During the workshop on the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its lessons, held by the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies on June 11, 2024,[1] I reflected on the words of Professor Ahmet Alibašić from the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo and Professor Emir Hadžikadunić from the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. Professor Alibašić stated, “In 1992, we said: ‘We sacrifice peace for justice.’ Then we came back four years later and said: ‘We sacrifice justice for peace.’” The war taught them the crucial lesson of the importance of restoring peace and stability. This prompts us Syrians to ask: What lessons can we draw from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience? More importantly, what have the 13 bitter years of the ongoing Syrian war taught us?
I still vividly remember the events of the Bosnian civil war, which we closely followed during the first half of the 1990s. The intervention of Europe and the United States in the Bosnian conflict was largely driven by strategic interests rather than purely humanitarian motives. The West aimed to support the weaker party not just to ensure justice, but also to weaken the Eastern Bloc and its allies, including by cementing the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In 1990, Yugoslavia was a medium-sized state with a population of nearly 23 million and played a significant role among the non-aligned countries during the Cold War. The breakup of Yugoslavia resulted in six small countries—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia—and the Kosovo region, each of which needed external support to survive. The West then imposed a liberal political model on these newly formed countries.
Europe and the United States encouraged the peoples of Yugoslavia to demand independence, quickly recognizing the countries that emerged from the Yugoslav Federation. Several Islamic countries—including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—encouraged Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina to secede, with some, like Saudi Arabia and Iran, providing material support and weapons. Meanwhile, Russia, preoccupied with its internal problems, was unable to support the Serbs.
In Syria, as in other Arab Spring countries, the West quickly supported what appeared to be a third wave of democracy. Following the Latin American wave in the 1980s and the Eastern European wave in the 1990s, the Arab Spring initially seemed, at the start of the 2010s, to herald a new era of democracy and liberalism. However, the complexities within Arab countries hindered this democratic transformation, leading instead to severe turmoil, particularly in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, followed by Sudan.
During the aforementioned workshop, Dr. Alibašić said: “Until 1987, no Yugoslav, regardless of their background, could have imagined the wars and events that would unfold. Since 1945, Yugoslavs of all sects shared a common culture and level of education, with socialist ideology being dominant. There were no prominent sectarian, nationalist, or religious fanaticisms, and none of us cared about each other’s religion or sect. Yet, within just five years, everything was turned upside down.”
The incitement of nationalist and sectarian sentiments catalyzed the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. This incitement originated from emerging local leaders eager to assume leadership positions within their groups, using nationalist and religious fervor as a convenient tool. The general population, facing difficulties in their lives before 1990, aspired for change, driven by the “dream” or illusion that Western-style liberalism, of which they only knew fragments from the news, would bring prosperity to all. Latent nationalist and religious sentiments, suppressed during communist rule, began to resurface and resonate among the people. The ambitions of local leaders, combined with the people’s desire for change, fueled these sentiments, which began to define each group in opposition to the others. This combination of factors led to demands for independence, imbued with nationalist and religious overtones.
The main event that significantly inflamed nationalist sentiments and led to the outbreak of war in Bosnia was the local elections of 1991. These elections were held at the level of the entities composing the Yugoslav Federation, before elections were held at the central Yugoslav level and before establishing a new, elected central authority to replace the former Yugoslav government. This sequence of events, encouraged by the West, incited separatist nationalist sentiments. After the elections, the local political parties that won shifted their programs to support secession and independence. In contrast, establishing an elected Yugoslav central authority first would likely have strengthened tendencies to remain in the Yugoslav Federation on newly agreed-upon foundations.
The reality in Syria before 2011 was different. The decline of nationalist and leftist ideology, which had been dominant between the 1950s and 1960s, began in the 1970s. In its place, religious, sectarian, tribal, and local affiliations grew, reaching their peak in 2010, although the regime suppressed any expression of these affiliations. Polarization in Syria began with the March 1963 coup, which brought a group of Nasserite and Baathist junior officers to power. After internal conflicts and purges, power ended up in the hands of junior officers from minorities, especially Alawites, who ruled under the Arab Socialist Baath Party. This culminated in Hafez Assad seizing power in 1970. The regime took on a sectarian character and, sensing a lack of legitimacy, stripped traditional Sunni-dominated classes and groups of political power and wealth through agrarian reform and the nationalization of private companies, also eroding their social status. The new rulers surrounded themselves with a security apparatus and an army loyal to them, establishing an oppressive security system.
