organizations operating in Syria to obtain re-licensing, subject to specific conditions. They have been given a six-month period after completing their initial license to allow for an evaluation of their work, before being granted a permanent license. The work of organizations continued uninterrupted after the decision was issued, with the exception of some organizations known to be affiliated with members of the Assad regime, such as the Qandeel Foundation in Rif Dimashq. Qandeel foundation is affiliated with Mazen al-Azb, the brother of Hikmat al-Azb, a member of the People’s Assembly and a member of the Baath Central Committee.
In this context, many institutions affiliated with the Assad regime’s army ceased their operations on their own and concealed their identities on social media platforms. This includes the Martyr Foundation, which had been responsible for assisting the regime’s wounded soldiers and militias.
In the realm of civil society organizations, their role remains largely confined to urgent relief efforts, as well as cosmetic campaigns in cities. These include initiatives such as painting streets and creating wall murals, as seen in the ‘We Returned, Syria’ campaign. This campaign, which involved several civil organizations—most notably the Syrian Civil Defense—also included efforts to clean parts of the Barada River in the capital. The most active organizations are those that previously operated in liberated areas, although their focus varies by city. Most activities are currently concentrated in Damascus, even among organizations that were formerly active in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib. This has resulted in an imbalance in community support, with events and projects being heavily centered in the capital while remaining largely absent from other cities. Meanwhile, the Madaniya Foundation convened a general conference in Damascus to discuss the experience of civil society during the pre-Assad fall phase, its anticipated role in the upcoming phase, and the challenges it faces moving forward. At the trade union level, unions have continued to operate, including those whose structures remain unchanged from the Assad regime era, such as the Union of the Chamber of Commerce in Syria.
There has been no systematic interference in personal freedoms – signalling no change in the authorities approach so far. However, some individual initiatives, unrelated to Public Security or the government, have carried out religious outreach campaigns in certain areas, such as Bab Touma and near the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, as well as near the Umayyad Mosque in Aleppo. In terms of press and media freedom, no cases of interference with local, Arab, or Western media have been reported. However, official channels and outlets remain inactive and absent from the media landscape.
- Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons:
Several cities witnessed the return of displaced persons to their hometowns and villages, particularly in the countryside of Damascus, with Darayya and Qudsayya being notable examples. The largest percentage of returnees were settled in Idlib and its surrounding countryside, as well as in the countryside of Aleppo. Additionally, there was a return of Syrian refugees from Jordan to their cities, particularly Daraa, with approximately 5,300 people recorded returning from Jordan to Syria in December 2024.
From a general perspective, political and social activities within Syria have continued without any restrictions from the authorities. However, the absence of official internal messaging has made frequent rumors about certain decisions—such as those related to the national conference—a focal point of public attention. This continued lack of internal clarity may lead to societal tension, as ambiguity leads to the spread of unverified information, much of which is often conflicting. Meanwhile, the caretaker government has prioritized foreign relations and shaping its international communications over clarifying the features of the next phase domestically.
Service, Livelihood and Economic Monitoring
The service and living conditions in Syria still require significant efforts to improve, and these can be categorized into several aspects as follows:
Electricity and Telecommunication Services
Electricity: Rationing hours remain unchanged. The Minister of Electricity in the caretaker government in Damascus stated that restoring electricity generation in Syria to pre-2010 levels would take three years and require an investment of up to $40 billion due to the extensive maintenance needed for the infrastructure and networks. He also noted that providing electricity for six to eight hours per day would take approximately two months.
Communications: Syriatel has begun installing coverage towers in the city of Idlib after a 10-year interruption. However, network coverage remains poor in most areas of the countryside.
Standard of Living and Salaries:
In an effort to alleviate financial burdens on the government in Damascus, the Minister of Economy declared that “the removal of full subsidies is tied to an increase in income and will be implemented gradually and, the amount of $120 is the minimum per month to provide a decent life for the Syrian citizen.” In this context, the Minister of Finance announced that the government will increase public sector employees’ salaries by 400% next month. This salary increase will help improve the standard of living for government employees, except for those who are set to be laid off. However, the removal of subsidies for certain essential goods amid the country’s challenging economic conditions will have a negative impact on broad segments of society, particularly those with limited incomes and individuals not employed in government departments.
In a related development, the Ministry of Finance issued a memo regarding the status of salaries for both active and retired military personnel. According to the ministry, military retirees from before 2011 will receive their full salaries after their nominal financial records are audited. However, for active and retired military personnel after 2011, their names will be submitted to human rights and legal committees for review and recommendations. This decision may lead to tension among many individuals who were dependent on these salaries, particularly as their value has already diminished. Some justify the decision by pointing out that the salary regulations included many beneficiaries and corrupt individuals. Others argue that the decision stems from the former regime’s army being responsible for numerous crimes and massacres against the Syrian people during the years of the revolution, thereby ensuring the exclusion of its members from new formations and even depriving them of their salaries. These procedures, lacking an acceptable rationale, may go far to frustrate the principles of transitional justice and do not contribute to achieving long-term stability.
Decisions, Fees and Taxes:
The Ministry of Finance issued three exemptions from fines, fees, and taxes, allowing taxpayers to benefit if they settle their dues before the end of March. This may facilitate the procedures for citizens affected and, at the same time, contribute to the swift collection of outstanding finances for the state treasury. Turning to trade tariffs, the Syrian government has issued a new list of customs duties and circulated it to all border crossings and ports. This decision has raised questions about its feasibility and impact, as it has negatively affected the northern regions that were outside the former regime’s control. However, it has contributed to lowering some prices in areas liberated after the fall of the former regime. It is worth noting that the issuance of customs tariffs should typically be governed by law and follow extensive studies conducted by specialists.
In a less protectionist move, the Minister of Oil announced that the private sector would be allowed to import petroleum materials into Syria, though their distribution remains restricted. While international bodies or companies can import oil, the distribution to various regions is strictly controlled by the Syrian government. This month three oil tankers, carrying a combined total of approximately 15,000 tons, were unloaded. The ministry also announced that fuel prices would be set in US dollars, which may lead to price instability if the exchange rate becomes volatile. Such fluctuations could, in turn, impact the prices of goods and products associated with fuel.
Average Prices of Key Food Items in Syria (January 1–15, 2025)
The prices of goods and foodstuffs have decreased in most areas of Syria compared to the period under the former regime. This decline is attributed to several factors, including the drop in the dollar exchange rate, the removal of security checkpoints that previously imposed royalties on goods, and the entry of products from neighboring countries such as Turkey and Jordan. However, a disparity in the prices of certain goods between governorates persists, driven by factors such as supply and demand, the presence of local or foreign competition, and the government’s adherence to a free market policy without regulating prices.
Table 1: Average Minimum and Maximum Prices of Basic Foodstuffs in Syrian Governorates
During the Monitoring Period
Table 2: Average Prices of Gold and Foreign Currencies in Syria
