With the intensity of military operations in Syria on the wane, there has been a growing discussion, both at official and social levels, regarding the potential repatriation of Syrian refugees. This discourse is particularly prominent in neighboring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan), where significant numbers of Syrians have sought refuge to escape the perils of the prolonged Syrian war. In Lebanon, with its substantial refugee population numbering 831,000, the question gains particular prominence. Local forces in Lebanon have initiated racist campaigns against Syrian refugees. Similarly, in Jordan, which hosts 675,000 refugees, the government is exerting pressure on the Assad regime to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. Even in Egypt, where there was a hospitable attitude towards Syrians at both the governmental and popular levels, there is a recent emergence of discussions on the presence of Syrian refugees. Some factions in Egypt are now advocating for their return to Syria.
As for Turkey, the issue of Syrian refugees (approximately 3.3 million)[1] has taken on additional complexities, particularly as it became a focal point in electoral conflicts between the ruling coalition and the opposition. Despite being fundamentally a humanitarian concern, the refugee issue has been manipulated for political purposes. This has resulted in social, administrative, and psychological pressures on Syrian refugees, exacerbated by racist campaigns orchestrated by certain groups. These campaigns spread unfounded rumors, distorted facts, and attributed Turkey’s economic, social, and political woes to the presence of Syrians. Consequently, the government has tightened legal procedures for both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees. Despite numerous studies and analyses affirming the positive impact of refugee presence, the Turkish opposition insists on characterizing Syria as “safe” and argues that the reasons for hosting Syrians in Turkey are a thing of the past. They openly advocate for the return of Syrian refugees to their homes, claiming it is necessary to prevent further division within Turkish society.
To address and counter this argument, the straightforward response is that the proposition holds merit only under circumstances conducive to a secure and voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their original homes, once the factors necessitating asylum have ceased to exist. Until those reasons for seeking asylum are eliminated, such a return remains unfeasible.
This paper explores the potential for Syrian refugees, both in Turkey and other host countries, to return to their homes. We also examine the conditions necessary for a secure and voluntary repatriation process.
1) The Size of the Problem
While handling the refugee crisis would be straightforward if the number of Syrian refugees worldwide were in the thousands, the ongoing Syrian war has resulted in an overwhelming situation. Since 2011, nearly eight million Syrian refugees have sought shelter in 45 countries.
Undoubtedly, addressing this substantial refugee population requires meeting various material and political prerequisites, alongside significant investments, to facilitate their voluntary and secure return. This challenge is particularly formidable given the widespread destruction of Syria’s infrastructure and capacities across various domains due to the ongoing war.
While there may be varied motivations behind displacement and seeking asylum, the primary reasons for refugees were the regime’s violence, destructive practices, and security persecutions. Consequently, the return of these refugees is intricately tied to the elimination of the factors that compelled them to seek refuge in the first place.
In 2021, the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies undertook various studies examining the political,[2] security, military,[3] economic, social,[4] legal, and legislative factors[5] influencing the potential return of Syrian refugees. These studies involved a systematic analysis of responses from a sample of Syrians residing in Turkey, shedding light on the reasons for their asylum. The figure below[6] illustrates the responses from this refugee sample regarding these reasons:
2) The Willingness of Syrian Refugees to Return
The extent of Syrian refugees’ desire to return to their homes is a recurring theme in local Turkish discussions. Logically, it can be inferred that the majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey express a strong desire to return to their homeland. This eagerness is contingent upon the availability of conditions that ensure a safe and voluntary return, providing an acceptable standard of living and dignity. The living conditions for most Syrians in Turkey are deemed distressing, falling short of offering comfort in terms of income levels, job nature, prolonged working hours, and unfair working conditions. Additionally, issues such as bullying of their children in schools, discriminatory treatment by police and government departments, and social tensions in their residential areas contribute to a lower quality of life compared to their pre-migration experience in Syria. The prospect of return becomes more attractive when considering the opportunity to reside in their own homes and lands, surrounded by family, relatives, familiar surroundings, cultural context, and their home country. It’s noteworthy that 53% of Syrian refugees in Turkey still possess property in Syria, while Syrian refugees generally lack property ownership in Turkey,[7] except for a numerically insignificant minority within the business class. To delve into the acceptable conditions for return, which will be elaborated on later, is crucial for understanding the dynamics shaping the desire of Syrian refugees in Turkey to reclaim their homes.
The Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies conducted a poll in 2021 to gauge the inclination of Syrian refugees in Turkey towards returning to their homeland. The findings, published on the center’s website, revealed that “a substantial majority of the respondents (75.6%) expressed a willingness to return to Syria. However, their willingness was contingent upon two key conditions: a change in the current ruling regime and the cessation of security persecutions, which pose a genuine threat to potential returnees. This concern is underscored by documented instances of individuals returning, only to face arrest or even fatal consequences.”[8] Further analysis of the poll indicates that the primary factors influencing the decision to return revolve around the assurance of basic living necessities. Specifically, respondents expressed the need for secure employment opportunities, the availability of essential services, and the fulfillment of material and service requirements for daily life—essential elements that are currently lacking in their homeland. The data implies that addressing these fundamental needs is crucial to fostering a favorable environment for the majority of Syrians contemplating a return to their homeland.
On the flip side, there is a smaller subgroup that may be reluctant to repatriate. Having spent over a decade in Turkey, numerous Syrian refugees have successfully forged a new life for themselves, enrolling their children in Turkish schools and universities. For this particular segment, Turkish has become their primary language, making relocation a formidable challenge. This challenge is compounded for those whose homes in Syria were decimated, and who lack property there. Moreover, there exists a considerable number of individuals who actively opposed the regime and engaged in peaceful demonstrations. Fearing arrest and forced disappearance, these people are apprehensive about returning, given the notorious practices of the Syrian security services. Adding to the complexity are thousands of entrepreneurs who have established thriving businesses in Turkey. For them, the prospect of replicating the same level of success and prosperity in Syria appears unlikely. However, a subset of these businessmen may consider returning if a political resolution is reached, leading to reconstruction efforts that promise abundant job opportunities, investments, and business prospects.
The following figure[9] provides a concise overview of the responses from a sample of Syrians regarding the conditions for their potential return to Syria. These insights were gathered through the opinion poll conducted by Harmoon Center.
3) Reasons for the reluctance or challenges associated with returning
3.1. Lack of Housing
The availability of housing is a fundamental element for secure and respectable living, and numerous studies and reports emphasize the extensive destruction that occurred in residential neighborhoods where protests took place. Entire neighborhoods in cities and towns, particularly those that became sanctuaries for Free Army factions opposing the regime’s violence, faced severe destruction. This was notably observed in areas like Daraa, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and their rural areas, as well as the northern countryside of Latakia. The conflict resulted in the destruction of approximately 328,000 homes rendered uninhabitable, with an additional 600,000 to 1 million homes suffering varying degrees of damage.[10] This devastation extended beyond homes, encompassing critical infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and essential facilities in these areas. The residents of these regions sought refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, and as a consequence, the majority of these refugees lack ready homes, adequate school buildings for their children, and sufficient hospitals and clinics for healthcare services. The war-induced destruction and forced displacement triggered significant transformations in the Syrian real estate landscape. Entire neighborhoods and towns ceased to exist, with few landmarks remaining, and the years of conflict brought about substantial alterations in the local real estate landscape. The regime and de facto powers played a role in reinforcing this reality, driven by a combination of political, military, and economic objectives.
3.2. Insufficient conditions for living in dignity in Syria
UNOCHA reports state that about 15 million Syrians are in need of assistance, and that “At the end of 2022, almost 7 out of 10 people in Syria needed assistance…. Humanitarian indicators in Syria continue to deteriorate. Basic services are collapsing, there is an ongoing cholera outbreak, economic indicators are worsening, and climate and human-caused shocks are compounding an already dire situation, making people even more vulnerable.”[11]
Field research conducted by a Harmoon Center team revealed that a mere 3.5% of the sampled respondents managed to acquire a sufficient amount of energy sources. In stark contrast, 96.5% confirmed their inability to meet their essential energy needs. The scarcity of energy sources extends beyond its economic implications, reaching into the realms of lifestyles and societal values in Syria, particularly in areas controlled by the regime. The continuous decline in the per capita share of energy sources, coupled with elevated levels of rationing, has had a profound impact on the overall activities of Syrian families and individuals. This is attributed to the active and central role of energy in daily life. Consequently, novel and unfamiliar social models have emerged, influencing personal behavior, dietary patterns, education, grooming practices, and mobility, as well as social interactions within families and with relatives and neighbors.[12]
The field study mentioned above revealed that 52% of Syrians have a diet that is largely lacking in meat, animal proteins, fruits, and sweets, placing it in the low category. Another 32% indicated that their diet falls into the average classification, as it includes meat, fruit, and animal protein in quantities less than necessary. Only 16% reported having a good diet.