Their actions fueled religious and sectarian sentiments, leading to several conflicts, starting with the Hama events in April 1964 and continuing with clashes between the Fighting Vanguard, the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the regime from 1977 to 1982. This period witnessed the Artillery School massacre in Aleppo and the Hama massacre in February 1982. Though circumstances prevented these movements from achieving widespread success, sectarian tensions smoldered beneath the surface. This situation laid the groundwork for the growth of sectarianism in Syria during a time characterized by a political and intellectual vacuum following the decline of nationalist, leftist, and socialist thought. Sectarianism was further fueled by petrodollars, whether through direct funding, particularly from Saudi Arabia, or the remittances of hundreds of thousands of Syrians working in the Gulf countries.
Therefore, it was not surprising that the popular opposition movement that began in March 2011 against Assad’s regime initially took on a subtle sectarian hue. The regime provoked religious feelings among the demonstrators to promote the sectarian character of the conflict, believing this would divide its enemies and ensure its survival. The intervention of Iran and its affiliated militias, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq, and the Fatimiyyoun and Zaynabiyyoun from Pakistan and Afghanistan, further fueled sectarianism. The sectarian tendencies of the opposition combined with the efforts of the regime and its allies, transforming the Syrian uprising into a civil war. Sectarianism was the catalyst that turned the Syrian uprising into a civil war.
Nearly 2,000 Islamic jihadist and Salafist fighters came to Bosnia, with Croatia facilitating their entry and the passage of material aid and weapons to the Bosnians, supported by Europe and the United States. According to Professor Alibašić, these jihadists were “hostile to democracy and the civil state, and wanted to establish a religious (Islamic) state, while we, and our leader Alija Izetbegović, wanted to build a modern, democratic, secular state. In essence, they were a mixture of terrorists, spies, and fanatics.” However, the Bosnian leadership managed to control them, preventing significant harm, though their presence had a negative impact overall.
In Syria, droves of jihadists and Salafists from all over the world entered, in numbers far greater than those in Bosnia. Since 2012, large numbers of Islamic fighters, both Arabs and foreigners, have flowed into Syria, including veterans from Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Egypt, and other conflicts. Their entry transformed the national character of many factions that initially took up arms during the first year of the Syrian uprising into an Islamic and later jihadist character, as seen with groups like Al-Nusra Front. The regime bolstered the presence and role of these Islamic factions by releasing hundreds of Syrian jihadists from its prisons, many of whom were spies for the regime and Iran. The presence of Salafist and jihadist factions took on dangerous international dimensions when the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria. This prompted US President Obama to form an international coalition and declare war on ISIS, shifting the international community’s focus from the political transition in Syria to eliminating the imminent terrorist threat.
External actors played a decisive role in ending the war in Bosnia, and its location in Europe significantly contributed to the urgency with which Europe and the United States sought to bring the conflict to a close. In contrast, Syria’s location in the Middle East, coupled with its proximity to Israel, influenced the prolongation of the war, devastating Syria and contributing to the broader chaos in the region. Henry Kissinger’s famous quip – “It is not in the interest of the United States to solve any problem in the world, but rather it must manage it in a way that serves American interests” – seems applicable to the Syrian case. Additionally, the concept of “creative chaos,” theorized by former US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the George W. Bush administration, reflects one of the strategies and patterns in American foreign policy.
The civil war in Bosnia was not a proxy war; external actors unified to support the weaker side in the conflict. In contrast, the Syrian war saw external actors divided into multiple groups. Supporters of the opposition were split between the Turkey-Qatar and Saudi Arabia-UAE axes. On the other hand, Iran and Russia backed the regime with a coordinated approach, while Europe and the United States each pursued their own policies. In Bosnia, external parties recognized the anti-Serb Bosnian side as a unified and organized force with integrated political and military leadership. Consequently, they provided it with material, military, political, and media support. In Syria, however, supporters of the opposition gave aid to numerous fragmented factions, each lacking central military or political leadership and a unified program. The supporting countries did not consolidate these factions into a single, effective group, nor did they work to integrate their political and military leadership. This fragmentation has persisted, and to this day, it remains the prevailing condition and the primary challenge.
The countries supporting the Bosnians were unified in their goals and methods: they aimed to help the Bosnians achieve independence and counter the Serbs, who were superior in both numbers and equipment. In contrast, the countries supporting the Syrian opposition had a fragmented agenda. They were divided into two main fronts: Turkey and Qatar on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were concerned that a political Islam movement might seize power in Syria if Assad and his regime fell. For the Bosnians, their goal was clear: to gain independence, end the civil war, and protect themselves from the Serbs who sought to maintain control and preserve the unity of the country. In Syria, however, the uprising lacked a unified program accepted by all factions, despite documents issued by the National Council and the Cairo Conference. The factions that dominated the conflict had conflicting agendas, ranging from building a modern democratic state to establishing a medieval religious state.
In terms of hunting war criminals, the international community was more effective during the Bosnian war compared to the Syrian war. However, even in the Bosnian conflict, efforts were insufficient. Trials were held for only a small number of war criminals, and many escaped prosecution and accountability. In contrast, the international community has struggled to unify its stance on pursuing Syrian war criminals, despite the horrific nature of their actions, due to vetoes by Russia and China. The experiences from the Bosnian war and other civil conflicts suggest that expanding prosecution to include everyone who committed a crime can trigger additional conflict and hinder the restoration of civil peace. However, these experiences also highlight the importance of documenting war crimes and making efforts to bring major war criminals to international justice. The trials of some Syrian war criminals in European countries, such as Germany and France, underscore the necessity and importance of thorough documentation.
The experience of the Bosnian war demonstrated that, despite the War Crimes Court’s efforts to prosecute and convict a small number of war criminals, its achievements were limited relative to the scale of the crimes committed. Nevertheless, the Court remains symbolically significant, and documenting war crimes is crucial. However, war crimes courts and transitional justice processes alone do not ensure societal peace. It is ultimately impossible to try and convict everyone who committed crimes deserving punishment due to the sheer number of perpetrators, which hinders national reconciliation. Moreover, many perpetrators may argue that they were following orders. Historically, no civil or international conflict has seen all those who committed crimes tried and convicted. For example, during World War II, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 60 million people, only a few hundred Nazi leaders were prosecuted. Thus, it is essential to condemn senior officials who issued orders to ensure that major war criminals are held accountable. This raises important questions: What happens to those who profited from war through plunder, kidnapping, drug manufacturing, and trafficking? Can they be tried and held accountable, or will they be allowed to become the new rulers of society? If they are not held accountable, what kind of society will emerge from their dominance, and how can reconstruction be achieved by those who are inclined toward destruction?
Despite the international community’s support for the Bosnian side against the Serbs, it maintained a relatively balanced stance and proposed, even imposed, a solution that was not entirely in favor of either side. The Dayton Agreement, for instance, divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which comprises 51 percent of the country’s territory, and Republika Srpska, which comprises 49 percent. The international community’s motivation for this division stemmed from the understanding that societal peace cannot be achieved through a zero-sum approach, where one party wins everything and the other loses everything.
Serbian cantons are shown in red, Bosnian cantons in green, and Croatian cantons in blue.
In Bosnia, NATO forces compelled the Serbs to accept the terms of the Dayton Agreement, and I still recall the intensity of the bombing they endured. While it was Europeans and Americans who inflicted significant losses on the Serbs, they ultimately crafted a relatively balanced solution. In contrast, in the Syrian case, the West largely ignored Russia’s intervention in September 2015, which shifted the balance in favor of the regime. This regime, known for its intransigence and extremism, refused to consider any political solution, even at its weakest moments. Ultimately, the opposition was told, “You are the losers, and you must accept this outcome.”