The study also indicated that 57% of Syrians currently have fewer than three meals a day. Among them, 29% have two meals a day, 6% rely on only one meal, 14% alternate between two and three meals, and 8% alternate between one and two meals.
These statistics reveal that approximately 15% of Syrians residing in areas under regime control belong to a self-sufficient class. Additionally, one-third of the Syrian population lives in poverty, with approximately 50% experiencing extreme poverty. Many of these individuals rely on either remittances from relatives abroad or humanitarian aid distributed through the United Nations. Numerous reports indicate that the distribution of relief aid is being manipulated by the regime.
Furthermore, the insufficient availability of schools for students is a pressing issue, primarily due to the widespread destruction caused by the war. Many schools have been repurposed as military sites or makeshift shelters for displaced families. Notably, in cities like Palmyra, Douma, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa, a significant number of schools are non-operational. Across several cities, nearly one-third of educational facilities remain defunct, exacerbating the challenges faced in providing adequate education.
The challenging living conditions within Syria are contributing to the escalation of alarming phenomena in Syrian society. This includes a surge in suicide rates, an increase in violent crimes, a rise in family-related offenses, a widespread occurrence of thefts, the proliferation of drugs and addiction, elevated rates of divorce and spinsterhood, a spike in unemployment, the prevalence of child labor, and a notable increase in school dropouts.
Due to a lack of medical care, poverty, and limited access to energy sources, the harsh conditions in Syria give rise to various health challenges. During cold periods, respiratory diseases, joint issues, and rheumatism become more prevalent. Conversely, in times of extreme heat, respiratory and intestinal diseases, including epidemics like cholera, spread. Additionally, impoverished families face difficult decisions, such as whether to purchase medicine for their sick relatives or provide them with nutritious food. The study highlights that 48% of Syrians refrain from visiting the doctor, opting instead to buy medicine directly from pharmacies. This decision is often based on an online self-diagnosis or personal experience factors. Moreover, 17% of Syrians have resorted to traditional treatments involving folk prescriptions and herbal remedies to circumvent the high expenses associated with conventional medications.
In this context, the Syria TV website reported statements made by the former director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Shafiq Arbash, during an interview with Radio Sham FM, which has close ties to the regime. According to Arbash, the poverty rate in Syria surged to 90% between 2020 and 2021, as per official statistics that have not been released by the Syrian regime. Arbash further disclosed that statistics, jointly conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the World Food Program, indicate that approximately “8.3% of families face severe food insecurity, while 47.2% experience moderate food insecurity. Additionally, around 39.4% enjoy acceptable food security but remain vulnerable to shortages in the event of any shocks related to rising prices.”[13] A field survey conducted by Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies revealed that a significant 71% of residents are contemplating emigration due to the adverse economic and living conditions, the precarious security situation in regime-controlled areas, and a lack of optimism regarding improvements in their circumstances.[14]
3.2. Lack of safe return conditions
The report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, issued in September 2023, confirms that “Grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law continued across the Syrian Arab Republic, in government-held areas and areas controlled by non-State actors, during the first half of 2023. The humanitarian and economic situation continued to deteriorate, with over 15 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance.”[15]
Compulsory military service stands as a significant impediment to the repatriation of young refugees. Both the Syrian regime and the PYD organization, which governs the eastern Euphrates region, mandate compulsory military service for young men for several years. The prospect of returning Syrian youth entails subjecting them to mandatory military service and involvement in the persistent civil conflict in Syria.
Reaching a decision for the safe and voluntary return of individuals necessitates the presence of a fair legal framework and an efficient, unbiased judiciary that operates independently from the influence of security services—qualities currently lacking in any region of Syria. Moreover, such a decision requires the annulment of numerous laws, decrees, and regulations enacted by the regime, both prior to and after 2011.[16] Chief among these is the so-called “Anti-Terrorism Law” and the Terrorism Court, both of which are selectively applied against dissenting voices. These laws and courts are characterized by arbitrary measures and predetermined verdicts influenced by security services. It is evident that realizing these conditions is unattainable under the current regime, and such goals can only be realized within the context of a just political settlement in Syria.