The international community successfully imposed a solution in Bosnia, but a similar resolution for Syria remains elusive. Iran and Russia, which support the regime, continue to demand that the regime receive everything, citing the opposition’s defeat in the war. Meanwhile, Europe and the United States have rejected Russia and Iran’s conditions but have not taken effective steps to achieve a solution. The Arab position is also ambiguous. Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially supported the survival of Assad and his regime, fearing that political Islam might gain control in Syria. They took steps to normalize relations with him, promising that he distance himself from Iran and remain open to a political solution that includes the opposition, in line with UN Resolution 2254. However, both countries quickly discovered that the Assad regime was either unable or unwilling to honor its commitments. At the same time, they fear the regime’s collapse, which could pose significant risks.
Syria divided into four areas of control, each controlled by a de facto authority.
The dilemma in Syria is that the opposition to Assad and his regime has failed to present a viable alternative that is both acceptable to the West and sufficiently organized. As a result, key international, regional, and Arab stakeholders have become convinced that the regime’s collapse could lead to chaos similar to that which occurred in Libya. Meanwhile, the regime and its backers insist that the opposition must accept the regime’s conditions and rehabilitate it. However, it is widely acknowledged that societal peace cannot be achieved with the pre-2011 regime, let alone with conditions that are even harsher than those from before 2011. Imposing the regime’s conditions for a solution will merely keep the conflict simmering, as the remaining authority will remain dependent on external support, particularly from Iran. This situation effectively results in an Iranian mandate over Syria under the guise of supporting Assad and his regime, a reality that is already unfolding. Therefore, political transition is essential for stability in Syria, but the conditions necessary for such a transition are still lacking.
Understanding the Bosnian war experience reveals that restoring civil peace requires solutions developed within Syrian society itself, through consensus and compromise among Syrians. Mahmoud Badinjki quoted Lakhdar Brahimi in September 2012, addressing a group of opposition members in Cairo: “The upcoming danger is much greater than the past… The issue is in your hands, and there are those who say otherwise… Lebanon’s war lasted 15 years, and despite the international community’s efforts, they did not succeed. The solution eventually came from the Lebanese themselves.” When the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats failed to reach an agreement among themselves, European and American pressure led to the imposition of a solution at Dayton. US mediator Richard Holbrooke was more than just a mediator; he imposed his conditions on all parties. In November 1995, he gathered Bosnian, Serb, and Croat representatives at a military base near Dayton, along with representatives from France, Germany, Britain, Russia, and the United States. He told them, “Agree, or else…” and secured an agreement within just 21 days of negotiations. In contrast, Syria has seen a UN mediator with no real power. Over ten years and several negotiation rounds, including the Russian-led Astana and Sochi tracks, little progress has been made. The respected UN envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi resigned, sensing that the United States and Russia were not committed to ending the conflict. Despite this, Staffan de Mistura and his successor, Geir Pedersen, continued their missions for years without significant achievements, drawing high salaries throughout the process. During the Geneva negotiations between the opposition and the regime in early 2014, Brahimi expressed his frustration to the opposition, stating he would not tolerate deceit or procrastination. He refused to waste time while Syrians were being slaughtered, declaring: “I will not accept trading in the blood of the Syrian people. The international community must bear responsibility and produce results, but I will not bear responsibility.” He placed the blame for the failure of the negotiations squarely on the Russians and Americans.
Under the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia was placed under a form of international trusteeship, with international peacekeeping forces deployed to oversee its implementation. The agreement granted various international organizations the authority to monitor, supervise, and enforce its terms. The NATO-led Implementation Force, which took command from the UN Protection Forces on December 20, 1995, was responsible for the military aspects of the agreement. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was tasked with organizing the first free elections in 1996. Nevertheless, Bosnia still grapples with the shortcomings of the Dayton Agreement.
Without mutual agreement among Syrians, external forces may impose their own vision on the country. Many local and international observers now believe that, due to Syrians’ inability to reach consensus, some form of trusteeship may be necessary. At the same time, Syria will require assistance from regional and Arab countries for political stability, security, and reconstruction. The Bosnian war experience demonstrates that reaching an agreement among Syrians requires each party to acknowledge its past actions as a step toward mutual acceptance and consensus. Additionally, it is crucial to “bury” the sites of crimes to prevent future generations from being consumed by revenge. However, these sites cannot be “buried” until a consensus is achieved and each party feels sufficiently satisfied to move forward.
In the Bosnian war, which took place in the context of Yugoslavia, the political regime tightly controlled society and citizens’ initiatives, leaving little room for civil political and social work. The populace had no traditions of active civil engagement. When the Eastern Bloc disintegrated and individual and societal movements gained momentum, everyone rushed to participate, despite their limited experience. In an atmosphere of sectarian tension, it was easy for leaders skilled in sectarian mobilization to rally citizens to their cause. Consequently, these leaders came to dominate the conflict, directing it largely according to their ambitions and personal views.
In Syria, the situation was similar but more complex, as the opposition was fragmented into multiple groups rather than a single unified party. This fragmentation led to disastrous results. Therefore, it is crucial to activate the role of Syrian citizens by engaging them actively and effectively. Citizens should monitor the actions of their leaders, apply pressure to ensure leaders act in the broad interest of the public, and prevent warlords from solely controlling agreements and settlements. This requires energizing civil and political society, initiating change from the grassroots level, and organizing institutions so that Syrians have a voice and a role in shaping their present and future. The Syrian public should not wait for solutions to come from above, as leaders often prioritize their own interests over the country’s future. Ordinary people are generally more capable of reaching agreements, whereas the selfish interests of political and religious leaders can complicate consensus and lead to manipulation.
Despite the return of approximately 780,000 refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war caused significant changes in the region’s demographic composition. Some areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina have become less ethnically diverse than before the conflict. Residents of neighborhoods with diverse religious and ethnic communities often chose to stay in more homogeneous areas. In contrast, over 13 years of conflict in Syria have created a new reality, leading to the birth and growth of generations who are unfamiliar with their parents’ pre-war society, except through the parents’ news and memories. The scale of displacement in Syria is vast: Over five million people have been displaced within the country, another five million have sought refuge in neighboring countries, and more than a million have fled to distant countries in Europe, Australia, and America. This means that more than half of Syria’s population is currently living outside their homes, making the task of addressing the crisis significantly more challenging and costly. The experiences from the Bosnian war, as well as other conflicts, indicate that compensation for returning citizens who suffered major losses will be limited. Efforts to find aid and resources for reconstruction will indirectly address these losses.
Bosnians initially viewed the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war, as a temporary measure. They accepted some of its shortcomings with the hope that, once the situation stabilized, they could renegotiate and improve the terms. However, it became clear that what they had anticipated as a temporary agreement evolved into a long-term arrangement due to the difficulty of reaching a consensus on amendments. This experience offers a valuable lesson for the Syrians. It is crucial to ensure that any agreement made is comprehensive and suitable for the future. Amending such an agreement later will be challenging, making it essential to carefully consider the content and long-term consequences of any temporary agreement from the outset.
One of the most crucial aspects of the agreement is its provisions on public freedoms. The constitution must ensure that people have the right to move, organize, express themselves, and establish rules for fair elections. This framework is designed to prevent any single authority from exerting absolute control and to regulate the parliament’s operations and decision-making mechanisms. The goal is to have a truly effective parliament, not a decorative one like Syria’s People’s Assembly, and to prevent any minority from disrupting its functioning. Granting veto power to any minority can lead to parliamentary obstruction and create opportunities for political manipulation, as seen with Lebanon’s experience of the obstructing third. At the same time, it is essential to guarantee minority rights through constitutional provisions, laws, and practices that reflect genuine intentions. The new system should be a parliamentary one, avoiding the presidential system to which Syria has been subjected for decades. Tunisia’s current semi-presidential system demonstrates the complications that can arise, underscoring the importance of moving towards a more effective parliamentary structure.