A recent study conducted by Refugee Protection Watch, a coalition of NGOs dedicated to working with Syrian refugees and conducting research on protection and safe return, reveals that Syria remains unsafe. The organization conducted interviews with hundreds of refugees in Lebanon and returnees inside Syria. The study unequivocally asserts that “Syria is not a safe country for the return of its citizens, according to United Nations standards, and does not meet the conditions for a safe or dignified return.”[17]
3.3. Lack of political conditions
In 2011, Syrians took to the streets with the aim of achieving political change and transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Demonstrations witnessed the active participation of millions, encompassing individuals across various age groups. Despite efforts from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to dissuade Assad from using excessive force to quell peaceful protests, the regime remained intransigent. Notably, the regime rejected the Arab League initiative in the fall of 2011, subsequently dismissing all United Nations resolutions. In response to the regime’s brutal security measures in early 2011, several hundred thousand Syrian youths took up arms to protect their families from attacks by regime forces, militias, and supporting Shiite militias. Consequently, a significant number of them became targets for the Syrian security services, notorious for their harsh methods. Zaman al-Wasl website estimates that around one and a half million Syrians are wanted by the security services, with the website featuring a search engine for the names of these individuals.[18]
The Harmoon Center study, as mentioned above,[19] delved into the perspectives of Syrians regarding a voluntary and secure return to their homes. Through the responses gathered from a sample of Syrians, the study revealed varying conditions for return. Figure 11 encapsulates the summarized answers provided by the respondents in the sample.
3.4. The resistance of the regime and its allies against the return of Syrian refugees to their homes
The regime adamantly refuses to permit the return of refugees to areas under its control, and there are three primary reasons for this intransigence:
- The regime, responsible for the destruction of housing and infrastructure, faces financial bankruptcy, preventing it from ensuring the essential needs like minimum income, job opportunities, education, health services, electricity, and fuel for the return of a significant number of refugees. The regime argues that the repatriation of a large number of refugees would impose a burden too overwhelming for it to handle.
- Those who sought refuge in neighboring countries, especially residents from areas where anti-regime demonstrations occurred and became battlegrounds, faced devastating bombings by the regime using planes, artillery, and tanks. Homes, buildings, and entire neighborhoods were destroyed, resulting in the loss of over half a million Syrian lives. Consequently, the regime perceives these refugees as enemies and potential threats even if they wish to return peacefully at present. Therefore, it opposes their return, fearing the potential danger they may pose in the future.
- The third and arguably the most crucial reason is that the regime and its allies aim to keep the matter of refugee return in limbo, posing an ongoing challenge for multiple countries. The regime will persist in deploying this strategy until Assad has been accepted and rehabilitated, imposed sanctions lifted, and reconstruction assistance initiated. Currently, achieving these objectives is unattainable. Consequently, the regime adamantly opposes the return of any refugees at this point.
As part of its strategy to present itself as a responsible state, the regime, in collaboration with Russia, has been hosting an international conference on the return of refugees and displaced Syrians since 2017. The fifth round of this conference concluded its activities in Damascus on Thursday, October 20, 2022, during a joint meeting of the “Syrian and Russian Coordinating Bodies.” The regime’s Foreign Minister, Faisal al-Miqdad, declared, “Syria’s doors are open for the return of all refugees and displaced persons. All relevant parties are diligently working to make this a reality, ensuring their return to the homes from which terrorism has forced them out.”[20]
In his speech during the opening session of the International Conference on Syrian Refugees on November 11, 2020, Bashar al-Assad asserted that “the Syrian government is actively striving to facilitate the return of millions of refugees who fled the war in their country. However, he emphasized that the efforts of state institutions are being hindered by Western sanctions, thereby complicating the execution of these plans.”[21]
Upon examining the outcomes of the previous four sessions of the international conference on refugee return, initiated in 2017, it becomes evident that no substantial returns have occurred. The persistence of unfavorable conditions suggests that such returns are unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.
The regime’s unyielding stance against the return of Syrian refugees becomes apparent through Lebanon’s unsuccessful attempts to repatriate them. Despite the close ties between the Lebanese and Syrian regimes, and Lebanon’s persistent efforts, including official requests and meetings, to convince the Syrian regime to allow the return of some refugees, the regime remained steadfast in its refusal. Even when Lebanon forcibly repatriated a few thousand refugees, the regime responded by arresting some of them, aiming to instill fear among others. Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party and a prominent Druze leader, emphasized that “achieving the collective return of displaced Syrians is unlikely as long as the regime in their home country continues to reject their repatriation.”[22]
On May 1, 2023, Jordan hosted a regional consultative meeting, bringing together the heads of diplomatic delegations from Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. The primary focus of discussions centered on the crucial issue of facilitating the voluntary and secure repatriation of Syrian refugees, deemed an “absolute priority” by the participating countries.[23] Preceding this gathering, Jordan had engaged in numerous meetings and communications aimed at coordinating the return of Syrian refugees. However, the outcomes of these efforts mirrored those of Lebanon, where the practicalities of repatriation were met with resistance from the Syrian regime. Despite official statements that seemed to evade the issue, the challenges in facilitating the return of Syrian refugees persisted.
5.3. The situation in northern Syria
However, the regions of northern Syria, which have fallen outside the control of the Damascus regime, lack suitable conditions for a voluntary and secure return. Specifically, in the expansive region east of the Euphrates, encompassing vital resources such as oil production areas, agricultural lands, and abundant water resources, control lies with the PYD Kurdish forces. Remarkably, the PYD organization adamantly opposes the return of any Syrians to the territories under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of residents to Turkey and Iraq. Notably, the organization prohibits any Syrians from visiting or residing in the areas it controls. Consequently, this region cannot be considered as a viable option for accommodating the return of refugees from the surrounding areas.
As for the territories controlled by the self-styled “National Army,” they are densely populated and already strained, unable to accommodate additional numbers. The regions of northern Syria have absorbed hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals from Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Daraa, resulting in an overwhelming population density. According to the Syria Response Coordinators, the population in the northwestern regions, spanning three areas (Idlib and its surroundings, the Euphrates Shield region, and the Olive Branch region), has surged to 6,017,052 people. Displaced individuals, both within and outside camps, make up 49.32% of this total population. Specifically, 4,000,708 people reside in housing, which includes 209,838 individuals with special needs. Additionally, 2,016,344 people inhabit 1,873 camps, shelter centers, and spontaneous settlements, with 83,784 individuals having special needs within these environments.[24]
In addition to grappling with overpopulation, the region faces a severe shortage of job opportunities. Response coordinators in northern Syria report an alarming general unemployment rate of 88.65%. Moreover, a staggering 90.93% of the population in this area lives below the poverty line, with 40.67% of families experiencing hunger, particularly exacerbated by the halt in international aid.[25]
Hence, sending more individuals to northern Syria is not feasible, and if new housing projects are initiated, displaced individuals currently living in tents should be prioritized. It is crucial that the repatriation of Syrian refugees takes place specifically to their original homes from which they were displaced, rather than to any other locations.
Conclusion
Currently, the conditions are not conducive to the voluntary and secure repatriation of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Essential factors such as housing, job opportunities, income sources, and even basic education and health services are lacking. Additionally, there is a lack of political stability that would shield returnees from potential reprisals by the regime. The overall conditions within Syria are deemed inhospitable. Notably, a study by the Harmoon Center highlights a growing trend of migration from areas under regime control since 2019, particularly towards Europe. This escalating migration, especially among the youth, poses a threat to the future of Syria both as a nation and as a people.
The realization of a voluntary and secure return for Syrian refugees hinges on a political resolution founded on a transition to a new political system. This system should aim at reinstating Syria’s unity and coherence, grounded in democratic principles, human rights, values of citizenship, and the peaceful transfer of power through democratic processes. This ideal scenario would be characterized by an atmosphere fostering public freedoms of expression and organization. Nevertheless, the attainment of such a solution remains a holy grail of sorts.