Restructuring the army and security forces in Bosnia did not present a major problem due to the presence of UN forces, which implemented the Dayton Agreement and facilitated the process. In contrast, restructuring the army, security, and militias in Syria is far more complex. The Syrian regime’s army is dominated by Alawite officers and includes several key military units with an Alawite character. This army, along with sectarian militias formed and brought into Syria, is associated with killings, displacement, destruction, and massacres. Despite the regime’s efforts to create national defense militias from other sects, the most influential militias are sectarian, particularly those from Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which are predominantly Shiite. Removing foreign militias, disbanding local militias, and managing the effects of restructuring the army are significant challenges if an agreement on restructuring is reached. A major hurdle is convincing the Alawites to relinquish their controlling role over the army and security forces. Additionally, the fragmentation and lack of leadership among opposition factions pose another challenge to reaching an agreement. With so many faction leaders, Turkey, which has control over the armed opposition factions, must play a crucial role in facilitating a consensus among them. Even if a consensus is achieved, the large number of armed individuals from both sides will present a significant challenge in securing employment opportunities for them; otherwise, they may be reluctant to give up their weapons.
Elections in Bosnia were relatively straightforward, largely due to the involvement of an international body that managed, rather than just monitored, the process. Monitoring alone is often ineffective. In Syria, however, the conditions are not conducive to a near-term resolution. UN Resolution 2254 calls for elections and a new constitution, but general elections could significantly impact Syria’s future. According to the regime’s agenda, presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2028, which is four years away. The regime is considered the legitimate authority in Syria by international forums, despite its incomplete legitimacy. The current constitution does not allow Assad to run for re-election. Consequently, Assad has two options: Amend the existing constitution with the approval of the current People’s Assembly, or push the Constitutional Committee to draft a new constitution to gain international legitimacy. This new constitution would likely adhere to the presidential system, allowing for two presidential terms of seven years each. In this scenario, Assad would be able to run and likely win the elections, regardless of international monitoring. Even if an international body manages the elections, Assad’s victory seems almost certain. The opposition is politically fragmented, militarily weak, financially strained, and lacks a cohesive program. The disarray within the opposition, combined with its failed governance of controlled areas and its Islamic orientation, makes it unlikely that a viable competing candidate would emerge. Therefore, the most viable path for Syria may be to adopt a parliamentary system. This would enable society to better express itself and advance its voters’ interests, forming a parliament with real power to select and hold the prime minister accountable, while the president retains only formal powers.
In conclusion, policies based on narrow sectarian and ethnic interests fail to provide effective solutions. Instead, inflaming sectarian, religious, or nationalist sentiments can destabilize societies and disrupt societal peace. The civil war in Bosnia benefited from conditions that facilitated effective international intervention. By contrast, the conditions surrounding the Syrian war led to regional and international involvement that contributed to its continuity. Our comparison reveals that state interests, rather than higher values, principles, or ethics, often dictate policies towards conflicts. European and American intervention in Bosnia was effective and aimed at ending the war swiftly. However, their approach to Syria has focused on managing the war’s continuation, driven by concerns over potential chaos if Assad were to fall, given the lack of a viable alternative to lead the country. In Bosnia, the unity of opposition forces—both militarily and politically—provided a reliable alternative to protect them. In contrast, the Syrian political opposition remains fragmented, lacking a cohesive political program. The competition among supporting regional powers has further contributed to this fragmentation, turning the Syrian conflict into a proxy war, unlike the Bosnian conflict. Bosnia’s geographic distance from Israel and its lack of concern for it worked in its favor.
Nevertheless, despite the conflict lasting just four years, Bosnia still grapples with the war’s effects and has achieved only limited social reconciliation nearly three decades after its end. In Syria, where the war is ongoing, the future remains uncertain and could potentially worsen. The war’s impacts are likely to persist for decades.
[1] See report at: https://2u.pw/NC5GXGph