Works Cited
- “An opinion poll conducted by Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies in August 2022 examined the sentiments of Syrians residing in Turkey regarding the prospect of returning to their homeland.” https://bit.ly/3u9dmSy
- “Repercussions of Energy Source Scarcity on Living and Social Patterns in Syria, Particularly in Regime Controlled Areas,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, January 2023. https://bit.ly/3U76HDk
- “Security and Military Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, May 2012. https://bit.ly/3U1ZXqb
- “Socioeconomic Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, June 2012. https://bit.ly/3vDnqDL
- Al-Abdallah, Samir, “Migration from areas under Syrian regime control after 2019,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, September 2022. https://bit.ly/4aZ7093
- Al-Aita, Samir, “Urban Recovery Framework in the Field of Housing after the Conflict in Syria: A Preliminary Methodological Material, Social, and Economic Perception,” September 2020. https://bit.ly/48HLxA6
- Syria Response Coordinators, https://bit.ly/3U6d1dW
- Syria TV website, “Official statistics: The poverty rate in Syria surged to 90% between 2020 and 2021,” May 24, 2022. https://bit.ly/422YSQI
- Syrian Arab Republic | OCHA (unocha.org)
- Turkish Ministry of Interior website. https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638
[1] As of December 5, 2023, the count of individuals classified under temporary protection status in Turkey stood at 3,274,059 Syrians. https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638
[2] “Political Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, May 2021. Accessed on November 15, 2023. https://bit.ly/4aWIm9b
[3] “Security and Military Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, May 2021. Accessed on November 15, 2023. https://bit.ly/3U1ZXqb
[4] “Socioeconomic Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, June 2021. Accessed on November 17, 2023. https://bit.ly/3vDnqDL
[5] “Legal and Legislative Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, June 2021. Accessed on November 12, 2023. https://bit.ly/3S813y4
[6] “Security and Military Determinants,” op. cit.
[7] An opinion poll conducted by Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies in August 2022 examined the sentiments of Syrians residing in Turkey regarding the prospect of returning to their homeland. Accessed on November 11, 2023. https://bit.ly/3u9dmSy
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Samir Al-Aita, “Urban Recovery Framework in the Field of Housing after the Conflict in Syria: A Preliminary Methodological Material, Social, and Economic Perception,” September 2020. Accessed on November 12, 2023. https://bit.ly/48HLxA6
[11] Syrian Arab Republic | OCHA (unocha.org)
[12] “Repercussions of Energy Source Scarcity on Living and Social Patterns in Syria, Particularly in Regime Controlled Areas,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, January 2023. Accessed on November 13, 2023. https://bit.ly/3U76HDk
[13] Syria TV website, “Official statistics: The poverty rate in Syria surged to 90% between 2020 and 2021,” May 24, 2022. Accessed on November 15, 2023. https://bit.ly/422YSQI
[14] Samir Al-Abdallah, “Migration from areas under Syrian regime control after 2019,” Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, September 2022. Accessed on November 15, 2023. https://bit.ly/4aZ7093
[15] Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.” Microsoft Word – 2314788E.docx (un.org)
[16] Since 2011 onwards, the regime has enacted over 50 laws and decrees directly impacting the security, lives, and property of refugees, capitalizing on their absence and limited ability to protest or document. Some of these measures pertain to the ownership of extensive areas under the pretexts of development, organization, slum engineering, and reconstruction. Over the years, a multitude of circulars and counter-circulars, often contradicting the constitution, have been issued, causing confusion among both refugees and non-refugees. This influx of regulations has made it challenging to comprehend and keep up with these directives. See “Socioeconomic Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons,” op. cit.
[17] Cited in Ibid.
[19] “Security and Military Determinants Influencing the Repatriation of Syrian Refugees and Displaced Persons.” Op. cit.
[20] “A conference for the return of Syrian refugees concludes in Damascus. The regime claims the return of 5 million,” Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, October 20, 2022. Accessed on November 20, 2023. https://bit.ly/4aX7Mnb
[21] “President Bashar al-Assad’s speech during the opening of the International Conference on the Return of Syrian Refugees,” Sputnik Arabic, November 11, 2020. Accessed on November 20, 2023. https://bit.ly/3U7YnmK
[22] “Jumblatt: The collective return of displaced Syrians remains unattainable due to the Assad regime’s rejection,” Baladi News, March 18, 2019. Accessed on November 14, 2023. https://bit.ly/3vBjbZo.
[23] “Three Questions to Clarify the Circumstances of the Current Pressure for Syrian Refugees to Return Voluntarily to Their Country,” Al Jazeera, May 3, 2023. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://bit.ly/3HnQlye
[25] Ibid.
